SecurityDriver News

This is the second article by Derek Humble on situational awareness. Derek is a transplanted British security professional currently living in Toronto, Canada. After a career in the British Military he took a position with a large Canadian security provider operating a specialized department offering corporate protective services to Canada’s elite. In 1988 Derek decided to incorporate his own business that he named The Anvil Group. 

The Anvil Group Inc under Derek’s guidance ran operations in Canada and around the world with operations in North, Central and South America as well as Europe. Derek has run numerous versions of secure driver programs around the world specifically Moscow, Chicago, Mexico City and London to name a few. He is a long time friend, and was an early graduate of the old Scotti School of Defensive Driving and has constantly strived to study the cerebral aspects to protective driving as much as the physical practical side of the business.

 Currently Derek consults with companies on matters of personal protection, risk management and travel risk assessments.   

 dhumble@nemesisinfo.com

NEMESIS CONSULTING

Situation Awareness Part Two – Understanding “Attack Modes” and why it helps every Protector  - by Derek Humbel

 As discussed in part one understanding the threat is crucial to professional protection under any circumstances, anywhere. The fact that no one can “Protect against everything, every where, all the time” means narrowing down the threat to a specific kind of tactic and that is very helpful in timely counter actions.

The key is to designate the kind of attack mode(s) that affect those at risk. To simplify this process think of two kinds of attack mode:

The attack modes breakdown into two main types:

 “THE DELIBERATE ATTACK MODE” Encompasses those who are at risk from political, special interest, financial or geographical reasons that may well involve organized groups conducting pre-surveillance, threat assessments and may well run various rehearsals. Recognising these activities and reacting accordingly is the best result of being “Situation Aware”. However if those planning something see a high level of professionalism on the part of the protector(s) it might be sufficient reason for them to choose another target (selfish but true). Even hardened terrorists/insurgents want to succeed and it is the aim of the professional protector to give those bent on harm to reason to doubt their chance of success. Professional protection staff must understand that their actions might well be under scrutiny at any time (“good surveillance teams are hard to find”, as they say). A lack of total professionalism at all times is an invitation to those bent on harm.

 “THE IMMEDIATE ATTACK MODE” is the alternative but most common type of attack mode and it represents the risk of incidents involving opportunity, envy, grudge, or plain chance. These are single person situations involving very little in the way of preparation or planning. There are a few exceptions to this but in general these events involve one or maybe two individuals deciding to take advantage of an immediate situation. These scenarios might be at drop off and pick up points, exiting from a residence or even whilst in transit. There is little that can be done to deter these kinds of attackers they will have tunnel vision to their target (when questioned some idiots say they didn’t even see the bodyguard(s) but to allow this attack to be successful may not cause hardship to your protectee, but it may well harm the teams career prospects. The counter measures, protective routines and protection principles are what will save the day. In many cases habits and routines can cause harm but in countering against the ‘Immediate Attack Mode” The master principle is of course lock the doors such as once everyone has embarked a passer by grabbing a door handle and opening a door. This won’t harm anyone but security heads will and should roll.

 Once the types of attack mode are understood and adhered to it is necessary break them down as to where those attacks are most likely. Typically the old military mantra of the necessity “To dominate no-mans land” works beautifully in protection assignments. The dangers increase as you exit and enter secured bases/offices and unless the threat is sufficiently high (various forms of IEDs would be an example) protection teams can relax when on the road. Heightened awareness can only be maintained over limited periods of time (in some cases it must be) so by understanding the Attack Modes and the threats that those being protected face relaxation is possible and tactically righteous. This understanding of the required ‘ALERT LEVELS” makes the requirement of continuous protection assignments possible.  Heightened alert levels as you leave a secure location can be reduced as you get onto the road and away from the start point and as your destination draws near increasing the protection level is effective and necessary. During WW1 the most likely place to get ambushed was on re-entry to your own front lines by enemy forces let alone the risk of being shot at by your own side being alert at the right time is vital.

A UN report on the assassination of Pakistani Prime Minister Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto has been widely circulated. It is fairly long, 54 pages. I have taken the section that deals with the “Day of the Assassination”. When we have some time we will offer our opinion of what happened and developed a lessons learned. In the interim I am sure the the community would welcome any comments. It’s long but filled with good info.

