SecurityDriver News

Got this email from Sean Wang of International Armored Group, Sean was responding the May 9^th VR Armored Vehicle Classification Post

Sean wanted to elaborate a bit more on the issue. Here is what he had to say.

 Basically, the BRV 2009 VR7 certificate validates the vehicle armoring design by putting the vehicle through live ballistic testing.  Anyone can basically purchase certified ballistic steel and ballistic glass and install it on a vehicle, the challenge lies in the design and integration of the armoring so that the passenger cabin is fully sealed to prevent penetration from any projectiles.  Also, please note that under the BRV 2009 standard, VR7 is equivalent to the B6 level of armoring, not B7.  This is a common misconception due to the change in nomenclature.

In my opinion the only way to test an armoured vehicle is by shooting at the vehicle. As you can imagine this is expensive. The manufacture destroys the vehicle in the testing process. Take a look at the videos at the end of the article.

 I also wanted to mention that the blast testing is not a part of the BRV 2009 standards, which strictly covers ballistic threats.  Most of our armored vehicles are being used for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq where explosives are the most prominent threat.  Many organizations require certain levels of blast protection as well for their vehicles, which is the reason why we conducted additional testing even though it was not necessary to obtain the VR7 certificate.

 Sean sent along couple of demonstration videos of our vehicle ballistic and blast testing – I’m impressed.

The International Armored Group Web Site

Sean’s email sean.wang@interarmored.com

This is the second article by Derek Humble on situational awareness. Derek is a transplanted British security professional currently living in Toronto, Canada. After a career in the British Military he took a position with a large Canadian security provider operating a specialized department offering corporate protective services to Canada’s elite. In 1988 Derek decided to incorporate his own business that he named The Anvil Group. 

The Anvil Group Inc under Derek’s guidance ran operations in Canada and around the world with operations in North, Central and South America as well as Europe. Derek has run numerous versions of secure driver programs around the world specifically Moscow, Chicago, Mexico City and London to name a few. He is a long time friend, and was an early graduate of the old Scotti School of Defensive Driving and has constantly strived to study the cerebral aspects to protective driving as much as the physical practical side of the business.

 Currently Derek consults with companies on matters of personal protection, risk management and travel risk assessments.   

 dhumble@nemesisinfo.com

NEMESIS CONSULTING

Situation Awareness Part Two – Understanding “Attack Modes” and why it helps every Protector  - by Derek Humbel

 As discussed in part one understanding the threat is crucial to professional protection under any circumstances, anywhere. The fact that no one can “Protect against everything, every where, all the time” means narrowing down the threat to a specific kind of tactic and that is very helpful in timely counter actions.

The key is to designate the kind of attack mode(s) that affect those at risk. To simplify this process think of two kinds of attack mode:

The attack modes breakdown into two main types:

 “THE DELIBERATE ATTACK MODE” Encompasses those who are at risk from political, special interest, financial or geographical reasons that may well involve organized groups conducting pre-surveillance, threat assessments and may well run various rehearsals. Recognising these activities and reacting accordingly is the best result of being “Situation Aware”. However if those planning something see a high level of professionalism on the part of the protector(s) it might be sufficient reason for them to choose another target (selfish but true). Even hardened terrorists/insurgents want to succeed and it is the aim of the professional protector to give those bent on harm to reason to doubt their chance of success. Professional protection staff must understand that their actions might well be under scrutiny at any time (“good surveillance teams are hard to find”, as they say). A lack of total professionalism at all times is an invitation to those bent on harm.

 “THE IMMEDIATE ATTACK MODE” is the alternative but most common type of attack mode and it represents the risk of incidents involving opportunity, envy, grudge, or plain chance. These are single person situations involving very little in the way of preparation or planning. There are a few exceptions to this but in general these events involve one or maybe two individuals deciding to take advantage of an immediate situation. These scenarios might be at drop off and pick up points, exiting from a residence or even whilst in transit. There is little that can be done to deter these kinds of attackers they will have tunnel vision to their target (when questioned some idiots say they didn’t even see the bodyguard(s) but to allow this attack to be successful may not cause hardship to your protectee, but it may well harm the teams career prospects. The counter measures, protective routines and protection principles are what will save the day. In many cases habits and routines can cause harm but in countering against the ‘Immediate Attack Mode” The master principle is of course lock the doors such as once everyone has embarked a passer by grabbing a door handle and opening a door. This won’t harm anyone but security heads will and should roll.

