CSO On Line Magazine has a good article by Christopher Falkenberg President of Insite Security.
The title of the article is “Executive protection: Why the private sector model is broken”
From Mr. Falkenberg’s article – “So, the executive protection model for the private sector is broken. The only thing that the security industry has sold is this half-baked, one-size-fits all solution that is not focused on the real needs of executives or their families.”
My question to you all is – Is part of this the due to the way we train? Are the schools training students for the corporate market?
I have some strong opinions on this – but before I mouth off I would like to hear what you have to say.
I recently came across an article on a Blog written by Richard Bradford. He wrote about a subject that is near and dear to anybody who has been doing this for any length of time – Road Blocks. Some of those moments that made me question why I left the comfortable environment of engineering occurred at road blocks. Richard wrote a good article with good information, and most importantly he is willing to share his substantial knowledge with others – he is a Pass It Forward guy.
When you look at his background you can understand why he would be a good source of information. Richard served with the US Government for over 35 years. He is a graduate of the US Military Academy at West Point, and was an Army Infantry and Special Forces officer, Richard also spent 23 years as a Paramilitary Operations Officer for the Central Intelligence Agency.
Richards email address – rnbradford@AegisLLC.org
Introduction
As a refresher on Frank Gallagher – he is one of the few protection professionals that have the credentials to write this article. Those credentials are impeccable. Frank writes from the perspective of a person that has worked at all levels of risk. He was the AIC of the Bremer detail in Iraq, for more than six years he was the Director of Security for Henry Kissinger Associates, and he was and is a lead instructor for the ATAP program.
You can reach Frank at – fg0321@gmail.com
FNG’S!!!!!!
Ok, you’ve landed that first EP job or PSD gig. You’re all excited and cannot wait to hit the ground running and show your new team leader how squared away you are, and just how bad to the bone you are to your new team mates. I’ve been on both sides of the fence (EP and PSD), so I feel an obligation to you and your future teammates and team leaders to point out a few facts that may make everyone’s lives easier and give you a solid chance to succeed and perhaps only be a “f—ing new guy” for a short while.
The first thing you have to remember is that someone has given you the opportunity of a lifetime. You have solved the riddle of “Catch-22”. You can’t get a job without experience, but how can you get a job if no one will let you get the experience. What comes first, the chicken or the egg? Meaning that someone saw something in you that makes them believe that you can do a job that you have never done before. It’s a huge leap of faith to hire a guy or girl for their first job. Others were passed over and you were selected.
In most cases, the people that were passed over had friends on your new team that are not pleased that their pals were not selected. Their feelings are hurt that their buddies did not make the grade. They are embarrassed that they put their name on someone that did not pass muster. Strike one! Not a great beginning, is it? Through no fault of your own, one or more members of your team are not thrilled that you are there. They may even resent your presence.
Now, these same folks have to train you to do things the way that works for the team. The key word here is: TEAM. Everyone has a job to do in order for the team to be a success. They will be looking for weakness, laziness, stupidity; and your attitude will be scrutinized every minute of every training day. They will expect you have a certain level of training and understanding of what they do. You will get a crash course in what to do, what not to do and how to do things. You will be given very little slack. And you will be expected to pull your weight sooner rather than later. They are working every day busting their asses trying to keep the VIP and the team alive. And now in their eyes, the team has been weakened by a new arrival that does not know how things are done or why they are done a certain way. Tempers are short as they’re pulling their full load and teaching you at the same time. Strike two!
The learning curve will be very steep. You will be judged sternly. Oh, and by the way, this is how things should be done. If a mistake is made, people could die. Your new team will be asked about your progress, attitude, and aptitude. All they know about you is that you are new and someone above their pay grade made the decision to hire you.
One thing about EP work and PSD work that I have to point out is that not everyone is able to do the job. I always wanted to play in the NFL. Guess what, I wasn’t big enough or fast enough to do it. No matter how bad I wanted it, it just wasn’t going to happen. I didn’t take it personally. I still watch the draft every year hoping to see my name called. It’s the same thing in this line of work. Some folks aren’t good enough! Not smart enough, lazy, out of shape, lack decisiveness, lack the skill sets required, or some combination of all of the above. We don’t play a professional sport where we go out and have beer after a bad game. People die when we lose. These are the attitudes of your new teammates as they evaluate you. Are you an asset or a liability?