 “The Day of the Assassination”

Departure from Zardari House for Liaquat Bagh

86. Around 1400 hours, Ms Bhutto left Zardari House, for Liaquat Bagh, in a convoy of vehicles. The convoy consisted of a black Toyota Land Cruiser used by Mr Tauqir Kaira, followed by Ms Bhutto’s white armoured Land Cruiser and two of Mr Kaira’s vehicles on either side of Ms Bhutto’s vehicle. The latter two were a Mercedes-Benz van on the right and a four-door double cabin vehicle on the left.

Immediately behind those vehicles were two Toyota Vigo pick-up trucks, positioned side by side. A black Mercedes-Benz car was behind these Vigos. This Mercedes- Benz, from Zardari House, was bullet-proof and served as the back-up vehicle for Ms Bhutto. The two Vigo pick-up trucks were also from Zardari House.

87. Mr Kaira was inside the lead vehicle with his security men. Accompanying Ms Bhutto in her vehicle were Mr Javed-ur-Rehman (driver, front-left seat), SSP Major (ret) Imtiaz Hussain (front-right seat), Makhdoom Amin Fahim (senior PPP member, second row-left seat), Ms Bhutto (second row-centre seat), Ms Naheed Khan (senior PPP member and political secretary of Ms Bhutto, second row-right seat). Seated in the back of the vehicle on two benches facing each other were Senator Safdar Abbasi (senior PPP member, rear-right bench), Mr Shahenshah (rear-left bench, facing

Senator Abbasi) and Mr Razaq Mirani (personal attendant of Ms Bhutto, rear-right bench next to Senator Abbasi and to his left). Mr Kaira’s two vehicles on either side of Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser carried his men. The Vigo pick-up trucks carried members of Mr Chaudry Aslam’s security team. Riding in the black Mercedes-Benz car were the driver, PPP official Mr Faratullah Babar in the front passenger seat and, in the rear passenger seat from left to right, two PPP officials Mr Babar Awan and Mr Rehman Malik and General (ret) Tauqir Zia.

Arrival at Liaquat Bagh

88. Ms Bhutto’s convoy reached the Faizabad junction at about 1415 hours, according to the Rawalpindi District Police, who were to assume responsibility for security of the convoy. According to the police and the Security Plan, an escort was to be provided composed of a traffic police “pilot” jeep, a regular police jeep leading the convoy and three Elite Force Toyota pick-up trucks protecting Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser on three sides. People in Ms Bhutto’s vehicle claim, however, that there was no such escort except for one traffic police vehicle.

89. At about 1456 hours, Ms Bhutto’s convoy turned right at the Murree Road – Liaquat Road junction and headed towards Liaquat Bagh. Video footage shows Ms Bhutto’s convoy driving from the Murree Road – Liaquat Bagh junction to the inner security gate leading to the VIP parking area at Liaquat Bagh. The footage shows Ms Bhutto standing through the roof escape hatch of her Land Cruiser and waving at the large crowd around the vehicle while it moved slowly on Liaquat Road.

90. Both ASP Ashfaq Anwar who was the supervisor of the Elite Force unit and Inspector Azmat Ali Dogar, the unit’s commander, told the Commission that they accompanied Ms Bhutto all the way to the back of the stage according to the Security Plan. However, video footage and pictures show that as Ms Bhutto drove on much of Liaquat Road, her vehicle was flanked only by her private security vehicles. The Elite Force vehicles were nowhere near her vehicle. In fact, the Commission has identified Inspector Dogar among the crowd some distance from Ms Bhutto’s vehicle.

Contrary to the police assertion, there was no police-provided box formation around Ms Bhutto as she arrived at the rally, and the Elite Force unit did not execute their duties as specified in the security deployment. Furthermore, the Commission does not believe that the full escort as described by the police was ever present.

91. At about 1516 hours, Ms Bhutto’s convoy stopped for a few minutes at the inner gate of the parking area waiting for that gate to be opened, during which Ms Bhutto remained standing through the escape hatch. The police and some PPP members disagree as to the reason for the delay in opening the gate. While the PPP asserts that the police did not have the key to open the gate, the police said that they did not want the large crowd following Ms Bhutto to get into the VIP parking area.

Altogether, Ms Bhutto stood through the escape hatch for the approximately 20 minutes it took to drive from the Murree Road – Liaquat Road junction to the gate of the parking area. This calls into question the claim of the Rawalpindi District Police that they were surprised when Ms Bhutto emerged from the escape hatch on her way out of Liaquat Bagh.

92. Once the convoy passed through the inner gate, at about 1531 hours, it drove through the VIP parking area to the rear of the stage. At least the following three vehicles were in the VIP parking area: Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser, Mr Kaira’s lead vehicle and the black bullet-proof Mercedes-Benz car. Temporary wooden stairs had been built for the rally to access the rear of the stage directly from the parking area.