 Once the types of attack mode are understood and adhered to it is necessary break them down as to where those attacks are most likely. Typically the old military mantra of the necessity “To dominate no-mans land” works beautifully in protection assignments. The dangers increase as you exit and enter secured bases/offices and unless the threat is sufficiently high (various forms of IEDs would be an example) protection teams can relax when on the road. Heightened awareness can only be maintained over limited periods of time (in some cases it must be) so by understanding the Attack Modes and the threats that those being protected face relaxation is possible and tactically righteous. This understanding of the required ‘ALERT LEVELS” makes the requirement of continuous protection assignments possible.  Heightened alert levels as you leave a secure location can be reduced as you get onto the road and away from the start point and as your destination draws near increasing the protection level is effective and necessary. During WW1 the most likely place to get ambushed was on re-entry to your own front lines by enemy forces let alone the risk of being shot at by your own side being alert at the right time is vital.

July 24, 2010

For the protection specialist or security driver the worst-case scenario is a deliberate attempt to stop the vehicle.  Surviving those scenarios requires the ability to keep the vehicle moving and clear the kill zone as quickly as possible – no matter what is happening outside the vehicle.

Focused, Intense, Effective Training

 VDI’s Immediate Action Driving Skills course is designed to provide security practitioners – from the entry-level protection specialist to highly experienced private sector, military and law enforcement professionals - the training and experience needed to deal with the worst-case scenario, a vehicle ambush. Where survival comes down to the driver’s ability to respond instinctively to the threat, when the difference between success and failure is measured in tenths of a second. 

This one day course provides students with an opportunity to:

 - Learn from professionals with real world experience

 - Experience the realities of driving through a kill zone        

 - Understand how to effectivelyoperate damaged vehicles

 Students will gain hands-on, practical experience in:

 - Pushing through roadblocks - (One & two vehicle ramming)

 - Defeating rolling ambushes - (PIT/Counter-PIT techniques)

 - Dealing with an incapacitated driver – (Driving from passenger seat)

 - Forced lane excursions – (Surface transitions)

For addtional information
Joseph Autera
Tony Scotti’s Vehicle Dynamics Institute
Tel: 732 738-5221
Cell : 732–586-4020   email: jautera@vehicledynamics.net

Or Tony Scotti
781 395 3097 email tonyscotti@securitydriver.com

Malcolm Cheshire asked, via LinkedIn – “What is the VR armored vehicle classification and how does it differ from the other classifications”

 This is what I came up with

This is taken from an article I read.

  In order to address the issue of full vehicle certification, the VPAM BRV 1999 standard   was initially created, ranging from VR1 to VR7 (equivalent to B1 to B7 level of    protection).  Since then, a new and updated standard called the VPAM BRV 2009 (VR1 to  VR10) has been created with more stringent testing requirements.  The VR certification requires the entire armored vehicle to be subject to a comprehensive destructive testing process with multiple shots on the vehicle to ensure that the armoring will withstand the appropriate type of ammunition that it is rated for.

The most notable difference between the BRV2009 and BRV 1999 is that under the new standard, the firewall, windscreen, side panels, rear, gaps/apertures, and roof areas can be shot from any angle, whereas the older standard only required test shots to be fired from a 90 degree angle (45-60 degree angle for the roof).

The testing is still conducted by Beschussamt Mellrichstadt. This is the 2009 Standard - you will have to go to a computer translator to get in English.

Although it is an advertisement for BMW High Security Vehicles – this You Tube video is still a good primer on armored cars.

