SecurityDriver News

Another must read report from Stratfor

Thanks to Scott Stewart for writing it and a major thank you to Stratfor for allowing the article to be circulated.

Looking at the world from a protective-intelligence perspective, the theme for the past week has not been improvised explosive devices or potential mass-casualty attacks. While there have been suicide bombings in Afghanistan, alleged threats to the World Cup and seemingly endless post-mortem discussions of the failed May 1 Times Square attack, one recurring and under-reported theme in a number of regions around the world has been kidnapping.

For example, in Heidenheim, Germany, Maria Boegerl, the wife of German banker Thomas Boegerl, was reportedly kidnapped from her home May 12. The kidnappers issued a ransom demand to the family and an amount was agreed upon. Mr. Boegerl placed the ransom payment at the arranged location, but the kidnappers never picked up the money (perhaps suspecting or detecting police involvement). The family has lost contact with the kidnappers, and fear for Mrs. Boegerl’s fate has caused German authorities to launch a massive search operation, which has included hundreds of searchers along with dogs, helicopters and divers.

Two days after the Boegerl kidnapping, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) posted a message on the Internet claiming to have custody of French citizen Michel Germaneau, a retired engineer who had previously worked in Algeria’s petroleum sector. Germaneau was reportedly kidnapped April 22, in northern Niger, close to the border with Mali and Algeria. The AQIM video contained a photo of Germaneau and of his identification card. The group demanded a prisoner exchange and said that French President Nicolas Sarkozy would be responsible for the captive’s well-being.

Also on May 14, Diego Fernandez de Cevallos, a high-profile attorney and former presidential candidate, was kidnapped near his ranch in the Mexican state of Queretaro. Fernandez had left his home in Mexico City to drive to his ranch but never arrived. His vehicle was found abandoned near the ranch on Saturday morning and the vehicle reportedly showed signs of a struggle. It is not known who kidnapped Fernandez or what the motivation for the kidnapping was.

At the moment a kidnapping occurs, the abduction team usually has achieved tactical surprise and usually employs overwhelming force. To the previously unsuspecting victim, the abductors seemingly appear out of nowhere. But when examined carefully, kidnappings are, for the most part, the result of a long and carefully orchestrated process. They do not arise from a vacuum. There are almost always some indications or warnings that the process is in motion prior to the actual abduction, meaning that many kidnappings are avoidable. In light of this reality, let’s take a more detailed look at the phenomenon of kidnappings.

Types of Kidnappings

There are many different types of kidnappings. Although kidnappings for ransom and political kidnappings generate considerable news interest, most kidnappings have nothing to do with money or political statements. They are typically kidnappings conducted by family members in custody disputes, emotionally disturbed strangers wanting to take a child to raise or strangers who abduct a victim for sexual exploitation.

Even in financially motivated kidnappings, there are a number of different types. The stereotypical kidnapping of a high-value target comes most readily to mind, but there are also more spur-of-the-moment express kidnappings, where a person is held until his bank account can be drained using an ATM card, and even virtual kidnappings, where no kidnapping occurs at all but the victim is frightened by a claim that a loved one has been kidnapped and pays a ransom to the alleged abductors. Some of the piracy incidents in Somalia also move into the economic kidnapping realm, especially in cases where the crew or passengers are seen as being more valuable than the boat or its cargo.

Since kidnapping is such a broad topic, for the sake of this discussion, we will focus primarily on kidnappings that are financially motivated and those that are politically motivated. Financially motivated kidnappings can be conducted by a variety of criminal elements. At the highest level are highly trained professional kidnapping gangs that specialize in abducting high-net-worth individuals and who will frequently demand ransoms in the millions of dollars. Such groups often employ teams of specialists who carry out a variety of specific tasks such as collecting intelligence, conducting surveillance, snatching the target, negotiating with the victim’s family and establishing and guarding the safe-houses.

At the other end of the spectrum are gangs that randomly kidnap targets of opportunity. These gangs are generally far less skilled than the professional gangs and often will hold a victim for only a short time, as in an express kidnapping. Sometimes express kidnapping victims are held in the trunk of a car for the duration of their ordeal, which can sometimes last for days if the victim has a large amount in a checking account and a small daily ATM withdrawal limit. Other times, if an express kidnapping gang discovers it has grabbed a high-value target by accident, the gang will hold the victim longer and demand a much higher ransom. Occasionally, these express kidnapping groups will even “sell” a high-value victim to a more professional kidnapping gang. (On a side note, most express kidnapping victims tend to be male and are most frequently abducted while walking on the street after dark, and many have impaired their senses by consuming alcohol.)

