SecurityDriver News

Although an advertisement for the armored car company Centigon, this is a good and I would imagine expensive video depicting a vehicle attack. Not sure of level of protection and the type of rounds fired etc.

Got this email from Sean Wang of International Armored Group, Sean was responding the May 9^th VR Armored Vehicle Classification Post

Sean wanted to elaborate a bit more on the issue. Here is what he had to say.

 Basically, the BRV 2009 VR7 certificate validates the vehicle armoring design by putting the vehicle through live ballistic testing.  Anyone can basically purchase certified ballistic steel and ballistic glass and install it on a vehicle, the challenge lies in the design and integration of the armoring so that the passenger cabin is fully sealed to prevent penetration from any projectiles.  Also, please note that under the BRV 2009 standard, VR7 is equivalent to the B6 level of armoring, not B7.  This is a common misconception due to the change in nomenclature.

In my opinion the only way to test an armoured vehicle is by shooting at the vehicle. As you can imagine this is expensive. The manufacture destroys the vehicle in the testing process. Take a look at the videos at the end of the article.

 I also wanted to mention that the blast testing is not a part of the BRV 2009 standards, which strictly covers ballistic threats.  Most of our armored vehicles are being used for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq where explosives are the most prominent threat.  Many organizations require certain levels of blast protection as well for their vehicles, which is the reason why we conducted additional testing even though it was not necessary to obtain the VR7 certificate.

 Sean sent along couple of demonstration videos of our vehicle ballistic and blast testing – I’m impressed.

The International Armored Group Web Site

Sean’s email sean.wang@interarmored.com

Malcolm Cheshire asked, via LinkedIn – “What is the VR armored vehicle classification and how does it differ from the other classifications”

 This is what I came up with

This is taken from an article I read.

  In order to address the issue of full vehicle certification, the VPAM BRV 1999 standard   was initially created, ranging from VR1 to VR7 (equivalent to B1 to B7 level of    protection).  Since then, a new and updated standard called the VPAM BRV 2009 (VR1 to  VR10) has been created with more stringent testing requirements.  The VR certification requires the entire armored vehicle to be subject to a comprehensive destructive testing process with multiple shots on the vehicle to ensure that the armoring will withstand the appropriate type of ammunition that it is rated for.

The most notable difference between the BRV2009 and BRV 1999 is that under the new standard, the firewall, windscreen, side panels, rear, gaps/apertures, and roof areas can be shot from any angle, whereas the older standard only required test shots to be fired from a 90 degree angle (45-60 degree angle for the roof).

The testing is still conducted by Beschussamt Mellrichstadt. This is the 2009 Standard - you will have to go to a computer translator to get in English.

A UN report on the assassination of Pakistani Prime Minister Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto has been widely circulated. It is fairly long, 54 pages. I have taken the section that deals with the “Day of the Assassination”. When we have some time we will offer our opinion of what happened and developed a lessons learned. In the interim I am sure the the community would welcome any comments. It’s long but filled with good info.

 “The Day of the Assassination”

Departure from Zardari House for Liaquat Bagh

86. Around 1400 hours, Ms Bhutto left Zardari House, for Liaquat Bagh, in a convoy of vehicles. The convoy consisted of a black Toyota Land Cruiser used by Mr Tauqir Kaira, followed by Ms Bhutto’s white armoured Land Cruiser and two of Mr Kaira’s vehicles on either side of Ms Bhutto’s vehicle. The latter two were a Mercedes-Benz van on the right and a four-door double cabin vehicle on the left.

Immediately behind those vehicles were two Toyota Vigo pick-up trucks, positioned side by side. A black Mercedes-Benz car was behind these Vigos. This Mercedes- Benz, from Zardari House, was bullet-proof and served as the back-up vehicle for Ms Bhutto. The two Vigo pick-up trucks were also from Zardari House.