Nobody really cares what your background is. I’ve fired SEALS, Recon marines, cops, SF guys, regular military guys, SWAT cops, and every other flavor cool guy under the sun. We don’t care what you did yesterday; we care about today and tomorrow. Your past help you get here. Let it go and concentrate on using those skills in your new gig. Enough said.
You got the job because someone liked something about you. They thought you would an asset to the program. With this being said, the people that hired you will listen to the other guys when they ask about your performance. They need to know the truth about your progress and decide whether you can become a valued and trusted member of the team. Lives depend upon this evaluation – BOTH the VIP’s and your team mates. There is no room for a weak link and you will be culled from the herd based upon your peer group’s evaluations.
OK, you have two big strikes against you going in. What do we want to see from you? How can you level the playing field and actually make the grade? How do you impress the guys/girls?
First, it is far better to let people think you stupid than actually open your mouth and let them know you are stupid. Do not give your opinion on how things are done. Unless you were hired to run the show, then for at least a month make no suggestions on how to do things better. Your opinion means nothing until you know the nuances of your new job. The guys do not have time to explain why they don’t do some things a certain way while they are teaching you the way to do something. Reread that last sentence. Memorize it. Learn the team way before you ask why things aren’t done a certain way. These methods are tried and true and work. Believe me, unless it’s a start up gig every method known to the profession has been talked about, tried, implemented or discarded. You will be very hard pressed to invent some new way of doing things.
Second, show up with the proper gear. You will need it. Follow the gear list and bring it all. You may not think something is important, but your team leader sure does or it would not be on the gear list. Four pairs of pants mean four pairs. Two pairs of foot wear mean just that. Don’t try to out think the guys doing the job until you have been there for a while. They know more than you do.
Third, be prepared to work. There is no allowance for jet lag or heat acclimatization. You don’t get paid to rest for three days before you start training/work. You must be ready to hit the ground running. You were hired to fill a slot that may have been empty for a few days. The guys that are there have probably been splitting time filling that slot. They are tired, cranky, and need the rest way more than the new guy does. And now they have to train you. Truly a volatile situation to enter into while everyone is trying to stay alive.
Fourth, be in shape. You never get a second chance to make a first impression. If you have no stamina, no strength, or intestinal fortitude you will be gone quickly. In the private sector, there are no unions, no mandatory sleep times, and no coffee breaks. You eat when you can, sleep when you can, piss when you can and work out when you can. You have to be prepared to work long hours in sometimes arduous conditions and not complain, faint, or get sick.
Fifth, complain at your own risk. Be very wary of complaining to the detail leader, team leader, director of security or anyone else about slights (real or imagined) that you are unhappy about. No one cares about your opinion until you are a respected, valued member of the team. In our world, the squeaky wheel gets replaced, not greased. There is no crying in EP or PSD work.
Hopefully, you will follow these simple steps and some day laugh about how tough your first gig was. And maybe you will only have to wear the tag of “F—ING NEW GUY” for a few days.
Your comments are always welcome – Frank Gallagher fg0321@gmail.com
If you are in the EP Business you should read Circuit Magazine, they just made it a whole lot easier to find. To order current or past issues of the #1 magazine dedicated to the close protection industry, visit Circuit Magazine
Each issues has an article by Elijah Shaw, one of the sharpest guys in the business, that alone makes it worth the price.
By far the most misunderstood and neglected part of the Protection Business is the Business of Protection. Understanding how to use the web and the social media to acquire work and/or enhance your business is essential. Your web presence is becoming what use to be your resume or if you’re a company your brochure. Google is fast becoming the first impression. Your resume is not enough. Larry Snow, who writes the Web Design Smarts Blog, pointed out that 83 % of all recruiters Google their applicants and that 43 % discard the applicant based on what they see.
Have you ever Googled someone’s web site and are baffled by what you see. In one of Larry’s blog articles he says.
Larry then goes on how to explain how to fix that.
The other issue that gets me is the Social Media. I recently read an article that mentioned, if you hold a security clearance or if you ever want to apply for one, be mindful of your postings and contacts online, particularly on social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter. These sites pose risks to gaining and keeping a security clearance.
Larry has an article on his Blog about using the Social Media to your benefit.