Ms Bhutto climbed the stairs, went to the stage to wave to the crowd and took her seat before addressing the crowd.

93. Near the rear of the stage, a scuffle broke out between some workers of the PPP and police who tried to prevent them from climbing to the stage. This created tension between PPP workers and the police officers posted in that area. Accounts given by PPP representatives and the police with regard to the degree and nature of this event differ significantly. The police state that the dispute was minor and was settled immediately, whereas some on the local PPP side claim it was serious and led to bitter reactions from the police during the rest of the rally. They say that the police felt insulted and became more passive in their security role. The Commission finds that the police were indeed passive in their provision of security and believes it unprofessional if the Rawalpindi District Police reduced their level of alert to any degree as a result of wounded pride.

Exit from Liaquat Bagh

94. Several thousand people attended the event. Ms Bhutto was joined on the stage by a number of national-level PPP leaders and all of the parliamentary candidates from Rawalpindi district. The crowds were enthusiastic, and PPP leaders and activists considered the event to have been a great success. They say Ms Bhutto gave a strong and rousing speech, one of the best of her campaign, and describe her as having been radiant that day.

95. The public gathering concluded and, at about 1710 hours, Ms Bhutto descended the wooden stairs and entered her Land Cruiser. The occupants of the Land Cruiser and their seating positions were the same as for the trip in to Liaquat Bagh. The composition of passengers in the black Mercedes-Benz car also remained the same.

96. The black bullet-proof Mercedes-Benz car was the first to leave the parking area. It is not clear how much distance there was between this vehicle and the rest of Ms Bhutto’s convoy at the moment of the blast. Credible reports range from 100 meters to 250 meters. Some of those in the car said that they were close enough to Ms Bhutto’s vehicle to feel the impact of the blast. Others at the site of the blast have said that the Mercedes-Benz left Liaquat Bagh so quickly that it was nowhere to be seen when the blast occurred. Indeed, the Commission has not seen this vehicle in the many video images of the exit area it reviewed. Despite the acknowledgement of some occupants of the vehicle that they felt the impact of the blast, the Commission finds it incredible that they drove all the way to Zardari House, a drive of about 20 minutes, before they became aware that Ms Bhutto had been injured in the blast.

They should have stopped at a safe distance when they felt the blast so as to check on Ms Bhutto’s condition, the condition of her vehicle and whether the back-up vehicle was required. Indeed, as the back-up vehicle, the Mercedes-Benz car would have been an essential element of Ms Bhutto’s convoy on the return trip even if the occupants of that car had confirmed that Ms Bhutto had been unscathed in the attack.

97. Mr Kaira’s vehicle was the next to leave the inner parking area after the Mercedes-Benz car, with Ms Bhutto’s vehicle right behind it, followed by another of Mr Kaira’s vehicles. The two Vigo pick-up trucks then followed from the outer parking area located between the inner and outer gates.

98. At 1712 hours, Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser exited from the outer gate. Crowds of people who were already on Liaquat Road drew closer to the vehicle as it began to turn right onto Liaquat Road. In addition, many people left the park, swelling the crowd around the Land Cruiser, contrary to the police assertion that they did not allow anyone to leave the park before the departure of Ms Bhutto’s convoy. Ms Bhutto emerged through the escape hatch of the vehicle and started waving to her supporters. When the vehicle approached the central road divider, it was slowed further by the crowd.

99. Major Imtiaz, who was sitting in the front seat of the Land Cruiser, said that he was worried that the convoy was being slowed down by the crowd. He wanted to call CPO Saud Aziz by cell phone, but he did not have the CPO’s direct number. Instead he called CPO Saud Aziz’s operator and the operator at the police station in Multan, another town in Punjab Province (where Major Imtiaz had recently served). The Commission finds that this lack of preparation was a major flaw in the security arrangements and reflects badly on the professionalism of Major Imtiaz who should have had full and rapid access to the Rawalpindi police command.

100. Questions remain as to the nature of the crowd that gathered around the Land Cruiser. Passengers in the Land Cruiser and some local PPP members recalled that they were mostly PPP workers, and they did not see any strangers or irregular movements among them. The Rawalpindi District Police and other PPP members, however, suggested that a group of people had deliberately stood in front of the Land Cruiser to prevent it from moving. Regardless of the accuracy of either account, it remains that the police did not control the crowd outside of Liaquat Bagh. As a result, the attacker was able to get as close as he did to Ms Bhutto’s vehicle.