87. Mr Kaira was inside the lead vehicle with his security men. Accompanying Ms Bhutto in her vehicle were Mr Javed-ur-Rehman (driver, front-left seat), SSP Major (ret) Imtiaz Hussain (front-right seat), Makhdoom Amin Fahim (senior PPP member, second row-left seat), Ms Bhutto (second row-centre seat), Ms Naheed Khan (senior PPP member and political secretary of Ms Bhutto, second row-right seat). Seated in the back of the vehicle on two benches facing each other were Senator Safdar Abbasi (senior PPP member, rear-right bench), Mr Shahenshah (rear-left bench, facing

Senator Abbasi) and Mr Razaq Mirani (personal attendant of Ms Bhutto, rear-right bench next to Senator Abbasi and to his left). Mr Kaira’s two vehicles on either side of Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser carried his men. The Vigo pick-up trucks carried members of Mr Chaudry Aslam’s security team. Riding in the black Mercedes-Benz car were the driver, PPP official Mr Faratullah Babar in the front passenger seat and, in the rear passenger seat from left to right, two PPP officials Mr Babar Awan and Mr Rehman Malik and General (ret) Tauqir Zia.

Arrival at Liaquat Bagh

88. Ms Bhutto’s convoy reached the Faizabad junction at about 1415 hours, according to the Rawalpindi District Police, who were to assume responsibility for security of the convoy. According to the police and the Security Plan, an escort was to be provided composed of a traffic police “pilot” jeep, a regular police jeep leading the convoy and three Elite Force Toyota pick-up trucks protecting Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser on three sides. People in Ms Bhutto’s vehicle claim, however, that there was no such escort except for one traffic police vehicle.

89. At about 1456 hours, Ms Bhutto’s convoy turned right at the Murree Road – Liaquat Road junction and headed towards Liaquat Bagh. Video footage shows Ms Bhutto’s convoy driving from the Murree Road – Liaquat Bagh junction to the inner security gate leading to the VIP parking area at Liaquat Bagh. The footage shows Ms Bhutto standing through the roof escape hatch of her Land Cruiser and waving at the large crowd around the vehicle while it moved slowly on Liaquat Road.

90. Both ASP Ashfaq Anwar who was the supervisor of the Elite Force unit and Inspector Azmat Ali Dogar, the unit’s commander, told the Commission that they accompanied Ms Bhutto all the way to the back of the stage according to the Security Plan. However, video footage and pictures show that as Ms Bhutto drove on much of Liaquat Road, her vehicle was flanked only by her private security vehicles. The Elite Force vehicles were nowhere near her vehicle. In fact, the Commission has identified Inspector Dogar among the crowd some distance from Ms Bhutto’s vehicle.

Contrary to the police assertion, there was no police-provided box formation around Ms Bhutto as she arrived at the rally, and the Elite Force unit did not execute their duties as specified in the security deployment. Furthermore, the Commission does not believe that the full escort as described by the police was ever present.

91. At about 1516 hours, Ms Bhutto’s convoy stopped for a few minutes at the inner gate of the parking area waiting for that gate to be opened, during which Ms Bhutto remained standing through the escape hatch. The police and some PPP members disagree as to the reason for the delay in opening the gate. While the PPP asserts that the police did not have the key to open the gate, the police said that they did not want the large crowd following Ms Bhutto to get into the VIP parking area.

Altogether, Ms Bhutto stood through the escape hatch for the approximately 20 minutes it took to drive from the Murree Road – Liaquat Road junction to the gate of the parking area. This calls into question the claim of the Rawalpindi District Police that they were surprised when Ms Bhutto emerged from the escape hatch on her way out of Liaquat Bagh.

92. Once the convoy passed through the inner gate, at about 1531 hours, it drove through the VIP parking area to the rear of the stage. At least the following three vehicles were in the VIP parking area: Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser, Mr Kaira’s lead vehicle and the black bullet-proof Mercedes-Benz car. Temporary wooden stairs had been built for the rally to access the rear of the stage directly from the parking area.

Ms Bhutto climbed the stairs, went to the stage to wave to the crowd and took her seat before addressing the crowd.