I recently visited the Executive Security International (ESI) Stalker Training program in Grand Junction Colorado. The Stalker Program is a part of ESI’s Executive Protection Residency Program. As I walked into the classroom the first thing I noticed was the use of computers as a method of communications and instruction. ESI requires students to bring a lap top to the program and supplies them with a thumb drive that has the lessons and power points. As the instructor give their presentations students follow along on their computers. It was one of those “Why didn’t I think of that” moments.
These are my observations of the Stalker program. The subjects include
Threat Assessments
Threat management
Surveillance Detection
Advancing
Moving the Principal
Security Surveys
None of the above is new to the world of EP Training but it is how the program is packaged, presented, and students tested that is unusual in the industry and impressive.
The students are split into groups and are assigned to do advances on hotels, restaurants and the airport, produce a plan, present their plan to the instructors, and then implement the plan. This part of the program frankly is what most of the other programs teach, but where this program differs from others I have observed are the time factor, and the interaction between student and instructor.
The length of program allows the students ample time to complete the task. There is a lot of communications from instructor to student. After every field exercises the students huddle up with their instructors to review the exercises, they go over the good and the not too good. The not too good is analyzed, dissected and lessons learned are discussed, and the students go back out and do it again. Since the instructors are been there done that guys, the lessons learned are real and often taken from their experience – good ones and bad ones, makes for one hell of a teaching tool.
Prior to the above students are split into groups and assigned to a client who is a victim of a Stalker. The teams get a series of letters. These are REAL LETTERS that were sent to REAL PEOPLE, who have or had a REAL THREAT.
Students use their Threat Analysis training to provide a preliminary risk assessment, and then use their Threat Assessment training to single out the one letter that is an imminent threat
Once they identify the letter that represents a threat to their principal, they go through a series of role playing exercises. Using investigative tools and additional role playing they zero in the stalkers. By asking the correct questions during the role playing exercises students will eventually be able to identify the stalkers address, their criminal history, and a myriad of information that will help them to protect their client.
There is an extensive use of role player, at times I had to remind myself that they were role players. The role players are “The stalkers” – the client – a handwriting expert – a Sheriff and a Psychologist. Again they have ample time, and coaching from the instructors to achieve the standard that has been set. But it’s not just the role players, the time and the instructors it is also the logical systematic order in which it unfolds.
The conclusion is the threat assessments and management reports that each student (not group) must submit and is graded on. I read one and have to say it was one of the best I have have read, not just from a student, from anyone.
In the Stalking program ESI creates a learning environment that gives the student the time and coaching to reach a predetermined standard, then measures to assure they have reached that standard. The attention to detail, the realism, and the role playing is more than I can put into an article. I did not witness the entire program, but there seems to be a training philosophy that emphasizes “team building under stress” that runs through the entire Executive Protection Residency Program. A short article like this simply cannot do this program justice.
ESI is in the process of making the Stalker Program a corporate stand alone program, more on this later.
This is the second article by Derek Humble on situational awareness. Derek is a transplanted British security professional currently living in Toronto, Canada. After a career in the British Military he took a position with a large Canadian security provider operating a specialized department offering corporate protective services to Canada’s elite. In 1988 Derek decided to incorporate his own business that he named The Anvil Group.
The Anvil Group Inc under Derek’s guidance ran operations in Canada and around the world with operations in North, Central and South America as well as Europe. Derek has run numerous versions of secure driver programs around the world specifically Moscow, Chicago, Mexico City and London to name a few. He is a long time friend, and was an early graduate of the old Scotti School of Defensive Driving and has constantly strived to study the cerebral aspects to protective driving as much as the physical practical side of the business.
Currently Derek consults with companies on matters of personal protection, risk management and travel risk assessments.
Situation Awareness Part Two – Understanding “Attack Modes” and why it helps every Protector - by Derek Humbel
As discussed in part one understanding the threat is crucial to professional protection under any circumstances, anywhere. The fact that no one can “Protect against everything, every where, all the time” means narrowing down the threat to a specific kind of tactic and that is very helpful in timely counter actions.