In the United States, it is far more common for a relatively poor person to be kidnapped for financial motives than it is for a high-net-worth individual. This is because kidnapping groups frequently target groups of illegal immigrants, who they believe are far less likely to seek help from the authorities. In some cases, the police have found dozens of immigrant hostages being held in safe-houses.

Between the two extremes of kidnapping groups — those targeting the rich and those targeting the poor — there is a wide range of kidnapping gangs that might target a bank vice president or branch manager rather than the bank’s CEO, or that might kidnap the owner of a restaurant or other small business rather than an industrialist.

In the realm of political kidnappings, there are abductions that are very well-planned, such as the December 1981 kidnapping of Gen. James Dozier by the Italian Red Brigades, or Hezbollah’s March 1985 kidnapping of journalist Terry Anderson. However, there are also opportunistic cases of politically motivated kidnappings, such as when foreigners are abducted at a Taliban checkpoint in Afghanistan or AQIM militants grab a European tourist in the Sahel area of Africa. Of course, in the case of both the Taliban and AQIM, the groups see kidnapping as an important source of funding as well as a politically useful tool.

Understanding the Process

In deliberate (as opposed to opportunistic) kidnappings based on financial or political motives, the kidnappers generally follow a process that is very similar to what we call the terrorist attack cycle: target selection, planning, deployment, attack, escape and exploitation. In a kidnapping, this means the group must identify a victim; plan for the abduction, captivity and negotiation; conduct the abduction and secure the hostage; successfully leverage the life of the victim for financial or political gain; and then escape.

During some phases of this process, the kidnappers may not be visible to the target, but there are several points during the process when the kidnappers are forced to expose themselves to detection in order to accomplish their mission. Like the perpetrators of a terrorist attack, those planning a kidnapping are most vulnerable to detection while they are conducting surveillance — before they are ready to deploy and conduct their attack. As we have noted several times in past analyses, one of the secrets of countersurveillance is that most criminals are not very good at conducting surveillance. The primary reason they succeed is that no one is looking for them.

Of course, kidnappers are also very easy to spot once they launch their attack, pull their weapons and perhaps even begin to shoot. By this time, however, it might very well be too late to escape their attack. They will have selected their attack site and employed the forces they believe they need to overpower their victim and complete the operation. While the kidnappers could botch their operation and the target could escape unscathed, it is simply not practical to pin one’s hopes on that possibility. It is clearly better to spot the kidnappers early and avoid their trap before it is sprung and the guns come out.

Kidnappers, like other criminals, look for patterns and vulnerabilities that they can exploit. Their chances for success increase greatly if they are allowed to conduct surveillance at will and are given the opportunity to thoroughly assess the security measures (if any) employed by the target. We have seen several cases in Mexico in which the criminals even chose to attack despite security measures such as armored cars and armed security guards. In such cases, criminals attack with adequate resources to overcome existing security. For example, if there are protective agents, the attackers will plan to neutralize them first. If there is an armored vehicle, they will find ways to defeat the armor or grab the target when he or she is outside the vehicle. Because of this, criminals must not be allowed to conduct surveillance at will. Potential targets should practice a heightened but relaxed state of situational awareness that will help them spot hostile surveillance.

Potential targets should also conduct simple pattern and route analyses to determine where they are most predictable and vulnerable. Taking an objective look at your schedule and routes is really not as complicated as it may seem. While the ideal is to vary routes and times to avoid predictable locations, this is also difficult and disruptive and warranted only when the threat is extremely high. A more practical alternative is for potential targets to raise their situational awareness a notch as they travel through such areas at predictable times.

Of course, using the term “potential targets” points to another problem. Many kidnapping victims simply don’t believe they are potential targets until after they have been kidnapped, and therefore do not take commonsense security measures. Frequently, when such people are debriefed after their release from captivity, they are able to recall suspicious activity before their abduction that they did not take seriously because they did not consider themselves targets. One American businessman who was kidnapped in Central America said upon his release that he knew there was something odd about the behavior of a particular couple he saw frequently sitting on a park bench near his home prior to his kidnapping, but he didn’t think he was rich enough to be targeted for kidnapping. As soon as he was abducted, he said that he immediately knew that the awkward couple had been observing him to determine his pattern. He said that he often thought about that couple during his two months in captivity, and how a little bit of curiosity could have saved him from a terrifying ordeal and his family a substantial sum of money.