A UN report on the assassination of Pakistani Prime Minister Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto has been widely circulated. It is fairly long, 54 pages. I have taken the section that deals with the “Day of the Assassination”. When we have some time we will offer our opinion of what happened and developed a lessons learned. In the interim I am sure the the community would welcome any comments. It’s long but filled with good info.

 “The Day of the Assassination”

Departure from Zardari House for Liaquat Bagh

86. Around 1400 hours, Ms Bhutto left Zardari House, for Liaquat Bagh, in a convoy of vehicles. The convoy consisted of a black Toyota Land Cruiser used by Mr Tauqir Kaira, followed by Ms Bhutto’s white armoured Land Cruiser and two of Mr Kaira’s vehicles on either side of Ms Bhutto’s vehicle. The latter two were a Mercedes-Benz van on the right and a four-door double cabin vehicle on the left.

Immediately behind those vehicles were two Toyota Vigo pick-up trucks, positioned side by side. A black Mercedes-Benz car was behind these Vigos. This Mercedes- Benz, from Zardari House, was bullet-proof and served as the back-up vehicle for Ms Bhutto. The two Vigo pick-up trucks were also from Zardari House.

87. Mr Kaira was inside the lead vehicle with his security men. Accompanying Ms Bhutto in her vehicle were Mr Javed-ur-Rehman (driver, front-left seat), SSP Major (ret) Imtiaz Hussain (front-right seat), Makhdoom Amin Fahim (senior PPP member, second row-left seat), Ms Bhutto (second row-centre seat), Ms Naheed Khan (senior PPP member and political secretary of Ms Bhutto, second row-right seat). Seated in the back of the vehicle on two benches facing each other were Senator Safdar Abbasi (senior PPP member, rear-right bench), Mr Shahenshah (rear-left bench, facing

Senator Abbasi) and Mr Razaq Mirani (personal attendant of Ms Bhutto, rear-right bench next to Senator Abbasi and to his left). Mr Kaira’s two vehicles on either side of Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser carried his men. The Vigo pick-up trucks carried members of Mr Chaudry Aslam’s security team. Riding in the black Mercedes-Benz car were the driver, PPP official Mr Faratullah Babar in the front passenger seat and, in the rear passenger seat from left to right, two PPP officials Mr Babar Awan and Mr Rehman Malik and General (ret) Tauqir Zia.

Arrival at Liaquat Bagh

88. Ms Bhutto’s convoy reached the Faizabad junction at about 1415 hours, according to the Rawalpindi District Police, who were to assume responsibility for security of the convoy. According to the police and the Security Plan, an escort was to be provided composed of a traffic police “pilot” jeep, a regular police jeep leading the convoy and three Elite Force Toyota pick-up trucks protecting Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser on three sides. People in Ms Bhutto’s vehicle claim, however, that there was no such escort except for one traffic police vehicle.

89. At about 1456 hours, Ms Bhutto’s convoy turned right at the Murree Road – Liaquat Road junction and headed towards Liaquat Bagh. Video footage shows Ms Bhutto’s convoy driving from the Murree Road – Liaquat Bagh junction to the inner security gate leading to the VIP parking area at Liaquat Bagh. The footage shows Ms Bhutto standing through the roof escape hatch of her Land Cruiser and waving at the large crowd around the vehicle while it moved slowly on Liaquat Road.

90. Both ASP Ashfaq Anwar who was the supervisor of the Elite Force unit and Inspector Azmat Ali Dogar, the unit’s commander, told the Commission that they accompanied Ms Bhutto all the way to the back of the stage according to the Security Plan. However, video footage and pictures show that as Ms Bhutto drove on much of Liaquat Road, her vehicle was flanked only by her private security vehicles. The Elite Force vehicles were nowhere near her vehicle. In fact, the Commission has identified Inspector Dogar among the crowd some distance from Ms Bhutto’s vehicle.

Contrary to the police assertion, there was no police-provided box formation around Ms Bhutto as she arrived at the rally, and the Elite Force unit did not execute their duties as specified in the security deployment. Furthermore, the Commission does not believe that the full escort as described by the police was ever present.