The key is to designate the kind of attack mode(s) that affect those at risk. To simplify this process think of two kinds of attack mode:
The attack modes breakdown into two main types:
“THE DELIBERATE ATTACK MODE” Encompasses those who are at risk from political, special interest, financial or geographical reasons that may well involve organized groups conducting pre-surveillance, threat assessments and may well run various rehearsals. Recognising these activities and reacting accordingly is the best result of being “Situation Aware”. However if those planning something see a high level of professionalism on the part of the protector(s) it might be sufficient reason for them to choose another target (selfish but true). Even hardened terrorists/insurgents want to succeed and it is the aim of the professional protector to give those bent on harm to reason to doubt their chance of success. Professional protection staff must understand that their actions might well be under scrutiny at any time (“good surveillance teams are hard to find”, as they say). A lack of total professionalism at all times is an invitation to those bent on harm.
“THE IMMEDIATE ATTACK MODE” is the alternative but most common type of attack mode and it represents the risk of incidents involving opportunity, envy, grudge, or plain chance. These are single person situations involving very little in the way of preparation or planning. There are a few exceptions to this but in general these events involve one or maybe two individuals deciding to take advantage of an immediate situation. These scenarios might be at drop off and pick up points, exiting from a residence or even whilst in transit. There is little that can be done to deter these kinds of attackers they will have tunnel vision to their target (when questioned some idiots say they didn’t even see the bodyguard(s) but to allow this attack to be successful may not cause hardship to your protectee, but it may well harm the teams career prospects. The counter measures, protective routines and protection principles are what will save the day. In many cases habits and routines can cause harm but in countering against the ‘Immediate Attack Mode” The master principle is of course lock the doors such as once everyone has embarked a passer by grabbing a door handle and opening a door. This won’t harm anyone but security heads will and should roll.
Once the types of attack mode are understood and adhered to it is necessary break them down as to where those attacks are most likely. Typically the old military mantra of the necessity “To dominate no-mans land” works beautifully in protection assignments. The dangers increase as you exit and enter secured bases/offices and unless the threat is sufficiently high (various forms of IEDs would be an example) protection teams can relax when on the road. Heightened awareness can only be maintained over limited periods of time (in some cases it must be) so by understanding the Attack Modes and the threats that those being protected face relaxation is possible and tactically righteous. This understanding of the required ‘ALERT LEVELS” makes the requirement of continuous protection assignments possible. Heightened alert levels as you leave a secure location can be reduced as you get onto the road and away from the start point and as your destination draws near increasing the protection level is effective and necessary. During WW1 the most likely place to get ambushed was on re-entry to your own front lines by enemy forces let alone the risk of being shot at by your own side being alert at the right time is vital.
Protective Driving Operations
3-DAY PROGRAM SEPTEMBER 13-15, 2010
PROTECTIVE DRIVING OPERATIONS
ESI’s TRAINING FACILITY IN COLORADO
$950 (Limited Discount Price)
ESI and Tony Scotti’s VDI will be sponsoring a 3 Day Protective Driving Operations in Grand Junction Colorado.
The course provides participants with a unique opportunity to build upon their existing training and further develop the knowledge, skill and ability required to perform one of the most challenging aspects of protection, providing safe and secure transportation in a high risk environment.
This is accomplished through a series of informative discussions and hands on practical exercises, students will develop an understanding of what the driver/vehicle combination can and, most importantly, cannot do when confronted with a potentially life threatening situation while behind the wheel. An emphasis is placed on how the driver can most effectively manage the limited time and distance available to them as a safety or security incident unfolds.
Classroom discussion will include the role vehicles play in mission strategy and tactics. Students will learn how armored vehicles affects the decision making process, and how to select the proper vehicle for the mission – or how to maximize the effectiveness of the vehicle given.
All hands on exercises are scenario based and designed to train and measure driver ability. Hence students will be objectively tested, and are required to attain a standard. All test and standards are based on the laws of physics as applied to vehicle attacks. The scenarios used during the testing are from case studies of vehicle ambushes.
At the conclusion of the program students will have the knowledge too combine mission objectives, with the vehicles supplied, and if necessary, have the skills needed to escape the Kill Zone.
