SecurityDriver News

I recently came across an article on a Blog written by Richard Bradford. He wrote about a subject that is near and dear to anybody who has been doing this for any length of time – Road Blocks. Some of those moments that made me question why I left the comfortable environment of engineering occurred at road blocks. Richard wrote a good article with good information, and most importantly he is willing to share his substantial knowledge with others – he is a Pass It Forward guy.

 When you look at his background you can understand why he would be a good source of information. Richard served with the US Government for over 35 years.  He is a graduate of the US Military Academy at West Point, and was an Army Infantry and Special Forces officer, Richard also spent 23 years as a Paramilitary Operations Officer for the Central Intelligence Agency.

Richards email address – rnbradford@AegisLLC.org 

Web Site

Queensland Raceway

Joe and Larry have just come back from conducting training in Australia. They were there for a little more than a week.  The training was conducted at Queensland Raceway in beautiful downtown Kurwangbah, which is not too far from Brisbane. The program is specifically developed for our corporate clients and includes not only driving, but also Surveillance Detection and working the principal.

 TSVDI will be conducting the same program in the UAE , Guatemala, and followed by Europe, and South America. Although we have a hectic schedule coming up with 20 programs in 17 weeks in 4 countries, for 20 corporations, with some PSD, government, police, and private security companies thrown into the mix, we do have some seats available in our open enrollment programs.

Dates

Registration

Protective/Evasive Driving Course – This three day program is designed for professional security drivers, executive chauffeurs and protection specialists.

Immediate Action Driving Skills  – For the security driver or protection specialist a program designed to survive the worst-case scenario – October 23^rd New Jersey  

Surveillance Detection Tactics & Techniques  – This highly interactive three day course is designed to meet the unique needs of security professionals responsible for executive transportation and personal protection, particularly those working with limited manpower and resources.  October 27 – 29     New Jersey

  Vehicle Dynamics and Exercise Design –  An advanced 3 day course is designed to provide students with the capability to develop training scenarios that closely replicate the conditions they are likely to encounter in the real world. Restricted attendance November 15^th – 17^th New Jersey

 Instructor Development Program – A 5 day course that is widely acknowledged as the most advanced train-the-trainer driving programs offered today. The course provides the student with an in-depth understanding of the scientific approach to driver training and evaluation that was developed by Tony Scotti and refined over the last thirty five years. Restricted attendance – November 15^th – 19^th New Jersey

1979 Volvo Ad

Cleaning out my garage the other day and I found an old ad I did for Volvo. I’m sure most of the people reading this do not remember the Volvo 242 GT; it was a hell of a performance vehicle. In the late 70’s Volvo had the reputation of a stogy old man’s car (kind of like today’s Volvos) – at the time my school was sponsored by Volvo – we were asked to conduct a  product testing and comparisons program for the Volvo engineers and some people from their ad agency. We were testing the 242 GT against vehicles like the brand new (at that time) BMW 3 Series.

The results of the tests and some comments I made, brought about this ad, the ad appeared in all the Car Magazines. It even made it into the News Weeklies and some other none automotive publications. The ad came out in 1979.

 When the ad guys and engineers were driving through the Lane Change most of the cars were having a difficult time getting through without hitting anything, and were breaking loose at speeds that the 242 GT had no trouble with. Just as we do today (31 years later) we measured the other vehicles handling numbers and compared them to the measured numbers of the Volvo GT. The GT’s numbers were 13 to 15 % higher than all the other cars being tested.

 One comment made by an ad agency guy was “These other cars are exciting to drive”.  My comment was “If you think that’s exciting – drive a Pinto through the Lane Change” My other comment was “ When compared to the BMW the Volvo GT handles better than cars that are known for handling ”. That’s where the tag line came from. It was a classic case of mistaking adrenalin for handling. Just as today when students drive around a race track or through a lane change, without being tested and measured, they mistake adrenalin for education. 

 By the way for all you old racers the picture and test were done at Bridgehampton Raceway on Long Island.

In light of all the discussion concerning the assassination in Mexico – I thought I would go over my thoughts on Kill Zones. 