101. The Rawalpindi police authorities and some PPP workers dispute the exact exit route agreed for Ms Bhutto’s convoy. The Rawalpindi District Police and DCO Elahi claim that the planned route for the convoy was to turn right onto Liaquat Road and then left onto Murree Road, retracing the convoy’s entry route. Only in case of an emergency was the convoy to make a left turn after exiting from the outer gate; a decision to take the emergency route had to be made by the senior police officer in charge of security on the scene. Some local PPP workers who attended the preparatory meeting with the police disagree with this account. They claim that the original plan was to make a left turn onto Liaquat Road and that the minutes provided by the DCO, which did not indicate this left turn, were inaccurate. In any event, photographs show two stationary police vehicles on Liaquat Road blocking the left- side drive lane where the left turn would have been made. As a result, even in an emergency, it would have been impossible for Ms Bhutto’s convoy to make a left turn and use the escape route unless those police vehicles were quickly moved. The Commission learned that these vehicles were official vehicles of senior Rawalpindi police officers. The Commission finds it irresponsible that these vehicles were parked in such a way as to block the emergency exit route.

102. The Rawalpindi District Police claim that police vehicles from the Elite Force unit headed by ASP Ashfaq Anwar were waiting outside the outer gate to escort Ms Bhutto’s convoy and that they were about to go into a protective box formation when the attack on Ms Bhutto took place. However, forming the box at this point was impracticable given the narrow width of Liaquat Road and the number of people who had already started to surround Ms Bhutto’s vehicle. In any event, video footage shows very few uniformed police on the scene available to push back the crowd to create space for the box formation. Furthermore, video and photographs taken shortly before the blast as well as Commission interviews indicate that the Elite Force unit was not in position to go into a box formation. The Elite Force unit was in place neither for the entry nor the exit of the convoy and did not afford the protection they were tasked with, thus failing spectacularly in their duty.

103. Overall, video and photographic materials as well as the Commission’s interviews establish that there were very few police deployed outside the outer gate and on Liaquat Road as Ms Bhutto’s convoy attempted to depart the scene.

The Attack

104. From the exit, Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser started to make a right turn onto Liaquat Road. As it slowly approached the central divider on Liaquat Road, the crowd began chanting slogans. There is some dispute over whether Ms Bhutto made the decision to stand up on her own or was urged to do so. Before she stood up, Ms Bhutto asked Ms Naheed Khan to make a phone call to Mr Nawaz Sharif, PML-N leader, to convey condolences for the deaths of some of his supporters who had been shot during the PML-N rally earlier that day. It had been reported that the shooting incident occurred between supporters of the PML-N and those of the PML-Q parties.

105. While Ms Khan was trying to reach Mr Sharif, Ms Bhutto stopped her and asked Senator Abbasi, who was sitting in the rear seat, to chant slogans to the crowd using the vehicle’s loudspeaker. Ms Bhutto then stood on the seat and appeared through the escape hatch, with her head and shoulders exposed.

106. Ms Bhutto waved to the crowd. The vehicle continued to move slowly into its right turn onto Liaquat Road. At this point, a man wearing dark glasses appeared in the crowd on the left side of the Land Cruiser. Around 1714 hours, while the vehicle continued into its right turn, the man pulled out a pistol, and from a distance of approximately two to three meters, fired three shots at Ms Bhutto. According to video analysis conducted by Scotland Yard, the three shots were fired in less than one second.

107. The Commission examined video footage taken from a back angle, which shows Ms Bhutto’s dupatta, her white head covering, and her hair flick upwards after the second shot. However, there is no evidence of a link between the second shot and that movement. After the third shot, she started to move down into the vehicle.

108. After the third shot, the gunman lowered the gun, looked down and then detonated the explosives. At the time of the blast, the gunman was near the left rear corner of the vehicle. Video footage shows that at the time of the explosion, the Land Cruiser was still making the right turn. The Scotland Yard team’s analysis shows that it took 1.6 seconds from the time of the first shot to the detonation of the bomb.

In the Land Cruiser

109. Ms Naheed Khan recalled that immediately after she had heard the three gunshots, Ms Bhutto fell down into the vehicle onto her lap. Ms Khan said that she felt the impact of the explosion immediately thereafter. The right side of Ms Bhutto’s head came to rest on Ms Khan’s lap. Ms Khan saw that Ms Bhutto was bleeding profusely from the right side of her head. She noticed that Ms Bhutto was not moving and saw that blood was also trickling from her ear. Makhdoom Amin Fahim recalled that Ms Bhutto fell heavily and showed no sign of life after falling.

