SecurityDriver News

In light of all the discussion concerning the assassination in Mexico – I thought I would go over my thoughts on Kill Zones. 

Since being in the Kill Zone can Ahhhhh kill you – you should

            Understand what they are

            How to stay out of them

            And if you get in one – how to get out of them

            If you can’t get out – how to put up one hell of a fight – but keep in mind why they are called Kill Zones 

Understand what they are – This isn’t brain surgery – A Kill Zone is a time distance relationship – how much time do I have and how much distance do I have. If you attend a “Security Driving School”, and they don’t talk about this concept – ask for your money back.

How to stay out of them – First and foremost – the best way to avoid an ambush, hence the kill zone, is don’t be there when it happens. There are plenty of people who are an ambush looking for a place to happen, just hope they are driving the same roads you are. 

If you haven’t done it already, take a course that has a heavy emphasis on Surveillance Detection – Route Surveys, and Advancing. 

And if you get in one – how to get out of them – Driving out of the kill zone is an exercise in the laws of physics and is a measurable skill. These are not skills you learn sitting in the back seat of a vehicle driving around a race track. The only skill you learn sitting in the back seat is how to projectile vomit out the back window. Again – If you attend a Security Driving School and they don’t talk – demonstrate – practice – objectively measure your skill to escape the Kill Zone – ask for your money back.           

If you can’t get out – how to put up one hell of a fight. This is where shooting skills meet driving skills – there are shooting schools that emphasize these skills – but keep in mind why they are called Kill Zones

I recently visited the Executive Security International (ESI) Stalker Training program in Grand Junction Colorado. The Stalker Program is a part of ESI’s Executive Protection Residency Program. As I walked into the classroom the first thing I noticed was the use of computers as a method of communications and instruction. ESI requires students to bring a lap top to the program and supplies them with a thumb drive that has the lessons and power points. As the instructor give their presentations students follow along on their computers. It was one of those “Why didn’t I think of that” moments.

 These are my observations of the Stalker program. The subjects include

Threat Assessments

Threat management

Surveillance Detection

Advancing

Moving the Principal

Security Surveys

None of the above is new to the world of EP Training but it is how the program is packaged, presented, and students tested that is unusual in the industry and impressive.

The students are split into groups and are assigned to do advances on hotels, restaurants and the airport, produce a plan, present their plan to the instructors, and then implement the plan. This part of the program frankly is what most of the other programs teach, but where this program differs from others I have observed are the time factor, and the interaction between student and instructor.

 The length of program allows the students ample time to complete the task. There is a lot of communications from instructor to student. After every field exercises the students huddle up with their instructors to review the exercises, they go over the good and the not too good. The not too good is analyzed, dissected and lessons learned are discussed, and the students go back out and do it again. Since the instructors are been there done that guys, the lessons learned are real and often taken from their experience – good ones and bad ones, makes for one hell of a teaching tool.

 Prior to the above students are split into groups and assigned to a client who is a victim of a Stalker. The teams get a series of letters. These are REAL LETTERS that were sent to REAL PEOPLE, who have or had a REAL THREAT.

 Students use their Threat Analysis training to provide a preliminary risk assessment, and then use their Threat Assessment training to single out the one letter that is an imminent threat

 Once they identify the letter that represents a threat to their principal, they go through a series of role playing exercises. Using investigative tools and additional role playing they zero in the stalkers. By asking the correct questions during the role playing exercises students will eventually be able to identify the stalkers address, their criminal history, and a myriad of information that will help them to protect their client.

There is an extensive use of role player, at times I had to remind myself that they were role players. The role players are “The stalkers” – the client – a handwriting expert – a Sheriff and a Psychologist.  Again they have ample time, and coaching from the instructors to achieve the standard that has been set. But it’s not just the role players, the time and the instructors it is also the logical systematic order in which it unfolds.

 The conclusion is the threat assessments and management reports that each student (not group) must submit and is graded on. I read one and have to say it was one of the best I have have read, not just from a student, from anyone.

In the Stalking program ESI creates a learning environment that gives the student the time and coaching to reach a predetermined standard, then measures to assure they have reached that standard. The attention to detail, the realism, and the role playing is more than I can put into an article.  I did not witness the entire program, but there seems to be a training philosophy that emphasizes “team building under stress” that runs through the entire Executive Protection Residency Program. A short article like this simply cannot do this program justice.

ESI is in the process of making the Stalker Program a corporate stand alone program, more on this later.