Since being in the Kill Zone can Ahhhhh kill you – you should

            Understand what they are

            How to stay out of them

            And if you get in one – how to get out of them

            If you can’t get out – how to put up one hell of a fight – but keep in mind why they are called Kill Zones 

Understand what they are – This isn’t brain surgery – A Kill Zone is a time distance relationship – how much time do I have and how much distance do I have. If you attend a “Security Driving School”, and they don’t talk about this concept – ask for your money back.

How to stay out of them – First and foremost – the best way to avoid an ambush, hence the kill zone, is don’t be there when it happens. There are plenty of people who are an ambush looking for a place to happen, just hope they are driving the same roads you are. 

If you haven’t done it already, take a course that has a heavy emphasis on Surveillance Detection – Route Surveys, and Advancing. 

And if you get in one – how to get out of them – Driving out of the kill zone is an exercise in the laws of physics and is a measurable skill. These are not skills you learn sitting in the back seat of a vehicle driving around a race track. The only skill you learn sitting in the back seat is how to projectile vomit out the back window. Again – If you attend a Security Driving School and they don’t talk – demonstrate – practice – objectively measure your skill to escape the Kill Zone – ask for your money back.           

If you can’t get out – how to put up one hell of a fight. This is where shooting skills meet driving skills – there are shooting schools that emphasize these skills – but keep in mind why they are called Kill Zones

This is the second article by Derek Humble on situational awareness. Derek is a transplanted British security professional currently living in Toronto, Canada. After a career in the British Military he took a position with a large Canadian security provider operating a specialized department offering corporate protective services to Canada’s elite. In 1988 Derek decided to incorporate his own business that he named The Anvil Group. 

The Anvil Group Inc under Derek’s guidance ran operations in Canada and around the world with operations in North, Central and South America as well as Europe. Derek has run numerous versions of secure driver programs around the world specifically Moscow, Chicago, Mexico City and London to name a few. He is a long time friend, and was an early graduate of the old Scotti School of Defensive Driving and has constantly strived to study the cerebral aspects to protective driving as much as the physical practical side of the business.

 Currently Derek consults with companies on matters of personal protection, risk management and travel risk assessments.   

 dhumble@nemesisinfo.com

NEMESIS CONSULTING

Situation Awareness Part Two – Understanding “Attack Modes” and why it helps every Protector  - by Derek Humbel

 As discussed in part one understanding the threat is crucial to professional protection under any circumstances, anywhere. The fact that no one can “Protect against everything, every where, all the time” means narrowing down the threat to a specific kind of tactic and that is very helpful in timely counter actions.

The key is to designate the kind of attack mode(s) that affect those at risk. To simplify this process think of two kinds of attack mode:

The attack modes breakdown into two main types:

 “THE DELIBERATE ATTACK MODE” Encompasses those who are at risk from political, special interest, financial or geographical reasons that may well involve organized groups conducting pre-surveillance, threat assessments and may well run various rehearsals. Recognising these activities and reacting accordingly is the best result of being “Situation Aware”. However if those planning something see a high level of professionalism on the part of the protector(s) it might be sufficient reason for them to choose another target (selfish but true). Even hardened terrorists/insurgents want to succeed and it is the aim of the professional protector to give those bent on harm to reason to doubt their chance of success. Professional protection staff must understand that their actions might well be under scrutiny at any time (“good surveillance teams are hard to find”, as they say). A lack of total professionalism at all times is an invitation to those bent on harm.

 “THE IMMEDIATE ATTACK MODE” is the alternative but most common type of attack mode and it represents the risk of incidents involving opportunity, envy, grudge, or plain chance. These are single person situations involving very little in the way of preparation or planning. There are a few exceptions to this but in general these events involve one or maybe two individuals deciding to take advantage of an immediate situation. These scenarios might be at drop off and pick up points, exiting from a residence or even whilst in transit. There is little that can be done to deter these kinds of attackers they will have tunnel vision to their target (when questioned some idiots say they didn’t even see the bodyguard(s) but to allow this attack to be successful may not cause hardship to your protectee, but it may well harm the teams career prospects. The counter measures, protective routines and protection principles are what will save the day. In many cases habits and routines can cause harm but in countering against the ‘Immediate Attack Mode” The master principle is of course lock the doors such as once everyone has embarked a passer by grabbing a door handle and opening a door. This won’t harm anyone but security heads will and should roll.