According to Scotland Yard’s video analysis, the flash of the blast appeared just over two-thirds of a second after Ms Bhutto disappeared from view.

110. No one else in her vehicle was seriously injured.

Transfer to the Hospital

111. After the explosion, Senator Abbasi told the driver to drive to the hospital (initially having in mind a hospital in Islamabad). Although all four of its tires were punctured by the blast, the Land Cruiser managed to drive along Liaquat Road for approximately 300 meters towards the junction with Murree Road where it turned left. As the Land Cruiser moved along Murree Road, it became increasingly difficult for the driver to manoeuvre on the metal rims of the wheels. The Land Cruiser made a U-turn at the Rehmanabad junction, located approximately four kilometres from the Liaquat Road-Murree Road junction, in order to get to the other side of the road where Rawalpindi General Hospital (RGH) was located. The occupants of the Land Cruiser recalled that at this point there was only one traffic police vehicle ahead of the Land Cruiser. No other vehicles were visible – neither the bullet proof black Mercedes-Benz car nor any Elite Force unit vehicle. Following the U-turn, the Land Cruiser stalled. The party had to wait for some time on Murree Road until a private vehicle that belonged to Ms Sherry Rehman arrived and took Ms Bhutto to the hospital.

The International Executive Protection Conference sponsored by the ESI Alumni Association will be held in Las Vegas Aug 6th to the 8th at the Caesar’s Place.

The conference is a networking event opened to all Protection Professionals. The conference presents a unique opportunity to network with others in the business. Studies indicate that 75% of all positions are filled by networking, my guess would be in the protection business that number is higher.

There are discussions by industry leaders such as – Directors of Security of major corporations – Detail Leaders from high end security companies – Personal Protection Agents working in the industry, all of them willing to share their experience with you.

For three days the conference delivers seminars that are relevant to the success of your business or career. Subjects that you won’t find in most other Protection Conferences – like financing and budgeting – International travel for the EP agent – Resume writing – you can have your resume reviewed by people who have worked in the industry for decades and have looked at hundreds of resumes.

And in my opinion one of the most important seminars of the convention is the “Building a Business including Branding and Marketing”. The talk is given by a graduate of the prestigious Wharton School of Business, who also happens to be the CEO of a Security Company with 18 years of experience supplying personal protection agents.

There are other great subjects covering the use of K9’s and Close Protection

Oh I forgot to mention that I will be the Keynote Speaker

For more information

A good article/outline about motorcade accidents, although I do think the authors may have an axe to grind.

A short article I did for State Farm Insurance

This article was written by Gordon Mitchell, PhD, CPP.  Dr. Mitchell operates Future Focus, a Seattle based company which provides electronic eavesdropping.  The article was written more than ten years ago but still has some valid points.

 A good chauffeur is concerned about not spilling the boss’s coffee and avoiding bumps. Generally chauffeurs can handle routine emergencies if they happen slowly. This has nothing in common with the skills needed for a trained security driver.

 Security drivers are very aware of the environment and are always prepared to drive out of a problem using the full potential of the vehicle. This is guaranteed to spill coffee. It also saves lives.

Good Security Driver

In no particular order – security

 The most critical skill is learning to recognize trouble and stay out of threatening situations. The most critical thing to recognize is the presence of surveillance.

 Security skills of course include defensive driving but the most memorable training involves offensive driving. Even though few security drivers use their training in ramming or pursuit driving these sort of high adrenaline activities make an impression. In fact making an impression on a student is what a good driving school must do.

Out of Control

A security driver has absolutely no control over several critical factors in executive security. The first is where the executive lives. Only in unusual cases such as high threat overseas assignments will the executive home be chosen by security personnel. The executive’s neighborhood may be on a dead end street, an apartment building or near a busy highway. All require different approaches to avoid the problems that threaten the executive.

 Weather and traffic are also out of the control of the security driver. They affect the general security environment and may allow threats such as ambushes to become more of a problem than they would be on “normal” days. These variables must be part of a security driver’s thinking and need to be part of overall contingency planning.

Ex-cops make good Security Drivers

Because they are naturally suspicious of people and circumstances, former police officers make good security drivers. They have been trained and conditioned to observe their environment and have generally been prepared for some of the driving situations that security drivers may encounter.