91. At about 1516 hours, Ms Bhutto’s convoy stopped for a few minutes at the inner gate of the parking area waiting for that gate to be opened, during which Ms Bhutto remained standing through the escape hatch. The police and some PPP members disagree as to the reason for the delay in opening the gate. While the PPP asserts that the police did not have the key to open the gate, the police said that they did not want the large crowd following Ms Bhutto to get into the VIP parking area.

Altogether, Ms Bhutto stood through the escape hatch for the approximately 20 minutes it took to drive from the Murree Road – Liaquat Road junction to the gate of the parking area. This calls into question the claim of the Rawalpindi District Police that they were surprised when Ms Bhutto emerged from the escape hatch on her way out of Liaquat Bagh.

92. Once the convoy passed through the inner gate, at about 1531 hours, it drove through the VIP parking area to the rear of the stage. At least the following three vehicles were in the VIP parking area: Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser, Mr Kaira’s lead vehicle and the black bullet-proof Mercedes-Benz car. Temporary wooden stairs had been built for the rally to access the rear of the stage directly from the parking area.

Ms Bhutto climbed the stairs, went to the stage to wave to the crowd and took her seat before addressing the crowd.

93. Near the rear of the stage, a scuffle broke out between some workers of the PPP and police who tried to prevent them from climbing to the stage. This created tension between PPP workers and the police officers posted in that area. Accounts given by PPP representatives and the police with regard to the degree and nature of this event differ significantly. The police state that the dispute was minor and was settled immediately, whereas some on the local PPP side claim it was serious and led to bitter reactions from the police during the rest of the rally. They say that the police felt insulted and became more passive in their security role. The Commission finds that the police were indeed passive in their provision of security and believes it unprofessional if the Rawalpindi District Police reduced their level of alert to any degree as a result of wounded pride.

Exit from Liaquat Bagh

94. Several thousand people attended the event. Ms Bhutto was joined on the stage by a number of national-level PPP leaders and all of the parliamentary candidates from Rawalpindi district. The crowds were enthusiastic, and PPP leaders and activists considered the event to have been a great success. They say Ms Bhutto gave a strong and rousing speech, one of the best of her campaign, and describe her as having been radiant that day.

95. The public gathering concluded and, at about 1710 hours, Ms Bhutto descended the wooden stairs and entered her Land Cruiser. The occupants of the Land Cruiser and their seating positions were the same as for the trip in to Liaquat Bagh. The composition of passengers in the black Mercedes-Benz car also remained the same.

96. The black bullet-proof Mercedes-Benz car was the first to leave the parking area. It is not clear how much distance there was between this vehicle and the rest of Ms Bhutto’s convoy at the moment of the blast. Credible reports range from 100 meters to 250 meters. Some of those in the car said that they were close enough to Ms Bhutto’s vehicle to feel the impact of the blast. Others at the site of the blast have said that the Mercedes-Benz left Liaquat Bagh so quickly that it was nowhere to be seen when the blast occurred. Indeed, the Commission has not seen this vehicle in the many video images of the exit area it reviewed. Despite the acknowledgement of some occupants of the vehicle that they felt the impact of the blast, the Commission finds it incredible that they drove all the way to Zardari House, a drive of about 20 minutes, before they became aware that Ms Bhutto had been injured in the blast.

They should have stopped at a safe distance when they felt the blast so as to check on Ms Bhutto’s condition, the condition of her vehicle and whether the back-up vehicle was required. Indeed, as the back-up vehicle, the Mercedes-Benz car would have been an essential element of Ms Bhutto’s convoy on the return trip even if the occupants of that car had confirmed that Ms Bhutto had been unscathed in the attack.

97. Mr Kaira’s vehicle was the next to leave the inner parking area after the Mercedes-Benz car, with Ms Bhutto’s vehicle right behind it, followed by another of Mr Kaira’s vehicles. The two Vigo pick-up trucks then followed from the outer parking area located between the inner and outer gates.