The same steps involved in a deliberate kidnapping are also followed in ad hoc, opportunistic kidnappings — though the steps may be condensed and accomplished in seconds or minutes rather than the weeks or months normally associated with a well-planned kidnapping operation. And the same problems with lack of awareness often apply. It is not uncommon to talk to someone who was involved in an express kidnapping and hear the person say, “I got a bad feeling about those three guys standing near that car when I started walking down that block, but I kept walking anyway.” This frequent occurrence highlights the importance of situational awareness, attack recognition and proper mindset maintenance.

Potential targets do not have to institute security measures that will make them invulnerable to such crimes — something that is very difficult and that can be very expensive. Rather, the objective is to take measures that make them a harder target than other members of the specific class of individuals to which they belong. Groups conducting pre-operational surveillance, whether for an intentional kidnapping or an opportunistic kidnapping, prefer a target that is unaware and easy prey. Taking some basic security measures such as maintaining a healthy state of situational awareness will, in many cases, cause the criminals to choose another target who is less aware and therefore more vulnerable.

Also, most people who are kidnapped in places like Afghanistan or the Sahel know they are going into dangerous places and disregard the warnings not to go to those places. Many of these people, like journalists and aid workers, take the risk as part of their jobs. Others, like the European tourists abducted in the Sahel (and some of the pleasure boaters kidnapped by Somali pirates), appear to naively disregard the risk or to be thrill-seekers. In the recent Germaneau case in Niger, due to the number of highly publicized kidnappings in the Sahel region over the past eight years, and Germaneau’s personal history of working in Algeria, it would be hard to argue that he did not know what he could be getting himself into (though we are unsure at this point what motivated him to run that risk). After Germaneau’s kidnapping, his driver was subsequently arrested, raising the possibility that he was somehow complicit in the abduction. This is a reminder that it is not at all unusual for kidnapping gangs to have inside help, whether a maid, bodyguard, interpreter or taxi driver.

In retrospect, almost every person who is kidnapped either missed or ignored some indication or warning of danger. These warnings can range from observable criminal behavior to a consular information bulletin specifically warning people not to drive outside of cities in Guatemala after dark, for example. This means that, while kidnapping can be a devastating crime, it can also be an avoidable one.

Joe giving the standoff foot print lecture in our Surveillance Detection Program

Students working on their field exercises

Joe and Larry getting the students ready for one of Our Vehicle Dynamics and Exercise Design Programs, the program is one of our Mission Oriented Driving Skills (MODS) programs. This is an old article about the program.

The students gathering vehicle dynamics data on a Lenco BearCat, they are measuring handling capability.

Larry and Jerry conducting a motorcade program in the UAE

By – Frank Gallagher Fg0321@gmail.com

First off, I want to say thanks to everyone that took the time to read the original article and responded. Criticizing or making observations is always a double edged sword. Some agreed wholeheartedly with what I wrote, some agreed with parts and others were incensed by what I wrote. Everyone is entitled to their opinion.

The biggest concept/concern that I was trying to get across was that there is a major lack of respect for what we do. The clients have lost respect for the profession and the protection agents have lost respect for themselves and what we do. It raises the age old question – what comes first – the chicken or the egg?

As I wrote, we are in the service industry. We provide a valuable service to the people that we protect. We keep them out of trouble, the tabloids, the court system, and allow them to live as a normal a life as possible. An honorable goal, if I do say so myself.

Many times, the lines between what we are supposed to do and what we end up doing get very blurry. Again, the acid test for me is always – what is safer for the client. There is no line in the sand nor is it a measure of testosterone levels. The safety and security of the client must always come first.

Anyone that has been in the business knows that we are sometimes asked to do thing above and beyond what our job description is. In an emergency, we do what we have to do. But, what constitutes an emergency? Is a lack of planning by the house staff an emergency that makes us don a butler’s outfit and serve drinks? Is the chef over sleeping an emergency that means we cook breakfast? Maybe, maybe not.

The overriding question (to me anyway) becomes, if it happens once and we do what we think is the right thing have we set the stage for this to become a common place or regular request or expected duties? Are we, the ultimate utility tool for the client? Do we cut the grass when the gardener fails to show up the day of an afternoon party? (HORRORS! The lawn looks terrible! We’ll be embarrassed! Get the security team out there now!) Do we serve drinks at every party because we did it once? Do we begin to make breakfast every morning? How does the client begin to view us? Are we dual or tripled tasked with chores that should be done by the butler, maids, chefs, or nannies? Have we lost the respect for the profession and the respect of the client?