93. Near the rear of the stage, a scuffle broke out between some workers of the PPP and police who tried to prevent them from climbing to the stage. This created tension between PPP workers and the police officers posted in that area. Accounts given by PPP representatives and the police with regard to the degree and nature of this event differ significantly. The police state that the dispute was minor and was settled immediately, whereas some on the local PPP side claim it was serious and led to bitter reactions from the police during the rest of the rally. They say that the police felt insulted and became more passive in their security role. The Commission finds that the police were indeed passive in their provision of security and believes it unprofessional if the Rawalpindi District Police reduced their level of alert to any degree as a result of wounded pride.

Exit from Liaquat Bagh

94. Several thousand people attended the event. Ms Bhutto was joined on the stage by a number of national-level PPP leaders and all of the parliamentary candidates from Rawalpindi district. The crowds were enthusiastic, and PPP leaders and activists considered the event to have been a great success. They say Ms Bhutto gave a strong and rousing speech, one of the best of her campaign, and describe her as having been radiant that day.

95. The public gathering concluded and, at about 1710 hours, Ms Bhutto descended the wooden stairs and entered her Land Cruiser. The occupants of the Land Cruiser and their seating positions were the same as for the trip in to Liaquat Bagh. The composition of passengers in the black Mercedes-Benz car also remained the same.

96. The black bullet-proof Mercedes-Benz car was the first to leave the parking area. It is not clear how much distance there was between this vehicle and the rest of Ms Bhutto’s convoy at the moment of the blast. Credible reports range from 100 meters to 250 meters. Some of those in the car said that they were close enough to Ms Bhutto’s vehicle to feel the impact of the blast. Others at the site of the blast have said that the Mercedes-Benz left Liaquat Bagh so quickly that it was nowhere to be seen when the blast occurred. Indeed, the Commission has not seen this vehicle in the many video images of the exit area it reviewed. Despite the acknowledgement of some occupants of the vehicle that they felt the impact of the blast, the Commission finds it incredible that they drove all the way to Zardari House, a drive of about 20 minutes, before they became aware that Ms Bhutto had been injured in the blast.

They should have stopped at a safe distance when they felt the blast so as to check on Ms Bhutto’s condition, the condition of her vehicle and whether the back-up vehicle was required. Indeed, as the back-up vehicle, the Mercedes-Benz car would have been an essential element of Ms Bhutto’s convoy on the return trip even if the occupants of that car had confirmed that Ms Bhutto had been unscathed in the attack.

97. Mr Kaira’s vehicle was the next to leave the inner parking area after the Mercedes-Benz car, with Ms Bhutto’s vehicle right behind it, followed by another of Mr Kaira’s vehicles. The two Vigo pick-up trucks then followed from the outer parking area located between the inner and outer gates.

98. At 1712 hours, Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser exited from the outer gate. Crowds of people who were already on Liaquat Road drew closer to the vehicle as it began to turn right onto Liaquat Road. In addition, many people left the park, swelling the crowd around the Land Cruiser, contrary to the police assertion that they did not allow anyone to leave the park before the departure of Ms Bhutto’s convoy. Ms Bhutto emerged through the escape hatch of the vehicle and started waving to her supporters. When the vehicle approached the central road divider, it was slowed further by the crowd.

99. Major Imtiaz, who was sitting in the front seat of the Land Cruiser, said that he was worried that the convoy was being slowed down by the crowd. He wanted to call CPO Saud Aziz by cell phone, but he did not have the CPO’s direct number. Instead he called CPO Saud Aziz’s operator and the operator at the police station in Multan, another town in Punjab Province (where Major Imtiaz had recently served). The Commission finds that this lack of preparation was a major flaw in the security arrangements and reflects badly on the professionalism of Major Imtiaz who should have had full and rapid access to the Rawalpindi police command.