98. At 1712 hours, Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser exited from the outer gate. Crowds of people who were already on Liaquat Road drew closer to the vehicle as it began to turn right onto Liaquat Road. In addition, many people left the park, swelling the crowd around the Land Cruiser, contrary to the police assertion that they did not allow anyone to leave the park before the departure of Ms Bhutto’s convoy. Ms Bhutto emerged through the escape hatch of the vehicle and started waving to her supporters. When the vehicle approached the central road divider, it was slowed further by the crowd.

99. Major Imtiaz, who was sitting in the front seat of the Land Cruiser, said that he was worried that the convoy was being slowed down by the crowd. He wanted to call CPO Saud Aziz by cell phone, but he did not have the CPO’s direct number. Instead he called CPO Saud Aziz’s operator and the operator at the police station in Multan, another town in Punjab Province (where Major Imtiaz had recently served). The Commission finds that this lack of preparation was a major flaw in the security arrangements and reflects badly on the professionalism of Major Imtiaz who should have had full and rapid access to the Rawalpindi police command.

100. Questions remain as to the nature of the crowd that gathered around the Land Cruiser. Passengers in the Land Cruiser and some local PPP members recalled that they were mostly PPP workers, and they did not see any strangers or irregular movements among them. The Rawalpindi District Police and other PPP members, however, suggested that a group of people had deliberately stood in front of the Land Cruiser to prevent it from moving. Regardless of the accuracy of either account, it remains that the police did not control the crowd outside of Liaquat Bagh. As a result, the attacker was able to get as close as he did to Ms Bhutto’s vehicle.

101. The Rawalpindi police authorities and some PPP workers dispute the exact exit route agreed for Ms Bhutto’s convoy. The Rawalpindi District Police and DCO Elahi claim that the planned route for the convoy was to turn right onto Liaquat Road and then left onto Murree Road, retracing the convoy’s entry route. Only in case of an emergency was the convoy to make a left turn after exiting from the outer gate; a decision to take the emergency route had to be made by the senior police officer in charge of security on the scene. Some local PPP workers who attended the preparatory meeting with the police disagree with this account. They claim that the original plan was to make a left turn onto Liaquat Road and that the minutes provided by the DCO, which did not indicate this left turn, were inaccurate. In any event, photographs show two stationary police vehicles on Liaquat Road blocking the left- side drive lane where the left turn would have been made. As a result, even in an emergency, it would have been impossible for Ms Bhutto’s convoy to make a left turn and use the escape route unless those police vehicles were quickly moved. The Commission learned that these vehicles were official vehicles of senior Rawalpindi police officers. The Commission finds it irresponsible that these vehicles were parked in such a way as to block the emergency exit route.

102. The Rawalpindi District Police claim that police vehicles from the Elite Force unit headed by ASP Ashfaq Anwar were waiting outside the outer gate to escort Ms Bhutto’s convoy and that they were about to go into a protective box formation when the attack on Ms Bhutto took place. However, forming the box at this point was impracticable given the narrow width of Liaquat Road and the number of people who had already started to surround Ms Bhutto’s vehicle. In any event, video footage shows very few uniformed police on the scene available to push back the crowd to create space for the box formation. Furthermore, video and photographs taken shortly before the blast as well as Commission interviews indicate that the Elite Force unit was not in position to go into a box formation. The Elite Force unit was in place neither for the entry nor the exit of the convoy and did not afford the protection they were tasked with, thus failing spectacularly in their duty.

103. Overall, video and photographic materials as well as the Commission’s interviews establish that there were very few police deployed outside the outer gate and on Liaquat Road as Ms Bhutto’s convoy attempted to depart the scene.

The Attack

104. From the exit, Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser started to make a right turn onto Liaquat Road. As it slowly approached the central divider on Liaquat Road, the crowd began chanting slogans. There is some dispute over whether Ms Bhutto made the decision to stand up on her own or was urged to do so. Before she stood up, Ms Bhutto asked Ms Naheed Khan to make a phone call to Mr Nawaz Sharif, PML-N leader, to convey condolences for the deaths of some of his supporters who had been shot during the PML-N rally earlier that day. It had been reported that the shooting incident occurred between supporters of the PML-N and those of the PML-Q parties.