My intent in the original article was to point out that we need to stick to what we do best – protect the client and their family. While we’re serving drinks or making breakfast, who is watching the security cameras? Who’s doing the advances, running the routes, or patrolling the property while we are doing someone else’s’ job? Does someone take our place in the command post? Or does the client begin to think that we’re not really that important? Respect is a two way street.

And always remember, that respect is earned. It does not come with a title or a job description. It is earned every day. Most clients are successful because they are predators, bullies, leaders in their fields. They eat the weak. They respect and acknowledge strength when they see it and meet it. I have yet to meet a client that did not respect me for explaining what we do and why. And, the strange requests rarely come my way.

Where do we, as professionals, draw the line?

Thanks for the feedback.

Introduction

Frank Gallagher is one of the few protection professionals that have the credentials to write this article. Those credentials are impeccable, and his concerns are valid. Frank writes from the perspective of a person that has worked at all levels of risk. He was the AIC of the Bremer detail in Iraq, and the Director of Security for Henry Kissinger for more than six years, and he was a lead instructor for the ATAP program.

 He has done protection operations in 46 countries. Some extremely high threat, some nearly zero threat. To date his track record is pretty good. He has had zero casualties for VIP’s and zero for his team. He has taught protection in another dozen extremely high threat countries. None of the people that he has taught have ever had a VIP injured.

Read it and feel free to comment – you can comment here on the Blogs or contact Frank at fg0321@gmail.com

Executive Protection in 2010 – Have We Lost Perspective?

Being an executive protection agent used to be a vocation of a higher calling. Think about it – we knowingly put ourselves in harm’s way every day to make sure that other people are not hurt or embarrassed. Yet 99% of the population goes through their daily lives avoiding confrontation at all costs. And, for some reason, we look to put ourselves directly in the path of potential danger. The people that we protect may or may not have significant risks to their safety due to their political views, are movie stars, rappers, famous entertainers, their socio-economic standing (rich people), or have made business decisions that angered fringe groups. Some fanatics may believe that based upon their notoriety that these folks are open game to insult or injury at the time and choosing of their fanaticism.

Other times, we are there to simply keep the protected from becoming a target of opportunity. We analyze their daily routines and try to keep them from becoming predictable and attempt to dissuade them from doing stupid things. Oft times we are successful, other times we are not. We strive to keep them from being hurt, killed, their kids kidnapped, from being blackmailed, embarrassed, or cast in an unflattering light. This is an honorable profession. We do what we do because we can. We fight for those who can’t or won’t fight for themselves. We allow them to live a semblance of a normal life.

Think about it for a second. The reward for the truly successful is to be surrounded by people (myself included) that they would never even talk to, if we did not provide a service to them. They look at us as an evil necessity. They don’t and will never understand why we do what we do. To them, we are truly the Neanderthals – we haven’t evolved. We serve a purpose that is not understood by them and never will be. If nothing ever happens to the people that we are protecting it raises the question in their mind of whether or not they really need us. But, the real question is: did nothing ever happen because we were there?

I have been doing this for a long time. I have done protection in 46 countries, have taught thousands of students (both American and foreign), worked in extremely high threat environments and on details where there really was no threat. I have met hundreds of fellow protection specialists (both American and foreign). Some were outstanding, true professionals, others were the epitome of everything that is wrong with the industry today. Why are the less than the best still working in the field? They are destroying our image and making life very difficult for the guys and gals that know what they are doing. They are the reason that our protectees look at us with disdain most of the time.

Fat, lazy, stupid, excuse driven people should not be in the business. We need to know what our job is and how to do it. We need to run routes, do our reconnaissance, our threat assessments, and pick the best ways to keep our principals safe. Unfortunately, there is a subset of protection agent today that seems to think that they should be friends with the principal, that they should cross the line between protector and servant. They want to keep their job at all costs and will do anything to keep it.

Yes, we are in the service industry. In the private sector, do we sometimes carry bags and run to the store for the families that we are working for? Of course we do. The acid test for me always comes down to the question of what is safer for my client. Is it safer for me to run to the drug store and pick up a prescription or is it safer for the VIP to do it? The safety and security of our clients always comes first.