 Once the types of attack mode are understood and adhered to it is necessary break them down as to where those attacks are most likely. Typically the old military mantra of the necessity “To dominate no-mans land” works beautifully in protection assignments. The dangers increase as you exit and enter secured bases/offices and unless the threat is sufficiently high (various forms of IEDs would be an example) protection teams can relax when on the road. Heightened awareness can only be maintained over limited periods of time (in some cases it must be) so by understanding the Attack Modes and the threats that those being protected face relaxation is possible and tactically righteous. This understanding of the required ‘ALERT LEVELS” makes the requirement of continuous protection assignments possible.  Heightened alert levels as you leave a secure location can be reduced as you get onto the road and away from the start point and as your destination draws near increasing the protection level is effective and necessary. During WW1 the most likely place to get ambushed was on re-entry to your own front lines by enemy forces let alone the risk of being shot at by your own side being alert at the right time is vital.

Protective Driving Operations

3-DAY PROGRAM SEPTEMBER 13-15, 2010
PROTECTIVE DRIVING OPERATIONS
ESI’s TRAINING FACILITY IN COLORADO
$950 (Limited Discount Price)

ESI and Tony Scotti’s VDI will be sponsoring a 3 Day Protective Driving Operations in Grand Junction Colorado.

The course provides participants with a unique opportunity to build upon their existing training and further develop the knowledge, skill and ability required to perform one of the most challenging aspects of protection, providing safe and secure transportation in a high risk environment.

This is accomplished through a series of informative discussions and hands on practical exercises, students will develop an understanding of what the driver/vehicle combination can and, most importantly, cannot do when confronted with a potentially life threatening situation while behind the wheel. An emphasis is placed on how the driver can most effectively manage the limited time and distance available to them as a safety or security incident unfolds.

Classroom discussion will include the role vehicles play in mission strategy and tactics. Students will learn how armored vehicles affects the decision making process, and how to select the proper vehicle for the mission – or how to maximize the effectiveness of the vehicle given.

All hands on exercises are scenario based and designed to train and measure driver ability. Hence students will be objectively tested, and are required to attain a standard. All test and standards are based on the laws of physics as applied to vehicle attacks. The scenarios used during the testing are from case studies of vehicle ambushes.

At the conclusion of the program students will have the knowledge too combine mission objectives, with the vehicles supplied, and if necessary, have the skills needed to escape the Kill Zone.

CLASSROOM

DYNAMICS OF A VEHICLE EMERGENCY

CASE STUDIES OF VEHICLE ATTACKS

ROADSIDE BOMBS

KILL ZONE THEORY

TACTICS AND SECURITY VEHICLES

ARMORED VEHICLES 

HANDS ON EXERCISES

BACKING-UP EXERCISE

ROLLING AMBUSH

ATTACKS AGAINST THE CONVOY

VEHICLE FAMILIARIZATION

RUN FLAT EXERCISE

VEHICLE COMBAT

DRIVE DOWN DRILLS

 For more information contact Brandon Delcamp at 888 718 3105

A UN report on the assassination of Pakistani Prime Minister Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto has been widely circulated. It is fairly long, 54 pages. I have taken the section that deals with the “Day of the Assassination”. When we have some time we will offer our opinion of what happened and developed a lessons learned. In the interim I am sure the the community would welcome any comments. It’s long but filled with good info.

 “The Day of the Assassination”

Departure from Zardari House for Liaquat Bagh

86. Around 1400 hours, Ms Bhutto left Zardari House, for Liaquat Bagh, in a convoy of vehicles. The convoy consisted of a black Toyota Land Cruiser used by Mr Tauqir Kaira, followed by Ms Bhutto’s white armoured Land Cruiser and two of Mr Kaira’s vehicles on either side of Ms Bhutto’s vehicle. The latter two were a Mercedes-Benz van on the right and a four-door double cabin vehicle on the left.