105. While Ms Khan was trying to reach Mr Sharif, Ms Bhutto stopped her and asked Senator Abbasi, who was sitting in the rear seat, to chant slogans to the crowd using the vehicle’s loudspeaker. Ms Bhutto then stood on the seat and appeared through the escape hatch, with her head and shoulders exposed.

106. Ms Bhutto waved to the crowd. The vehicle continued to move slowly into its right turn onto Liaquat Road. At this point, a man wearing dark glasses appeared in the crowd on the left side of the Land Cruiser. Around 1714 hours, while the vehicle continued into its right turn, the man pulled out a pistol, and from a distance of approximately two to three meters, fired three shots at Ms Bhutto. According to video analysis conducted by Scotland Yard, the three shots were fired in less than one second.

107. The Commission examined video footage taken from a back angle, which shows Ms Bhutto’s dupatta, her white head covering, and her hair flick upwards after the second shot. However, there is no evidence of a link between the second shot and that movement. After the third shot, she started to move down into the vehicle.

108. After the third shot, the gunman lowered the gun, looked down and then detonated the explosives. At the time of the blast, the gunman was near the left rear corner of the vehicle. Video footage shows that at the time of the explosion, the Land Cruiser was still making the right turn. The Scotland Yard team’s analysis shows that it took 1.6 seconds from the time of the first shot to the detonation of the bomb.

In the Land Cruiser

109. Ms Naheed Khan recalled that immediately after she had heard the three gunshots, Ms Bhutto fell down into the vehicle onto her lap. Ms Khan said that she felt the impact of the explosion immediately thereafter. The right side of Ms Bhutto’s head came to rest on Ms Khan’s lap. Ms Khan saw that Ms Bhutto was bleeding profusely from the right side of her head. She noticed that Ms Bhutto was not moving and saw that blood was also trickling from her ear. Makhdoom Amin Fahim recalled that Ms Bhutto fell heavily and showed no sign of life after falling.

According to Scotland Yard’s video analysis, the flash of the blast appeared just over two-thirds of a second after Ms Bhutto disappeared from view.

110. No one else in her vehicle was seriously injured.

Transfer to the Hospital

111. After the explosion, Senator Abbasi told the driver to drive to the hospital (initially having in mind a hospital in Islamabad). Although all four of its tires were punctured by the blast, the Land Cruiser managed to drive along Liaquat Road for approximately 300 meters towards the junction with Murree Road where it turned left. As the Land Cruiser moved along Murree Road, it became increasingly difficult for the driver to manoeuvre on the metal rims of the wheels. The Land Cruiser made a U-turn at the Rehmanabad junction, located approximately four kilometres from the Liaquat Road-Murree Road junction, in order to get to the other side of the road where Rawalpindi General Hospital (RGH) was located. The occupants of the Land Cruiser recalled that at this point there was only one traffic police vehicle ahead of the Land Cruiser. No other vehicles were visible – neither the bullet proof black Mercedes-Benz car nor any Elite Force unit vehicle. Following the U-turn, the Land Cruiser stalled. The party had to wait for some time on Murree Road until a private vehicle that belonged to Ms Sherry Rehman arrived and took Ms Bhutto to the hospital.

The International Executive Protection Conference sponsored by the ESI Alumni Association will be held in Las Vegas Aug 6th to the 8th at the Caesar’s Place.

The conference is a networking event opened to all Protection Professionals. The conference presents a unique opportunity to network with others in the business. Studies indicate that 75% of all positions are filled by networking, my guess would be in the protection business that number is higher.

There are discussions by industry leaders such as – Directors of Security of major corporations – Detail Leaders from high end security companies – Personal Protection Agents working in the industry, all of them willing to share their experience with you.