100. Questions remain as to the nature of the crowd that gathered around the Land Cruiser. Passengers in the Land Cruiser and some local PPP members recalled that they were mostly PPP workers, and they did not see any strangers or irregular movements among them. The Rawalpindi District Police and other PPP members, however, suggested that a group of people had deliberately stood in front of the Land Cruiser to prevent it from moving. Regardless of the accuracy of either account, it remains that the police did not control the crowd outside of Liaquat Bagh. As a result, the attacker was able to get as close as he did to Ms Bhutto’s vehicle.

101. The Rawalpindi police authorities and some PPP workers dispute the exact exit route agreed for Ms Bhutto’s convoy. The Rawalpindi District Police and DCO Elahi claim that the planned route for the convoy was to turn right onto Liaquat Road and then left onto Murree Road, retracing the convoy’s entry route. Only in case of an emergency was the convoy to make a left turn after exiting from the outer gate; a decision to take the emergency route had to be made by the senior police officer in charge of security on the scene. Some local PPP workers who attended the preparatory meeting with the police disagree with this account. They claim that the original plan was to make a left turn onto Liaquat Road and that the minutes provided by the DCO, which did not indicate this left turn, were inaccurate. In any event, photographs show two stationary police vehicles on Liaquat Road blocking the left- side drive lane where the left turn would have been made. As a result, even in an emergency, it would have been impossible for Ms Bhutto’s convoy to make a left turn and use the escape route unless those police vehicles were quickly moved. The Commission learned that these vehicles were official vehicles of senior Rawalpindi police officers. The Commission finds it irresponsible that these vehicles were parked in such a way as to block the emergency exit route.

102. The Rawalpindi District Police claim that police vehicles from the Elite Force unit headed by ASP Ashfaq Anwar were waiting outside the outer gate to escort Ms Bhutto’s convoy and that they were about to go into a protective box formation when the attack on Ms Bhutto took place. However, forming the box at this point was impracticable given the narrow width of Liaquat Road and the number of people who had already started to surround Ms Bhutto’s vehicle. In any event, video footage shows very few uniformed police on the scene available to push back the crowd to create space for the box formation. Furthermore, video and photographs taken shortly before the blast as well as Commission interviews indicate that the Elite Force unit was not in position to go into a box formation. The Elite Force unit was in place neither for the entry nor the exit of the convoy and did not afford the protection they were tasked with, thus failing spectacularly in their duty.

103. Overall, video and photographic materials as well as the Commission’s interviews establish that there were very few police deployed outside the outer gate and on Liaquat Road as Ms Bhutto’s convoy attempted to depart the scene.

The Attack

104. From the exit, Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser started to make a right turn onto Liaquat Road. As it slowly approached the central divider on Liaquat Road, the crowd began chanting slogans. There is some dispute over whether Ms Bhutto made the decision to stand up on her own or was urged to do so. Before she stood up, Ms Bhutto asked Ms Naheed Khan to make a phone call to Mr Nawaz Sharif, PML-N leader, to convey condolences for the deaths of some of his supporters who had been shot during the PML-N rally earlier that day. It had been reported that the shooting incident occurred between supporters of the PML-N and those of the PML-Q parties.

105. While Ms Khan was trying to reach Mr Sharif, Ms Bhutto stopped her and asked Senator Abbasi, who was sitting in the rear seat, to chant slogans to the crowd using the vehicle’s loudspeaker. Ms Bhutto then stood on the seat and appeared through the escape hatch, with her head and shoulders exposed.

106. Ms Bhutto waved to the crowd. The vehicle continued to move slowly into its right turn onto Liaquat Road. At this point, a man wearing dark glasses appeared in the crowd on the left side of the Land Cruiser. Around 1714 hours, while the vehicle continued into its right turn, the man pulled out a pistol, and from a distance of approximately two to three meters, fired three shots at Ms Bhutto. According to video analysis conducted by Scotland Yard, the three shots were fired in less than one second.

107. The Commission examined video footage taken from a back angle, which shows Ms Bhutto’s dupatta, her white head covering, and her hair flick upwards after the second shot. However, there is no evidence of a link between the second shot and that movement. After the third shot, she started to move down into the vehicle.