Immediately behind those vehicles were two Toyota Vigo pick-up trucks, positioned side by side. A black Mercedes-Benz car was behind these Vigos. This Mercedes- Benz, from Zardari House, was bullet-proof and served as the back-up vehicle for Ms Bhutto. The two Vigo pick-up trucks were also from Zardari House.

87. Mr Kaira was inside the lead vehicle with his security men. Accompanying Ms Bhutto in her vehicle were Mr Javed-ur-Rehman (driver, front-left seat), SSP Major (ret) Imtiaz Hussain (front-right seat), Makhdoom Amin Fahim (senior PPP member, second row-left seat), Ms Bhutto (second row-centre seat), Ms Naheed Khan (senior PPP member and political secretary of Ms Bhutto, second row-right seat). Seated in the back of the vehicle on two benches facing each other were Senator Safdar Abbasi (senior PPP member, rear-right bench), Mr Shahenshah (rear-left bench, facing

Senator Abbasi) and Mr Razaq Mirani (personal attendant of Ms Bhutto, rear-right bench next to Senator Abbasi and to his left). Mr Kaira’s two vehicles on either side of Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser carried his men. The Vigo pick-up trucks carried members of Mr Chaudry Aslam’s security team. Riding in the black Mercedes-Benz car were the driver, PPP official Mr Faratullah Babar in the front passenger seat and, in the rear passenger seat from left to right, two PPP officials Mr Babar Awan and Mr Rehman Malik and General (ret) Tauqir Zia.

Arrival at Liaquat Bagh

88. Ms Bhutto’s convoy reached the Faizabad junction at about 1415 hours, according to the Rawalpindi District Police, who were to assume responsibility for security of the convoy. According to the police and the Security Plan, an escort was to be provided composed of a traffic police “pilot” jeep, a regular police jeep leading the convoy and three Elite Force Toyota pick-up trucks protecting Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser on three sides. People in Ms Bhutto’s vehicle claim, however, that there was no such escort except for one traffic police vehicle.

89. At about 1456 hours, Ms Bhutto’s convoy turned right at the Murree Road – Liaquat Road junction and headed towards Liaquat Bagh. Video footage shows Ms Bhutto’s convoy driving from the Murree Road – Liaquat Bagh junction to the inner security gate leading to the VIP parking area at Liaquat Bagh. The footage shows Ms Bhutto standing through the roof escape hatch of her Land Cruiser and waving at the large crowd around the vehicle while it moved slowly on Liaquat Road.

90. Both ASP Ashfaq Anwar who was the supervisor of the Elite Force unit and Inspector Azmat Ali Dogar, the unit’s commander, told the Commission that they accompanied Ms Bhutto all the way to the back of the stage according to the Security Plan. However, video footage and pictures show that as Ms Bhutto drove on much of Liaquat Road, her vehicle was flanked only by her private security vehicles. The Elite Force vehicles were nowhere near her vehicle. In fact, the Commission has identified Inspector Dogar among the crowd some distance from Ms Bhutto’s vehicle.

Contrary to the police assertion, there was no police-provided box formation around Ms Bhutto as she arrived at the rally, and the Elite Force unit did not execute their duties as specified in the security deployment. Furthermore, the Commission does not believe that the full escort as described by the police was ever present.

91. At about 1516 hours, Ms Bhutto’s convoy stopped for a few minutes at the inner gate of the parking area waiting for that gate to be opened, during which Ms Bhutto remained standing through the escape hatch. The police and some PPP members disagree as to the reason for the delay in opening the gate. While the PPP asserts that the police did not have the key to open the gate, the police said that they did not want the large crowd following Ms Bhutto to get into the VIP parking area.