CLASSROOM
DYNAMICS OF A VEHICLE EMERGENCY
CASE STUDIES OF VEHICLE ATTACKS
ROADSIDE BOMBS
KILL ZONE THEORY
TACTICS AND SECURITY VEHICLES
ARMORED VEHICLES
HANDS ON EXERCISES
BACKING-UP EXERCISE
ROLLING AMBUSH
ATTACKS AGAINST THE CONVOY
VEHICLE FAMILIARIZATION
RUN FLAT EXERCISE
VEHICLE COMBAT
DRIVE DOWN DRILLS
For more information contact Brandon Delcamp at 888 718 3105
July 24, 2010
For the protection specialist or security driver the worst-case scenario is a deliberate attempt to stop the vehicle. Surviving those scenarios requires the ability to keep the vehicle moving and clear the kill zone as quickly as possible – no matter what is happening outside the vehicle.
Focused, Intense, Effective Training
VDI’s Immediate Action Driving Skills course is designed to provide security practitioners – from the entry-level protection specialist to highly experienced private sector, military and law enforcement professionals - the training and experience needed to deal with the worst-case scenario, a vehicle ambush. Where survival comes down to the driver’s ability to respond instinctively to the threat, when the difference between success and failure is measured in tenths of a second.
This one day course provides students with an opportunity to:
- Learn from professionals with real world experience
- Experience the realities of driving through a kill zone
- Understand how to effectivelyoperate damaged vehicles
Students will gain hands-on, practical experience in:
- Pushing through roadblocks - (One & two vehicle ramming)
- Defeating rolling ambushes - (PIT/Counter-PIT techniques)
- Dealing with an incapacitated driver – (Driving from passenger seat)
- Forced lane excursions – (Surface transitions)
For addtional information
Joseph Autera
Tony Scotti’s Vehicle Dynamics Institute
Tel: 732 738-5221
Cell : 732–586-4020 email: jautera@vehicledynamics.net
Or Tony Scotti
781 395 3097 email tonyscotti@securitydriver.com
Another must read report from Stratfor
Thanks to Scott Stewart for writing it and a major thank you to Stratfor for allowing the article to be circulated.
Looking at the world from a protective-intelligence perspective, the theme for the past week has not been improvised explosive devices or potential mass-casualty attacks. While there have been suicide bombings in Afghanistan, alleged threats to the World Cup and seemingly endless post-mortem discussions of the failed May 1 Times Square attack, one recurring and under-reported theme in a number of regions around the world has been kidnapping.
For example, in Heidenheim, Germany, Maria Boegerl, the wife of German banker Thomas Boegerl, was reportedly kidnapped from her home May 12. The kidnappers issued a ransom demand to the family and an amount was agreed upon. Mr. Boegerl placed the ransom payment at the arranged location, but the kidnappers never picked up the money (perhaps suspecting or detecting police involvement). The family has lost contact with the kidnappers, and fear for Mrs. Boegerl’s fate has caused German authorities to launch a massive search operation, which has included hundreds of searchers along with dogs, helicopters and divers.
Two days after the Boegerl kidnapping, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) posted a message on the Internet claiming to have custody of French citizen Michel Germaneau, a retired engineer who had previously worked in Algeria’s petroleum sector. Germaneau was reportedly kidnapped April 22, in northern Niger, close to the border with Mali and Algeria. The AQIM video contained a photo of Germaneau and of his identification card. The group demanded a prisoner exchange and said that French President Nicolas Sarkozy would be responsible for the captive’s well-being.
Also on May 14, Diego Fernandez de Cevallos, a high-profile attorney and former presidential candidate, was kidnapped near his ranch in the Mexican state of Queretaro. Fernandez had left his home in Mexico City to drive to his ranch but never arrived. His vehicle was found abandoned near the ranch on Saturday morning and the vehicle reportedly showed signs of a struggle. It is not known who kidnapped Fernandez or what the motivation for the kidnapping was.
At the moment a kidnapping occurs, the abduction team usually has achieved tactical surprise and usually employs overwhelming force. To the previously unsuspecting victim, the abductors seemingly appear out of nowhere. But when examined carefully, kidnappings are, for the most part, the result of a long and carefully orchestrated process. They do not arise from a vacuum. There are almost always some indications or warnings that the process is in motion prior to the actual abduction, meaning that many kidnappings are avoidable. In light of this reality, let’s take a more detailed look at the phenomenon of kidnappings.
Types of Kidnappings
There are many different types of kidnappings. Although kidnappings for ransom and political kidnappings generate considerable news interest, most kidnappings have nothing to do with money or political statements. They are typically kidnappings conducted by family members in custody disputes, emotionally disturbed strangers wanting to take a child to raise or strangers who abduct a victim for sexual exploitation.