 A significant change of strategy is necessary in the transition from ” To Protect and Serve” to being concerned about the person in the back seat. Good security drivers do not think about apprehending anyone; they are expected to drive away from dangers, not confront them. Police officers that are able to leave their egos behind do well in the driver’s seat.

 All drivers must have good driving skills and physical capabilities. Since physiological changes occur with age, which can make drivers less effective, it is critical that basic vision, hearing and reactions are tested for all security drivers. Additionally, over the age of forty, night vision should be measured. At the age of fifty-five, peripheral vision should be added to the annual physical.

 Even a driver in good physical condition can become a liability if fatigue is present. This is especially a factor in city driving. Overtime pay may lure drivers into working longer than they should but eight-hour shifts should be the rule. A tired driver may only be able to operate the vehicle missing all of the security aspects of his job. A very tired driver may not even be able to handle the basic driving tasks.

Knowing the Threat is Key

Even though it makes sense to avoid danger by understanding the threat, many drivers do not employ effective surveillance detection skills or have a basic knowledge of threats. It is critical to begin the security driver’s work well before getting behind the wheel. This includes working closely with corporate security and executive assistants to keep updated on threats to the executive, changes in the corporation, and the general image of the organization.

Background work to identify and contain threats is much more effective than last minute offensive driving to get out of a tight spot. If a driver spends significant amounts of time with the executive she bears an even greater responsibility for the executive’s welfare. This situation requires even more work with security to define threats and avoid them.

Medical Emergencies

Most executives won’t be kidnapped but many will face medical emergencies of some sort while traveling. The obvious requirement for security drivers is knowledge of medical facilities along any given route. This does not just involve knowing the address of a hospital. Specific information on the nearest trauma centers, emergency rooms, fire stations, and outpatient facilities should be at hand. Knowing the direct line to an emergency room can save valuable minutes for a seriously ill or wounded executive.

A sensitive issue that is not normally addressed involves medical background information for the executive. Sharing medical history information with security drivers improves the survival probability for an executive but it is not common for “just a driver” to know about the boss’s chronic illness. If a medical emergency does occur or if an accident threatens the life of an executive a driver’s knowledge can be a lifesaver.

 Watch out for the TaxMan

The Internal Revenue Service look for opportunities to tax corporate compensation and executive protection can become a problem in this area if it is not handled properly. Imagine the difficulties associated with an unexpected $100,000 tax bill for the CEO. It is possible if the salary of a security driver and other related expenses are considered executive compensation. In a 40% tax bracket the personal income tax on several years protection can easily reach astronomical amounts.

 To avoid this problem it is crucial to employ an independent professional to study the corporate security needs. The study should be based on objective facts and circumstances. If security threats require a trained driver and security car for the benefit of the company the IRS should not tax the individual executive who also benefits.

 Dealing with Executive Objections

Whenever a change of executive lifestyle is involved, expect a problem. This is especially true for security where there is no direct link to corporate profits. If the CEO must have a security driver expect that the change will be resisted. The same security survey that was done to justify the expenses to the IRS may be helpful in convincing management of the need.

 One approach to the subject might be to explain the need for a proactive approach in terms of the other parts of the organization. No good manager would wait for a disaster to make changes in manufacturing, accounting or marketing. The same is true in security. Spending an effort and some money up front can produce significant results in the future.

We have developed an iPhone Application on Distracted Driving. According to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) driver distractions are the leading cause of most vehicle crashes and near-crashes.  The App came about when we looked at a study released by the NHTSA and the Virginia Tech Transportation Institute (VTTI).  The study discovered that 80% of crashes and 65% of near-crashes involve some form of driver distraction – and the distraction occurred within three seconds before the vehicle crash!   For those in High Risk Security that number “three seconds” is familiar. It is the “Kill Zone”.

The Kill Zone Concept is used to train our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan to avoid a vehicle ambush. Our iPhone Application uses the same theory to explain and avoid the dangers of Distracted Driving.

The theory is simple; a Kill Zone is a time-distance relationship. How much time does the driver have and how close is the problem (distance)?  The Kill Zone is directly related to the speed of the vehicle when the incident occurs.

An example of how Kill Zones relate to Distracted Driving look at the following scenario – You are 300 feet from a traffic light moving at 40 mph which is 60 feet per second. You get a text message; it takes 3 seconds to read the message – that means you drove 180 feet (3 seconds x 60 fps) without looking at the road. 