Altogether, Ms Bhutto stood through the escape hatch for the approximately 20 minutes it took to drive from the Murree Road – Liaquat Road junction to the gate of the parking area. This calls into question the claim of the Rawalpindi District Police that they were surprised when Ms Bhutto emerged from the escape hatch on her way out of Liaquat Bagh.

92. Once the convoy passed through the inner gate, at about 1531 hours, it drove through the VIP parking area to the rear of the stage. At least the following three vehicles were in the VIP parking area: Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser, Mr Kaira’s lead vehicle and the black bullet-proof Mercedes-Benz car. Temporary wooden stairs had been built for the rally to access the rear of the stage directly from the parking area.

Ms Bhutto climbed the stairs, went to the stage to wave to the crowd and took her seat before addressing the crowd.

93. Near the rear of the stage, a scuffle broke out between some workers of the PPP and police who tried to prevent them from climbing to the stage. This created tension between PPP workers and the police officers posted in that area. Accounts given by PPP representatives and the police with regard to the degree and nature of this event differ significantly. The police state that the dispute was minor and was settled immediately, whereas some on the local PPP side claim it was serious and led to bitter reactions from the police during the rest of the rally. They say that the police felt insulted and became more passive in their security role. The Commission finds that the police were indeed passive in their provision of security and believes it unprofessional if the Rawalpindi District Police reduced their level of alert to any degree as a result of wounded pride.

Exit from Liaquat Bagh

94. Several thousand people attended the event. Ms Bhutto was joined on the stage by a number of national-level PPP leaders and all of the parliamentary candidates from Rawalpindi district. The crowds were enthusiastic, and PPP leaders and activists considered the event to have been a great success. They say Ms Bhutto gave a strong and rousing speech, one of the best of her campaign, and describe her as having been radiant that day.

95. The public gathering concluded and, at about 1710 hours, Ms Bhutto descended the wooden stairs and entered her Land Cruiser. The occupants of the Land Cruiser and their seating positions were the same as for the trip in to Liaquat Bagh. The composition of passengers in the black Mercedes-Benz car also remained the same.

96. The black bullet-proof Mercedes-Benz car was the first to leave the parking area. It is not clear how much distance there was between this vehicle and the rest of Ms Bhutto’s convoy at the moment of the blast. Credible reports range from 100 meters to 250 meters. Some of those in the car said that they were close enough to Ms Bhutto’s vehicle to feel the impact of the blast. Others at the site of the blast have said that the Mercedes-Benz left Liaquat Bagh so quickly that it was nowhere to be seen when the blast occurred. Indeed, the Commission has not seen this vehicle in the many video images of the exit area it reviewed. Despite the acknowledgement of some occupants of the vehicle that they felt the impact of the blast, the Commission finds it incredible that they drove all the way to Zardari House, a drive of about 20 minutes, before they became aware that Ms Bhutto had been injured in the blast.

They should have stopped at a safe distance when they felt the blast so as to check on Ms Bhutto’s condition, the condition of her vehicle and whether the back-up vehicle was required. Indeed, as the back-up vehicle, the Mercedes-Benz car would have been an essential element of Ms Bhutto’s convoy on the return trip even if the occupants of that car had confirmed that Ms Bhutto had been unscathed in the attack.

97. Mr Kaira’s vehicle was the next to leave the inner parking area after the Mercedes-Benz car, with Ms Bhutto’s vehicle right behind it, followed by another of Mr Kaira’s vehicles. The two Vigo pick-up trucks then followed from the outer parking area located between the inner and outer gates.

98. At 1712 hours, Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser exited from the outer gate. Crowds of people who were already on Liaquat Road drew closer to the vehicle as it began to turn right onto Liaquat Road. In addition, many people left the park, swelling the crowd around the Land Cruiser, contrary to the police assertion that they did not allow anyone to leave the park before the departure of Ms Bhutto’s convoy. Ms Bhutto emerged through the escape hatch of the vehicle and started waving to her supporters. When the vehicle approached the central road divider, it was slowed further by the crowd.