Even in financially motivated kidnappings, there are a number of different types. The stereotypical kidnapping of a high-value target comes most readily to mind, but there are also more spur-of-the-moment express kidnappings, where a person is held until his bank account can be drained using an ATM card, and even virtual kidnappings, where no kidnapping occurs at all but the victim is frightened by a claim that a loved one has been kidnapped and pays a ransom to the alleged abductors. Some of the piracy incidents in Somalia also move into the economic kidnapping realm, especially in cases where the crew or passengers are seen as being more valuable than the boat or its cargo.
Since kidnapping is such a broad topic, for the sake of this discussion, we will focus primarily on kidnappings that are financially motivated and those that are politically motivated. Financially motivated kidnappings can be conducted by a variety of criminal elements. At the highest level are highly trained professional kidnapping gangs that specialize in abducting high-net-worth individuals and who will frequently demand ransoms in the millions of dollars. Such groups often employ teams of specialists who carry out a variety of specific tasks such as collecting intelligence, conducting surveillance, snatching the target, negotiating with the victim’s family and establishing and guarding the safe-houses.
At the other end of the spectrum are gangs that randomly kidnap targets of opportunity. These gangs are generally far less skilled than the professional gangs and often will hold a victim for only a short time, as in an express kidnapping. Sometimes express kidnapping victims are held in the trunk of a car for the duration of their ordeal, which can sometimes last for days if the victim has a large amount in a checking account and a small daily ATM withdrawal limit. Other times, if an express kidnapping gang discovers it has grabbed a high-value target by accident, the gang will hold the victim longer and demand a much higher ransom. Occasionally, these express kidnapping groups will even “sell” a high-value victim to a more professional kidnapping gang. (On a side note, most express kidnapping victims tend to be male and are most frequently abducted while walking on the street after dark, and many have impaired their senses by consuming alcohol.)
In the United States, it is far more common for a relatively poor person to be kidnapped for financial motives than it is for a high-net-worth individual. This is because kidnapping groups frequently target groups of illegal immigrants, who they believe are far less likely to seek help from the authorities. In some cases, the police have found dozens of immigrant hostages being held in safe-houses.
Between the two extremes of kidnapping groups — those targeting the rich and those targeting the poor — there is a wide range of kidnapping gangs that might target a bank vice president or branch manager rather than the bank’s CEO, or that might kidnap the owner of a restaurant or other small business rather than an industrialist.
In the realm of political kidnappings, there are abductions that are very well-planned, such as the December 1981 kidnapping of Gen. James Dozier by the Italian Red Brigades, or Hezbollah’s March 1985 kidnapping of journalist Terry Anderson. However, there are also opportunistic cases of politically motivated kidnappings, such as when foreigners are abducted at a Taliban checkpoint in Afghanistan or AQIM militants grab a European tourist in the Sahel area of Africa. Of course, in the case of both the Taliban and AQIM, the groups see kidnapping as an important source of funding as well as a politically useful tool.
Understanding the Process
In deliberate (as opposed to opportunistic) kidnappings based on financial or political motives, the kidnappers generally follow a process that is very similar to what we call the terrorist attack cycle: target selection, planning, deployment, attack, escape and exploitation. In a kidnapping, this means the group must identify a victim; plan for the abduction, captivity and negotiation; conduct the abduction and secure the hostage; successfully leverage the life of the victim for financial or political gain; and then escape.
During some phases of this process, the kidnappers may not be visible to the target, but there are several points during the process when the kidnappers are forced to expose themselves to detection in order to accomplish their mission. Like the perpetrators of a terrorist attack, those planning a kidnapping are most vulnerable to detection while they are conducting surveillance — before they are ready to deploy and conduct their attack. As we have noted several times in past analyses, one of the secrets of countersurveillance is that most criminals are not very good at conducting surveillance. The primary reason they succeed is that no one is looking for them.
Of course, kidnappers are also very easy to spot once they launch their attack, pull their weapons and perhaps even begin to shoot. By this time, however, it might very well be too late to escape their attack. They will have selected their attack site and employed the forces they believe they need to overpower their victim and complete the operation. While the kidnappers could botch their operation and the target could escape unscathed, it is simply not practical to pin one’s hopes on that possibility. It is clearly better to spot the kidnappers early and avoid their trap before it is sprung and the guns come out.