108. After the third shot, the gunman lowered the gun, looked down and then detonated the explosives. At the time of the blast, the gunman was near the left rear corner of the vehicle. Video footage shows that at the time of the explosion, the Land Cruiser was still making the right turn. The Scotland Yard team’s analysis shows that it took 1.6 seconds from the time of the first shot to the detonation of the bomb.

In the Land Cruiser

109. Ms Naheed Khan recalled that immediately after she had heard the three gunshots, Ms Bhutto fell down into the vehicle onto her lap. Ms Khan said that she felt the impact of the explosion immediately thereafter. The right side of Ms Bhutto’s head came to rest on Ms Khan’s lap. Ms Khan saw that Ms Bhutto was bleeding profusely from the right side of her head. She noticed that Ms Bhutto was not moving and saw that blood was also trickling from her ear. Makhdoom Amin Fahim recalled that Ms Bhutto fell heavily and showed no sign of life after falling.

According to Scotland Yard’s video analysis, the flash of the blast appeared just over two-thirds of a second after Ms Bhutto disappeared from view.

110. No one else in her vehicle was seriously injured.

Transfer to the Hospital

111. After the explosion, Senator Abbasi told the driver to drive to the hospital (initially having in mind a hospital in Islamabad). Although all four of its tires were punctured by the blast, the Land Cruiser managed to drive along Liaquat Road for approximately 300 meters towards the junction with Murree Road where it turned left. As the Land Cruiser moved along Murree Road, it became increasingly difficult for the driver to manoeuvre on the metal rims of the wheels. The Land Cruiser made a U-turn at the Rehmanabad junction, located approximately four kilometres from the Liaquat Road-Murree Road junction, in order to get to the other side of the road where Rawalpindi General Hospital (RGH) was located. The occupants of the Land Cruiser recalled that at this point there was only one traffic police vehicle ahead of the Land Cruiser. No other vehicles were visible – neither the bullet proof black Mercedes-Benz car nor any Elite Force unit vehicle. Following the U-turn, the Land Cruiser stalled. The party had to wait for some time on Murree Road until a private vehicle that belonged to Ms Sherry Rehman arrived and took Ms Bhutto to the hospital.

Derek Humble – an old friend (old describes most of my friends) sent me a film clip from a movie called “Year of the Gun” It is the movie version of the Moro ambush – if you are doing training it is a great learning tool.

 Derek’s info

www.nemesisinfo.com

A good article/outline about motorcade accidents, although I do think the authors may have an axe to grind.

In the process of a putting together an iPhone Application about vehicle attacks I came across this You Tube video. It is a re-enactment of the 1978 Moro kidnapping.  At the time, the kidnapping of the highly respected elder statesman of Italian politics, Aldo Moro, shocked the world. This incident would be similar to the kidnapping of one of our former Presidents. Although the Moro attack occurred more than 30 years ago it is still a lesson learned scenario.  

This event (plus the Schleyer ambush) had a profound effect on the security community. To gain an understanding of the historical significance of this attack we need to examine the security industry the 70’s.

Some History – During the 1970’s these types of attacks had been occurring often in South America, the prevailing attitude was that it would never spread beyond those borders.  Although the terrorism experts at the time (there were maybe three of them), had all been predicting this type of attack was going to spread, and become prolific. No one paid much attention to them, and the general feeling was that the terrorist were not that good – and that if you put a guy with gun sitting next to the chauffer, and maybe some guys with more guns in a vehicle following the boss the problem is solved. At the time the general thinking of the non security community was that the enemy was not that smart.  The following is an actual comment from an executive “After all we are dealing with unsophisticated rabble”.

 Lessons –  Moro was one of the attacks that brought to light that terrorist actually plan what they do. You can see from this re-enactment that these guys, and girl, had their act together.

This was one of the attacks that made the “powers to be” come to the conclusion that –

 Having guys with guns with the boss doesn’t solve the problem – it creates a different problem

 We ought to train those guys that are protecting the principal – drivers and shooters should be trained to drive and shoot

Armored cars are a good thing – we are talking about 1970’s armored cars that were a lot less sophisticated than they are now.