For three days the conference delivers seminars that are relevant to the success of your business or career. Subjects that you won’t find in most other Protection Conferences – like financing and budgeting – International travel for the EP agent – Resume writing – you can have your resume reviewed by people who have worked in the industry for decades and have looked at hundreds of resumes.

And in my opinion one of the most important seminars of the convention is the “Building a Business including Branding and Marketing”. The talk is given by a graduate of the prestigious Wharton School of Business, who also happens to be the CEO of a Security Company with 18 years of experience supplying personal protection agents.

There are other great subjects covering the use of K9’s and Close Protection

Oh I forgot to mention that I will be the Keynote Speaker

For more information

Jerry Glazebrook and Dr. Nick Nicholson, the Authors’ of the industry standard book “The Executive Protection Specialist Handbook”, have developed a task analysis for Executive Protection. The document is titled EP Core Competencies. I have known Jerry and Nick for longer than the three of us would want to admit. It would take a couple of pages to go over all their accomplishments. So I would suggest you read their bios.

Jerry’s Bio  Web Site   Email glazerjh@aol.com   Nicks Bio   Web Site    Email nnicholson@alallc.us

If you have any comments they would like to hear them, or if you have any questions I’m sure they would be happy to answer them.

EP Core Competencies

By Jerry Glazebrook and Dr. Nick Nicholson

Research
Knowledge of Sources of Information
Understand and Apply Basics Research Principles
Ability to Conduct Research on Travel, New Technology, and Individuals
Knowledge and Ability to Operate Computers
Ability to Gather Operational Intelligence
Ability to Develop Threat Profiles
Ability in Preparing a Personal Profile

Interpersonal Communications
Ability to Network with Others
Skilled in Effective Communication
Develop Independent Thinking Skills
Develop Team Skills
Ability to Conduct Interviews
Knowledge in Dress, Protocol, Personal
Appearance, Manners, Conduct, and Dining Etiquette
Ability to Liaison with Other Organizations
Ability to Effectively Communicate over the Phone and Radio
Knowledge of Verbal Persuasion Techniques
Recruiting and Selecting Personnel

Mechanical Ability
Basic Protection Equipment Operation
Understand Fire Prevention and Extinguish Techniques
Understand basic auto repair – changing flat tires-etc.

Presentation Skills
Conduct Training and Briefings for Principals Agents
Understand the Basic Instructional System Design Principles
Creating Effective Presentations

Inspections Advance Work
Conducting a Physical Security Surveys
Office
Residence
Routes
Choke Points & Danger Zones
Conducting Risk Assessments
Understanding the Specialized Interests of Children, Family Members, Visitors, Household
Staffs, and Recreational Activities

Emergency Medical Care
CPR
Trauma (Combat) Casualty Care
First Aid
Health and Safety Issues
Water Rescue

Specialized Security Concerns
Crowd Control
Identifying Mental Illness
Understanding Seaport Security
Maritime Tactical Boarding and Yacht
Understanding Aircraft Security
Special Function Planning – Parties, Concerts, Theater. etc.
Violence in the Workplace Issues
Terrorism Issues

Use of Force Issues
Defensive Tactics – Countermeasures
Intermediate Use of Force Weapons; Kubaton, Sprays. etc.

Technical Security Issues
Understanding Basic Explosive Devices
Detecting/Recognition Explosive Devices
Understanding “bugs” and Listening Devices
Detection of Listening Devices and Bugs
Conduct Preliminary Searches for Listening Devices
Understanding Sensor (Alarm) Technology and Operations

Writing Skills
Knowledge of Terminology
Report Writing
Developing Operation Orders/Policies & Procedures
Preparing Travel Reports

Driving Skills
Perform Safe Driving Techniques
Develop Evasive Driving Skills
Understand and Perform Motorcade Procedures

Physical Fitness
Physical Exercise & Weight Lifting
Endurance
Diet
Survival as a hostage
Stress Management Techniques