Kidnappers, like other criminals, look for patterns and vulnerabilities that they can exploit. Their chances for success increase greatly if they are allowed to conduct surveillance at will and are given the opportunity to thoroughly assess the security measures (if any) employed by the target. We have seen several cases in Mexico in which the criminals even chose to attack despite security measures such as armored cars and armed security guards. In such cases, criminals attack with adequate resources to overcome existing security. For example, if there are protective agents, the attackers will plan to neutralize them first. If there is an armored vehicle, they will find ways to defeat the armor or grab the target when he or she is outside the vehicle. Because of this, criminals must not be allowed to conduct surveillance at will. Potential targets should practice a heightened but relaxed state of situational awareness that will help them spot hostile surveillance.
Potential targets should also conduct simple pattern and route analyses to determine where they are most predictable and vulnerable. Taking an objective look at your schedule and routes is really not as complicated as it may seem. While the ideal is to vary routes and times to avoid predictable locations, this is also difficult and disruptive and warranted only when the threat is extremely high. A more practical alternative is for potential targets to raise their situational awareness a notch as they travel through such areas at predictable times.
Of course, using the term “potential targets” points to another problem. Many kidnapping victims simply don’t believe they are potential targets until after they have been kidnapped, and therefore do not take commonsense security measures. Frequently, when such people are debriefed after their release from captivity, they are able to recall suspicious activity before their abduction that they did not take seriously because they did not consider themselves targets. One American businessman who was kidnapped in Central America said upon his release that he knew there was something odd about the behavior of a particular couple he saw frequently sitting on a park bench near his home prior to his kidnapping, but he didn’t think he was rich enough to be targeted for kidnapping. As soon as he was abducted, he said that he immediately knew that the awkward couple had been observing him to determine his pattern. He said that he often thought about that couple during his two months in captivity, and how a little bit of curiosity could have saved him from a terrifying ordeal and his family a substantial sum of money.
The same steps involved in a deliberate kidnapping are also followed in ad hoc, opportunistic kidnappings — though the steps may be condensed and accomplished in seconds or minutes rather than the weeks or months normally associated with a well-planned kidnapping operation. And the same problems with lack of awareness often apply. It is not uncommon to talk to someone who was involved in an express kidnapping and hear the person say, “I got a bad feeling about those three guys standing near that car when I started walking down that block, but I kept walking anyway.” This frequent occurrence highlights the importance of situational awareness, attack recognition and proper mindset maintenance.
Potential targets do not have to institute security measures that will make them invulnerable to such crimes — something that is very difficult and that can be very expensive. Rather, the objective is to take measures that make them a harder target than other members of the specific class of individuals to which they belong. Groups conducting pre-operational surveillance, whether for an intentional kidnapping or an opportunistic kidnapping, prefer a target that is unaware and easy prey. Taking some basic security measures such as maintaining a healthy state of situational awareness will, in many cases, cause the criminals to choose another target who is less aware and therefore more vulnerable.
Also, most people who are kidnapped in places like Afghanistan or the Sahel know they are going into dangerous places and disregard the warnings not to go to those places. Many of these people, like journalists and aid workers, take the risk as part of their jobs. Others, like the European tourists abducted in the Sahel (and some of the pleasure boaters kidnapped by Somali pirates), appear to naively disregard the risk or to be thrill-seekers. In the recent Germaneau case in Niger, due to the number of highly publicized kidnappings in the Sahel region over the past eight years, and Germaneau’s personal history of working in Algeria, it would be hard to argue that he did not know what he could be getting himself into (though we are unsure at this point what motivated him to run that risk). After Germaneau’s kidnapping, his driver was subsequently arrested, raising the possibility that he was somehow complicit in the abduction. This is a reminder that it is not at all unusual for kidnapping gangs to have inside help, whether a maid, bodyguard, interpreter or taxi driver.
In retrospect, almost every person who is kidnapped either missed or ignored some indication or warning of danger. These warnings can range from observable criminal behavior to a consular information bulletin specifically warning people not to drive outside of cities in Guatemala after dark, for example. This means that, while kidnapping can be a devastating crime, it can also be an avoidable one.