99. Major Imtiaz, who was sitting in the front seat of the Land Cruiser, said that he was worried that the convoy was being slowed down by the crowd. He wanted to call CPO Saud Aziz by cell phone, but he did not have the CPO’s direct number. Instead he called CPO Saud Aziz’s operator and the operator at the police station in Multan, another town in Punjab Province (where Major Imtiaz had recently served). The Commission finds that this lack of preparation was a major flaw in the security arrangements and reflects badly on the professionalism of Major Imtiaz who should have had full and rapid access to the Rawalpindi police command.

100. Questions remain as to the nature of the crowd that gathered around the Land Cruiser. Passengers in the Land Cruiser and some local PPP members recalled that they were mostly PPP workers, and they did not see any strangers or irregular movements among them. The Rawalpindi District Police and other PPP members, however, suggested that a group of people had deliberately stood in front of the Land Cruiser to prevent it from moving. Regardless of the accuracy of either account, it remains that the police did not control the crowd outside of Liaquat Bagh. As a result, the attacker was able to get as close as he did to Ms Bhutto’s vehicle.

101. The Rawalpindi police authorities and some PPP workers dispute the exact exit route agreed for Ms Bhutto’s convoy. The Rawalpindi District Police and DCO Elahi claim that the planned route for the convoy was to turn right onto Liaquat Road and then left onto Murree Road, retracing the convoy’s entry route. Only in case of an emergency was the convoy to make a left turn after exiting from the outer gate; a decision to take the emergency route had to be made by the senior police officer in charge of security on the scene. Some local PPP workers who attended the preparatory meeting with the police disagree with this account. They claim that the original plan was to make a left turn onto Liaquat Road and that the minutes provided by the DCO, which did not indicate this left turn, were inaccurate. In any event, photographs show two stationary police vehicles on Liaquat Road blocking the left- side drive lane where the left turn would have been made. As a result, even in an emergency, it would have been impossible for Ms Bhutto’s convoy to make a left turn and use the escape route unless those police vehicles were quickly moved. The Commission learned that these vehicles were official vehicles of senior Rawalpindi police officers. The Commission finds it irresponsible that these vehicles were parked in such a way as to block the emergency exit route.

102. The Rawalpindi District Police claim that police vehicles from the Elite Force unit headed by ASP Ashfaq Anwar were waiting outside the outer gate to escort Ms Bhutto’s convoy and that they were about to go into a protective box formation when the attack on Ms Bhutto took place. However, forming the box at this point was impracticable given the narrow width of Liaquat Road and the number of people who had already started to surround Ms Bhutto’s vehicle. In any event, video footage shows very few uniformed police on the scene available to push back the crowd to create space for the box formation. Furthermore, video and photographs taken shortly before the blast as well as Commission interviews indicate that the Elite Force unit was not in position to go into a box formation. The Elite Force unit was in place neither for the entry nor the exit of the convoy and did not afford the protection they were tasked with, thus failing spectacularly in their duty.

103. Overall, video and photographic materials as well as the Commission’s interviews establish that there were very few police deployed outside the outer gate and on Liaquat Road as Ms Bhutto’s convoy attempted to depart the scene.

The Attack

104. From the exit, Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser started to make a right turn onto Liaquat Road. As it slowly approached the central divider on Liaquat Road, the crowd began chanting slogans. There is some dispute over whether Ms Bhutto made the decision to stand up on her own or was urged to do so. Before she stood up, Ms Bhutto asked Ms Naheed Khan to make a phone call to Mr Nawaz Sharif, PML-N leader, to convey condolences for the deaths of some of his supporters who had been shot during the PML-N rally earlier that day. It had been reported that the shooting incident occurred between supporters of the PML-N and those of the PML-Q parties.

105. While Ms Khan was trying to reach Mr Sharif, Ms Bhutto stopped her and asked Senator Abbasi, who was sitting in the rear seat, to chant slogans to the crowd using the vehicle’s loudspeaker. Ms Bhutto then stood on the seat and appeared through the escape hatch, with her head and shoulders exposed.