Firearms Training
Knowledge of Basic Firearms Skills
Ability to Effectively Shoot Required Weapons
Knowledge of Ballistic Hardware
Ability to Shoot on the Move
Ability to Perform Close Quarter Encounters (Combat)

Legal Issues
Knowledge of Protective Law
Preparing Case Information for Legal Authorities
Understanding Stalkers and the Law

Crisis Management
Planning
Command Post Operations
Managing a Command Post

Moving the Principal
Understand the Basic Principal Movement Techniques
Orienteering, Map Reading, and Movements in Emergency Situations
Ability to Perform Movements, Signals, Positioning, Arrivals and Departures

Surveillance Detection Skills
Ability to Observe/Describe/Identify People and Vehicles for Later Recall
Understand the Surveillance Process
Equipment & Cameras
Basic Surveillance Techniques

All vehicles are supported by a cushion of air contained in four flexible rubber tires.  If you could place a car on a glass floor and look at it from below, you would see four patches of rubber, most folks are surprised at the size of these four patches, depending on the vehicle – each patch a little smaller than a hand.  These are the only points of contact between the vehicle and the road.  Each of these four small patches of rubber is known as the “contact patch”. It is these four patches that create the traction which makes the vehicle – go – stop and turn. It is these four patches that send the feedback back to the driver, and it is these four patches the driver has to manage. Consider them to be the source of information needed to control the vehicle.

 How Much Rubber Do You Have?

If you conduct training and want to know the size of the contact patch your vehicle creates, jack up your vehicle, put ink on the bottom of the tire, and let the car down on a piece of paper (we use finger print ink). Have someone keep their foot on the brake as you let the vehicle down, it keeps the tire from rolling, and lower the tire on the paper – the tire will leave a mark on the paper that represents the tire contact patch. The paper should be outline paper dived in one inch blocks, it makes measuring the contact patch easier.

 Once done you have a “picture” of the tire contact patch, and can easily measure the size of the patch in square inches (width of the patch times the height of the patch). If you take that number multiply it by four that is how much rubber is on the road.

 In our vehicles, police package Crown Vics with P225/60R16 tires with 32 PSI, we have 36.75 square inches per tire and all four tires will give us of contact area of 147 square inches of rubber touching the road.

A project we are working on requires us to put together a series of animations depicting vehicle ambushes. The Gus Boulis ambush is a rough draft of our first animation, which means you will need to read the scenario (below) to get an idea of what is going on. We will be adding voice over and making some small changes. Eventually we will have a series of animated vehicle attacks – all with lessons learned. The animation is the work of Larry Snow from SJC if you have any comments or questions you can reach Larry at  lawrence.snow@yahoo.com

The Scenario

On Feb. 6, 2001 Boulis left his offices on Southeast 17th Street in Fort Lauderdale about 9:30 p.m. and headed down Miami Road, a shortcut to Federal Highway on his way home to Hollywood.

 As he was driving down Miami Road a car stopped in front of him, blocking his way. A vehicle coming from the other direction pulled up next to Boulis.  A passenger sitting in the back seat fired on him with a semi-automatic weapon.

Boulis managed to drive out to Federal Highway before crashing into a tree. He died a short time later at Broward General Medical Center.

Background

Gus Boulis was the owner of SunCruz Casinos, a Florida company. SunCruz consisted of boats that would travel off shore onto international water, where the passengers could gamble.

 In September of 2000, Boulis sold SunCruz for $147.5 million. Problems arose between Gus and the people that bought the boats. Throughout his business career Gus had a knack of pissing people off. You can read about him in this series of articles.

 At the time we were doing some work with the people who bought the boats.  Because of the concerns they had for their safety they had bodyguards and an armored Mercedes (I was a consultant with Mercedes at the time). The people who bought the boats eventually ran afoul of the law and wound up in jail, but nothing to do with the Boulis attack

 In September 2005 Anthony Moscatiello and James Fiorillo, both Florida residents, were arrested in connection with the murder. Anthony Ferrari, who resided in New York, was also detained in connection with the killing. You can gather from the names of the individuals who Gus pissed off.