There are, however, some lines that should never be crossed. And once crossed, there is no putting Pandora back in the box. Every time one of us crosses this line, it makes it impossible for the agents that follow to do their jobs properly. We, as professionals need to make sure that our VIP’s realize what our true functions are. We are not butlers, cooks, servants, or other members of the house hold staff. Our job is to give up our lives if called upon to do so. We move in front of threats, cover and evacuate our charges. We do so knowing that may be injured in the process.

Every time a client asks a protection agent to do something out of the norm, we have to respectfully explain that the task asked is not part of our responsibility. We are asked to do these things most often because the client has lost complete respect for our profession. This usually happens for a couple of reasons. We got lost taking the client somewhere, we were late for work, late for a pickup, forgot some equipment (medical gear is the most often problem i.e. band aids, aspirin, meds) or we get caught sleeping in the command post or we get caught trying to impress the buxom maid with our masculine charms. The client begins to think we do nothing but take their money because there never has been an attack or a kidnapping and as long as we’re there, we might as well take the coats of guests and help serve drinks. And, believe it or not, there are protection agents that do these things. They gladly do these things to keep their jobs not realizing that they are allowing the client to disrespect them to the highest order. Do you think for a second that the Secret Service agents take coats and serve drinks? Or the State Department protection agents? Hell no, they don’t.

I recently had a protection agent describe to me how he made breakfast for his client. When I asked why he didn’t wake up the chef to do so, he told me the chef was sleeping. I asked him if the chef would have taken the client to the office that day if the protection agent were asleep. Of course not he answered. Well, I asked him why would he ever make breakfast? He answered that he thought the client really liked how he made his scrambled eggs. What happens when the client asks the next protection agent to make him breakfast and the real professional says no, that’s not his job? Again, what are these agents thinking? This same guy also described to me how the client likes his bagels and cream cheese. When I asked him why he knew this, he said that he prepares them for him all time. The agent gets a sesame bagel, toasts it, and then hollows out the bread part of the bagel before applying the proper amount of cream cheese to the bagel. Are you fucking kidding me? And he was proud of this. This guy is not a protection agent, he’s a servant.

Of course, this same detail does not have route cards so new agents can learn the basics of the daily routine. Evidently this client has a preferred set of routes that cannot be deviated from. Again, why? Has no one ever explained to the client that varying routes is an easy way to NOT being predictable? There is nothing written down that can be studied by new agents. And, of course, these were all brand new ideas that were met with extreme resistance because they it would have meant the agents actually sat down and did some work instead of flirting with the house staff.

Is this the way of the profession in the 21^st century? I hope not. When the principals lose respect for the protection agents, then it is time to move on. Are we becoming a profession of man servants or do we still answer to a higher calling? I, for one, still have to shave every day and the man in the mirror does not lie. You see who and what you are. You can deceive others, but you can’t fool the guy in the mirror. Is there something wrong with being a professional? Or have we reached the point that the clients have such a disregard for protection agents that we are now only drivers/cooks/butlers/house maids?

The only way to change this problem is through education. Both for the agents and the clients.

Respect has to be a 2 way street. We have to respect the wishes and wants of the clients, but the clients have to understand what we do and why. We can’t keep crossing the line between protector and man servant. We have to have enough self respect and self esteem to verbalize what our job is. We need to make the clients understand what we are there for. And we need to do our jobs properly. And when push comes to shove, an agent has to make the right decision each time. Do we face off with bad guy with gun? Of course, we do. Do we face off with VIP when he says to cook his breakfast? In my world, the answer is YES. Breakfast is not my job and never will be. We don’t ask the chef to take on the man with gun, why should we scramble eggs?

In the process of a putting together an iPhone Application about vehicle attacks I came across this You Tube video. It is a re-enactment of the 1978 Moro kidnapping.  At the time, the kidnapping of the highly respected elder statesman of Italian politics, Aldo Moro, shocked the world. This incident would be similar to the kidnapping of one of our former Presidents. Although the Moro attack occurred more than 30 years ago it is still a lesson learned scenario.  

This event (plus the Schleyer ambush) had a profound effect on the security community. To gain an understanding of the historical significance of this attack we need to examine the security industry the 70’s.