You were 300 feet from the traffic light, but as you were reading the text message, you moved 180 feet. When you looked up from the text message, you are 120 feet (300 -180) from the traffic light that has now changed from yellow to red.

You are 120 feet in front of the red light and closing in at 60 fps.  You are in the Kill Zone, a time distance relationship, the distance is 120 feet and some quick arithmetic tells you that you have two seconds to react. And you are driving deeper into the kill zone.

If you can get you foot on the brake in a half-second (that’s fast), you will travel 30 feet (half of 60 fps).  So at the point of applying your brakes, you are 90 feet from the traffic light (the initial 120 feet minus the 30 feet it took to reach for the brake). 

You will have to stop a car moving at 40 MPH (60 feet a sec) in 1.5 seconds. Life is going to get terribly exciting.

Our App uses case studies in the form of presentations, similar to the one above, and offers lessons learned.  The objective is to keep you out of the kill zone. 

You can direct any questions or comments to

tonyscotti@securitydriver.com

lawrence.snow@sjcwebdesign.com

By Joe Autera

One of the many challenges that corporate security professionals face is maintaining adequate security for their executives and other key personnel as they go about their daily business. Often times, these challenges are far greater when those folks are traveling beyond the umbrella of protection that has been established for them in and around their residence, their workplace and while moving between these familiar locations. But what happens when they are visiting an out-of state (or overseas) facility? Or attending a meeting in a city where the company has no presence? We’ve all heard the stories of executives getting in the wrong car at some unfamiliar airport or, worse yet, hailing a cab when they can’t seem to find the driver hired to take them to that meeting and, on more than one occasion, listened as a corporate pilot or personal assistant recounts how some executive was picked-up ramp side by some nefarious looking character in a vehicle that was better suited for the scrap pile than carrying passengers.

When issues like this arise, they aren’t necessarily the fault of the person who was responsible for arranging the transportation, though they often bear the brunt of it. Larger transportation companies often boast of how many cities they cover, when in reality they sub-contract a large portion of their work out to independent operators, especially in cities with low volumes of business. Now, with the advent of the internet and pre-packaged web sites it’s all too easy for someone, say the independent driver with a single twelve year old sedan, to portray themselves as something other than what they are, like a high end, professional car service with modern cars and equipment. Complacency also plays a part in some of the problems that arise with ground transportation, particularly in smaller companies as they tend to rely on vendors simply because they’re the ones they have always used, even though the company’s needs may have changed dramatically.

Today, finding the right transportation provider is becoming even more complicated as a shifting economy and negative media attention have raised the profile and increased the security risks for many corporations and their executives while, at the same time, budgets are being cut and cost saving measures are being implemented across the board. All of this places an even greater importance on ensuring that contract ground transportation providers are not the weak link in your security program and that your company is getting what it pays for.

Regardless of whether risk management (security) or cost effectiveness is the driving factor in the decision making process, given what’s at stake – the safety and security of some of the company’s valuable assets – the need for a formal vetting process for transportation providers has never been greater. When properly documented, the results of such a process will prove useful in identifying which provider truly offers the better value, as opposed to the best price.

The framework for a ground transportation provider vetting process, that has proven to be useful for corporate security decision makers and satisfies most basic due diligence requirements is outlined below.

1. Verify vendors financial standing through third party service (Dunn & Bradstreet, Hoover’s, etc.)
2. Verify vendor holds proper operating licenses – transportation, security or both – for all locales they will be providing service in.  
3. Verify insurance (require that their broker provide ACORD certificates of insurance directly to you).
4. Establish contractual requirements for minimum coverage levels, require notification of any change in status or coverage
5. Check for and review current and past civil or criminal case filings in all locales where vendor operates – not just those where they will be servicing your account (use data mining service such as LexisNexis, Choicepoint, etc.)
6. Check with Better Business Bureau, or similar agency, for complaints in all locales where vendor operates – not just those where they will be servicing your account
7. Review vendors hiring practices (minimum qualifications, requisite experience etc. Require proof of compliance (i.e. sampling of documentation/credentials of new or recent hires as well as long term employees).
8. Review vendors training requirements (type of programs, frequency of training). Require proof of compliance (again, a sampling of documentation pertaining to current employees)
9. Review vendor’s maintenance and vehicle replacement program or policies, require proof of compliance (i.e. sampling of documentation for specific vehicles). For example, we are aware of at least one transportation provider that replaces all vehicles at 30K miles and has a strict maintenance schedule
10. Ensure vendor  has capability to fully support your security needs (i.e. drivers with specialized security training – not just off-duty police officers) through client references and review of appropriate documentation

As with any other vetting process the operative phrase is “trust, but verify”. When it comes to documentation and references, you want to take every step possible to ensure the accuracy and legitimacy of the information provided by contacting references directly, getting documentation directly from the source (i.e. the insurance broker), and establishing a contractual right to request further documentation, updated information or to perform periodic inspections, at your discretion.