106. Ms Bhutto waved to the crowd. The vehicle continued to move slowly into its right turn onto Liaquat Road. At this point, a man wearing dark glasses appeared in the crowd on the left side of the Land Cruiser. Around 1714 hours, while the vehicle continued into its right turn, the man pulled out a pistol, and from a distance of approximately two to three meters, fired three shots at Ms Bhutto. According to video analysis conducted by Scotland Yard, the three shots were fired in less than one second.

107. The Commission examined video footage taken from a back angle, which shows Ms Bhutto’s dupatta, her white head covering, and her hair flick upwards after the second shot. However, there is no evidence of a link between the second shot and that movement. After the third shot, she started to move down into the vehicle.

108. After the third shot, the gunman lowered the gun, looked down and then detonated the explosives. At the time of the blast, the gunman was near the left rear corner of the vehicle. Video footage shows that at the time of the explosion, the Land Cruiser was still making the right turn. The Scotland Yard team’s analysis shows that it took 1.6 seconds from the time of the first shot to the detonation of the bomb.

In the Land Cruiser

109. Ms Naheed Khan recalled that immediately after she had heard the three gunshots, Ms Bhutto fell down into the vehicle onto her lap. Ms Khan said that she felt the impact of the explosion immediately thereafter. The right side of Ms Bhutto’s head came to rest on Ms Khan’s lap. Ms Khan saw that Ms Bhutto was bleeding profusely from the right side of her head. She noticed that Ms Bhutto was not moving and saw that blood was also trickling from her ear. Makhdoom Amin Fahim recalled that Ms Bhutto fell heavily and showed no sign of life after falling.

According to Scotland Yard’s video analysis, the flash of the blast appeared just over two-thirds of a second after Ms Bhutto disappeared from view.

110. No one else in her vehicle was seriously injured.

Transfer to the Hospital

111. After the explosion, Senator Abbasi told the driver to drive to the hospital (initially having in mind a hospital in Islamabad). Although all four of its tires were punctured by the blast, the Land Cruiser managed to drive along Liaquat Road for approximately 300 meters towards the junction with Murree Road where it turned left. As the Land Cruiser moved along Murree Road, it became increasingly difficult for the driver to manoeuvre on the metal rims of the wheels. The Land Cruiser made a U-turn at the Rehmanabad junction, located approximately four kilometres from the Liaquat Road-Murree Road junction, in order to get to the other side of the road where Rawalpindi General Hospital (RGH) was located. The occupants of the Land Cruiser recalled that at this point there was only one traffic police vehicle ahead of the Land Cruiser. No other vehicles were visible – neither the bullet proof black Mercedes-Benz car nor any Elite Force unit vehicle. Following the U-turn, the Land Cruiser stalled. The party had to wait for some time on Murree Road until a private vehicle that belonged to Ms Sherry Rehman arrived and took Ms Bhutto to the hospital.

The problem with Unintended Acceleration has brought about discussions on brakes and braking. The following is some quick hits on braking. Some of this is repetitive from a previous post, but it is worth repeating.

The most powerful control on the vehicle is the brakes. Basically the brakes produce larger changes in speed than the gas pedal.

Our school cars – police packaged Ford Crown Victoria’s – can accelerate from 0 to 60 in about 9 to 10 seconds. With a trained driver – the vehicle can stop from 60 to 0 in an average of 3.5 seconds. The Crown Vic can stop from 60 MPH in about one third of the time it takes to accelerate to 60 MPH.

Because the brakes have an enormous potential, they can be the producer of both good and evil. According to the Society of Automotive Engineers most accidents start out with improper braking techniques.

 A small increase in speed will produce a large increase in stopping distance.

The fact is that if you double your speed you increase your stopping distance by a factor of four.

 If you increase your speed from 40 to 50 mph, speed has increased by 25 % but stopping distance has increased by 50 %.

The above is true even if you have ABS brakes. ABS cannot repeal the laws of physics, make you immune to road conditions, and most important, cannot overcome stupidity.

It makes no difference if a driver brakes with their left foot – threshold brakes – or uses a parachute to stop. If the speed is doubled the stopping distance increases by a factor of four.