The protection team was expendable

 This is a question – not a comment – have things changed that much in thirty years?  What do you think?

This is an article which I assume comes from a BMW Press Release. It is about the 2009 BMW AX Security Plus. As with other Press Releases I have seen from BMW it is written for the non security market.

 From the Press Release:

 “It is the first vehicle produced by a high-volume manufacturer to offer a security concept aimed at lessening the danger of attacks using the world’s most widely used handgun of the type AK 47”.

Mercedes and a few others manufactures have vehicles that meet that need.

 The vehicle is made in the Spartanburg plant in South Carolina; I’m not sure what I think about that.

 Like the other BMW press releases it mentions the seams and gaps in the AX Security Plus are armored, it has a spall proof windshield, and the suspension has been modified, like all that is something extra when in fact it is mandatory.

All the above does not take anything away from the vehicle. I did not see a price but, once you read through the marketing BS it is one hell of a vehicle.

BMW has announced their new High security Vehicle. The press release repeatedly uses the word unique to describe components and the manufacturing process.  Most of what is mentioned as “Unique” in our eyes is not unique. Reinforcing shock mounts, and tuning the suspension to accept the added weight is not unique. I know Mercedes has been doing it for years, and I think BMW has also been doing it for years. The car’s seams and gaps are all armored, that is not unique that’s mandatory.  Also the press release goes on to mention that the glass has “a unique level of resistance” I hope that means it stops the bullets it was designed to stop. Our guess would be that the press release was written by the ad folks whose goal was to try to explain the vehicle to John Q Public – who does not need or can’t afford the vehicle.

All the above does not negate the fact that this is one hell of an armored vehicle. If driving in a high risk environment, this is the kind you’ll need

http://www.bmw.com/com/en/newvehicles/7series/security/content.html

From an article by Joe Autera  jautera@vehicledynamics.net 

and Tony Scotti  tonyscotti@securitydriver.com

1 – Surveillance Detection is Critical

The most import issue is Surveillance Detection. In both the attacks it is apparent that surveillance of the target and the route played a critical role in the attack planning process. My 35+ years working in the armpit places of the world tells me that in many situations surveillance detection is not just the best protection; it may be the only protection. That is why it has become essential for security providers to learn how, when and where an attacker is likely to conduct surveillance as well as how to plan, manage and conduct effective surveillance detection operations.

2 – You Need the Right Tools for the Job

You need to have the right equipment – in our world that usually means a vehicle that can do the job. In a high risk environment doing the job is defined as an armored vehicle that will stop whatever rounds it is they are going to shoot at you. If you are in a Level 4 vehicle and they are firing Level 7 rounds, it’s is like taking a knife to a gunfight.

3 – The Attack Begins Long Before the First Gunshot

If your day is interrupted by the pitter patter of rounds hitting the windshield, it is not the first time the bad guys have had eyes on the target (that’s you). In one of the scenarios the attack was carried out by a large group with most of the rounds directed at the principal’s vehicle, this is an indication that the attackers had done their homework. More than likely they had surveillance in place up to the moment of the attack. Refer to Point 1.

4 – Training, Training, Training

In a recent vehicle ambush in Mexico, which lasted for minutes, not seconds, the principal’s vehicle was hit multiple times, at least once by grenade fragments, and was partially disabled due to a flat tire. Despite all of this, the drivers of both vehicles did exactly what needed to be done to ensure the principal’s survival, indicating excellent training. Your training must (not should) include Surveillance Detection.

5 – If the Vehicle Stops You Lose.

Time and time again we have seen that in a vehicle ambush the worst possible scenario is for the vehicle to come to a stop in the kill zone. Getting back to point 3 – training must include the “Science of the Kill Zone”. Even in attacks against an armored vehicle, once the vehicle is immobilized the attackers have control over the movement of the target, and that is not a good thing.

The complete article   http://www.vehicledynamics.net/articles/taleoftwo.html