While there is a lot to be said for dealing with larger, more established vendors there are some downsides as well (high turnover, less clout for your company, less emphasis on customer service, etc.) and if you happen to be in need of more specialized services – like experienced security drivers or drivers with BLS/AED certification, specially-equipped vehicles or the like – dealing with a smaller company with a shorter track record may be the only option available. If security is the deciding factor you may be best served by dealing with one of the few local or regional companies that provide a bona fide secure ground transportation service. Of course, regardless of how large or small the service providers business may be, a thorough vetting process will help guard against costly and embarrassing problems further down the road.

The driver’s ability to avoid vehicle violence does not depend solely on their ability to control the vehicle. A driver is at the mercy of the environment and of the vehicle they are driving.

Driving, any form of driving, is a balance, and that balance is called the “driving system.” The driving system is made up of three components: THE DRIVER, THE MACHINE, and THE ENVIRONMENT. In our world it is called the Security Drivers Triangle. If there is an accident or a successful ambush it is caused by a failure of the triangle, the driver, the vehicle, or the environment failed.

The Driver
Most accidents or ambushes are caused by driver error. In the non security world the proof lies in the numbers. Some 89 percent of all vehicular accidents are caused by driver error. The driver is responsible for the successful implementation of the DRIVER/MACHINE relationship. The driver has to know and understand the capabilities of the vehicle driver combination. The driver’s capability to maneuver out of an emergency is a measurable skill. The skill level is a number that indicates how much of the vehicle capability the driver can use. The simple fact is the higher the number the better the chances of survival. Given a vehicle, and an environment they must drive through, a security driver has to know what they are capable of and better yet what they are not capable of.

The Machine
Most passenger vehicles are good handling vehicles. But there are scenarios where the vehicles handling capabilities are lowered due to an increase in the vehicles security posture (armored vehicles). However, no matter how well or poorly a vehicle handles, it is only a machine, and like all machines, has its limitations, some vehicles higher than others. The vehicle, like the driver, has a measurable capability, which translates to a number, the higher the vehicles number the greater the chances of survival.

Driver/Machine
You cannot separate the driver from the vehicle. A good security driver understands vehicle dynamics and works to anticipate changes in the vehicle behavior and is ready to maximize the vehicles capability. A bad driver simply reacts to whatever happens.

The Environment
Driving in the non security world the environment is the weather – traffic – road design. If the road surface has been modified by nature, then the driver and machine portion of the driving system must cope with these changes.

In the security world the environment includes the security conditions the driver has to maneuver through. The driver/vehicle combination can have high survival numbers, but in a high risk environment they are at the mercy of the security environment – as much as possible try to control the environment, but there are times especially in a high risk environment were that is not an easy task.

We tend to think about vehicle ambush as something that happens someplace other than the US. But recently one of our former students got involved in a problem that is worth talking about.

George TZ was driving his principals 250K Bentley Turbo (Minus the principal) though the streets of one of the New York Burroughs.

George noticed a SUV, with a tinted windshield, Connecticut plates behind him; tinted windshields are illegal in New York. He didn’t pay much attention to the vehicle until he noticed the SUV still behind him a few miles down the road. At that point George decided to drive a surveillance detection route, and at the completion of the route the SUV was still there. George called 911 told the dispatcher the scenario, the decision was made to have a police vehicle meet George at a particular intersection. On his way to the rendezvous point, while waiting at a stop light, the SUV pulled around George and blocked his path. Two young gentlemen got out of the SUV with their hands inside their jackets and started to approach the Bentley.

George ran the options through his mind, ram (a $250,000 vehicle) or drive around the blocking SUV. He determined there was enough space to drive around the SUV, driving away from the would be bad guys. All this happening in seconds, he got back to the dispatcher and had the police meet him at the place of the almost ambush.

The police felt the description fit that of a group doing bad things in the New York area.

Lessons Learned

• George was alert and saw the SUV
• He understood the concept of Surveillance Detection
• Once the ambush started George went through his options and executed the selected option
• George has been involved in Security Driving for many years, but is constantly updating his driving and security skills.