 A major component of braking to avoid an emergency has nothing to do with braking, its all about where you look while the emergency is unfolding. Simply stated – your hands go where your eyes look.

 As soon as the emergency presents itself look for a place to put the vehicle. Look where you want the vehicle go and your hands will follow your eyes.

 Many times the driver’s eyes fixate on the object they are trying to avoid, and the result is they drive into it.

 SUMMARY

 Be careful about increasing speeds – for every 10% increase in speed it is a 20% increase in stopping distance.

 When confronted with an emergency press the brake pedal as hard as possible.

 Look where you want to put the vehicle.

 Bottom line you cannot arbitrarily increase your speed, it’s literally deadly.

Whether driving to the mall, driving the boss to work or driving in a high risk environment most driving is done in the Comfort Zone. The Comfort Zone is a combination of speed – steering and/or braking where the vehicle reacts as the driver expects it to. The Red Zone is a combination of speed – steering and/or braking that creates big changes in the way the vehicle responds, changes that are not expected, and create anxiety. Unless it is a race, the Red Zone is not a place a driver would go to on purpose, it is a place visited only when bad things are happening.

 It  may be difficult to think of a 10,000 lb armored Suburban as “sensitive”, but a car’s controls are very sensitive to speed, the faster you go, the more sensitive the vehicles braking and steering become. This area of sensitivity is the Red Zone.

 Research indicates that going from the Comfort Zone to the beginning stages of the Red Zone, happens with an increase of a fraction of an inch on the steering wheel, and/or an increases of speed as little as 2 MPH. To complicate the issue research has also shown the driver gets into their own personal Red Zone way before the vehicle does. As the driver enters Red Zone the vehicle will send feedback that makes the driver feel uncomfortable (the researcher’s way of saying scared). At this stage of the Red Zone the vehicle is still controllable, but the level of skill needed to keep the vehicle under control has gone up dramatically, and the window of opportunity to maintain control is extremely small.

 Look at it as the vehicle has a limit and the driver has a limit. The drivers limit is much lower than the vehicles limit. Basically the driver is uncomfortable with a combination of speed – steering and/or braking that are below the amount of speed – steering and/or braking the vehicle can take. 

 It is the transition from Comfort to Red that creates a training challenge. In an emergency a driver will be required to quickly transition from their Comfort Zone, into the Red Zone, there can be no hesitation. Common sense dictates that a driver has to be trained to recognize and manage this transition. In our opinion this transition is the essence of driver training. One of the goals of a driver training program is to raise the amount of steering, braking and speed a driver is comfortable with.

First this is a rare occurrence, but it can and has been fatal. One of the fatal incidents happened in my home town – Medford MA.

 If this event happens there are two things you want to do quick – real quick. Slow the car down and disconnect the engine from the drive wheels.

 Here are some things you can do; Press on the brake pedal – brakes can and will overpower the horsepower created by the engine. In a test done by Car and Driver magazine here is what they found “With a Camry’s travelling 70 mph, the brakes easily overcame all 268 horsepower – and stopped the car in 190 feet—that’s a foot shorter than the performance of a Ford Taurus without any gas-pedal problems and just 16 feet longer than with the Camry’s throttle closed.”

 Also from the same  Car and Driver  article – “If this is a concern, in the future look for vehicles with electronic throttle control since the advent of electronic throttle control, many automakers have added software to program the throttle to close—and therefore cut power to the engine”.

 Shift into neutral this will disconnect the engine from the drive wheels – don’t worry about the engine revs going crazy – most cars have rev limiters. But if your gas pedal is stuck and you are travelling 60 MPH or 90 Feet in a second, the least of your concerns is the engine revs.

 Keep in mind where you are. If you are on a major highway you don’t want to stop in the passing lane, the people behind you will get cranky. Once the car is in neutral you can control the speed of the car with the brake pedal. Get the car safely to the side of the road and if you can, off the road. DO NOT shut of the engine while the car is moving. Shutting off the engine will make the car hard to steer, just adding more excitement to your life.

 Once the car is stopped shut off the engine, take a deep breath.