Some History – During the 1970’s these types of attacks had been occurring often in South America, the prevailing attitude was that it would never spread beyond those borders.  Although the terrorism experts at the time (there were maybe three of them), had all been predicting this type of attack was going to spread, and become prolific. No one paid much attention to them, and the general feeling was that the terrorist were not that good – and that if you put a guy with gun sitting next to the chauffer, and maybe some guys with more guns in a vehicle following the boss the problem is solved. At the time the general thinking of the non security community was that the enemy was not that smart.  The following is an actual comment from an executive “After all we are dealing with unsophisticated rabble”.

 Lessons –  Moro was one of the attacks that brought to light that terrorist actually plan what they do. You can see from this re-enactment that these guys, and girl, had their act together.

This was one of the attacks that made the “powers to be” come to the conclusion that –

 Having guys with guns with the boss doesn’t solve the problem – it creates a different problem

 We ought to train those guys that are protecting the principal – drivers and shooters should be trained to drive and shoot

Armored cars are a good thing – we are talking about 1970’s armored cars that were a lot less sophisticated than they are now.

The protection team was expendable

 This is a question – not a comment – have things changed that much in thirty years?  What do you think?

We tend to think about vehicle ambush as something that happens someplace other than the US. But recently one of our former students got involved in a problem that is worth talking about.

George TZ was driving his principals 250K Bentley Turbo (Minus the principal) though the streets of one of the New York Burroughs.

George noticed a SUV, with a tinted windshield, Connecticut plates behind him; tinted windshields are illegal in New York. He didn’t pay much attention to the vehicle until he noticed the SUV still behind him a few miles down the road. At that point George decided to drive a surveillance detection route, and at the completion of the route the SUV was still there. George called 911 told the dispatcher the scenario, the decision was made to have a police vehicle meet George at a particular intersection. On his way to the rendezvous point, while waiting at a stop light, the SUV pulled around George and blocked his path. Two young gentlemen got out of the SUV with their hands inside their jackets and started to approach the Bentley.

George ran the options through his mind, ram (a $250,000 vehicle) or drive around the blocking SUV. He determined there was enough space to drive around the SUV, driving away from the would be bad guys. All this happening in seconds, he got back to the dispatcher and had the police meet him at the place of the almost ambush.

The police felt the description fit that of a group doing bad things in the New York area.

Lessons Learned

• George was alert and saw the SUV
• He understood the concept of Surveillance Detection
• Once the ambush started George went through his options and executed the selected option
• George has been involved in Security Driving for many years, but is constantly updating his driving and security skills.

From an article by Joe Autera  jautera@vehicledynamics.net 

and Tony Scotti  tonyscotti@securitydriver.com

1 – Surveillance Detection is Critical

The most import issue is Surveillance Detection. In both the attacks it is apparent that surveillance of the target and the route played a critical role in the attack planning process. My 35+ years working in the armpit places of the world tells me that in many situations surveillance detection is not just the best protection; it may be the only protection. That is why it has become essential for security providers to learn how, when and where an attacker is likely to conduct surveillance as well as how to plan, manage and conduct effective surveillance detection operations.

2 – You Need the Right Tools for the Job

You need to have the right equipment – in our world that usually means a vehicle that can do the job. In a high risk environment doing the job is defined as an armored vehicle that will stop whatever rounds it is they are going to shoot at you. If you are in a Level 4 vehicle and they are firing Level 7 rounds, it’s is like taking a knife to a gunfight.

3 – The Attack Begins Long Before the First Gunshot

If your day is interrupted by the pitter patter of rounds hitting the windshield, it is not the first time the bad guys have had eyes on the target (that’s you). In one of the scenarios the attack was carried out by a large group with most of the rounds directed at the principal’s vehicle, this is an indication that the attackers had done their homework. More than likely they had surveillance in place up to the moment of the attack. Refer to Point 1.

4 – Training, Training, Training

In a recent vehicle ambush in Mexico, which lasted for minutes, not seconds, the principal’s vehicle was hit multiple times, at least once by grenade fragments, and was partially disabled due to a flat tire. Despite all of this, the drivers of both vehicles did exactly what needed to be done to ensure the principal’s survival, indicating excellent training. Your training must (not should) include Surveillance Detection.

5 – If the Vehicle Stops You Lose.

Time and time again we have seen that in a vehicle ambush the worst possible scenario is for the vehicle to come to a stop in the kill zone. Getting back to point 3 – training must include the “Science of the Kill Zone”. Even in attacks against an armored vehicle, once the vehicle is immobilized the attackers have control over the movement of the target, and that is not a good thing.

The complete article   http://www.vehicledynamics.net/articles/taleoftwo.html