This is the second article by Derek Humble on situational awareness. Derek is a transplanted British security professional currently living in Toronto, Canada. After a career in the British Military he took a position with a large Canadian security provider operating a specialized department offering corporate protective services to Canada’s elite. In 1988 Derek decided to incorporate his own business that he named The Anvil Group. 

The Anvil Group Inc under Derek’s guidance ran operations in Canada and around the world with operations in North, Central and South America as well as Europe. Derek has run numerous versions of secure driver programs around the world specifically Moscow, Chicago, Mexico City and London to name a few. He is a long time friend, and was an early graduate of the old Scotti School of Defensive Driving and has constantly strived to study the cerebral aspects to protective driving as much as the physical practical side of the business.

 Currently Derek consults with companies on matters of personal protection, risk management and travel risk assessments.   

 dhumble@nemesisinfo.com

NEMESIS CONSULTING

Situation Awareness Part Two – Understanding “Attack Modes” and why it helps every Protector  - by Derek Humbel

 As discussed in part one understanding the threat is crucial to professional protection under any circumstances, anywhere. The fact that no one can “Protect against everything, every where, all the time” means narrowing down the threat to a specific kind of tactic and that is very helpful in timely counter actions.

The key is to designate the kind of attack mode(s) that affect those at risk. To simplify this process think of two kinds of attack mode:

The attack modes breakdown into two main types:

 “THE DELIBERATE ATTACK MODE” Encompasses those who are at risk from political, special interest, financial or geographical reasons that may well involve organized groups conducting pre-surveillance, threat assessments and may well run various rehearsals. Recognising these activities and reacting accordingly is the best result of being “Situation Aware”. However if those planning something see a high level of professionalism on the part of the protector(s) it might be sufficient reason for them to choose another target (selfish but true). Even hardened terrorists/insurgents want to succeed and it is the aim of the professional protector to give those bent on harm to reason to doubt their chance of success. Professional protection staff must understand that their actions might well be under scrutiny at any time (“good surveillance teams are hard to find”, as they say). A lack of total professionalism at all times is an invitation to those bent on harm.

 “THE IMMEDIATE ATTACK MODE” is the alternative but most common type of attack mode and it represents the risk of incidents involving opportunity, envy, grudge, or plain chance. These are single person situations involving very little in the way of preparation or planning. There are a few exceptions to this but in general these events involve one or maybe two individuals deciding to take advantage of an immediate situation. These scenarios might be at drop off and pick up points, exiting from a residence or even whilst in transit. There is little that can be done to deter these kinds of attackers they will have tunnel vision to their target (when questioned some idiots say they didn’t even see the bodyguard(s) but to allow this attack to be successful may not cause hardship to your protectee, but it may well harm the teams career prospects. The counter measures, protective routines and protection principles are what will save the day. In many cases habits and routines can cause harm but in countering against the ‘Immediate Attack Mode” The master principle is of course lock the doors such as once everyone has embarked a passer by grabbing a door handle and opening a door. This won’t harm anyone but security heads will and should roll.

 Once the types of attack mode are understood and adhered to it is necessary break them down as to where those attacks are most likely. Typically the old military mantra of the necessity “To dominate no-mans land” works beautifully in protection assignments. The dangers increase as you exit and enter secured bases/offices and unless the threat is sufficiently high (various forms of IEDs would be an example) protection teams can relax when on the road. Heightened awareness can only be maintained over limited periods of time (in some cases it must be) so by understanding the Attack Modes and the threats that those being protected face relaxation is possible and tactically righteous. This understanding of the required ‘ALERT LEVELS” makes the requirement of continuous protection assignments possible.  Heightened alert levels as you leave a secure location can be reduced as you get onto the road and away from the start point and as your destination draws near increasing the protection level is effective and necessary. During WW1 the most likely place to get ambushed was on re-entry to your own front lines by enemy forces let alone the risk of being shot at by your own side being alert at the right time is vital.

Another must read report from Stratfor

Thanks to Scott Stewart for writing it and a major thank you to Stratfor for allowing the article to be circulated.

Looking at the world from a protective-intelligence perspective, the theme for the past week has not been improvised explosive devices or potential mass-casualty attacks. While there have been suicide bombings in Afghanistan, alleged threats to the World Cup and seemingly endless post-mortem discussions of the failed May 1 Times Square attack, one recurring and under-reported theme in a number of regions around the world has been kidnapping.

For example, in Heidenheim, Germany, Maria Boegerl, the wife of German banker Thomas Boegerl, was reportedly kidnapped from her home May 12. The kidnappers issued a ransom demand to the family and an amount was agreed upon. Mr. Boegerl placed the ransom payment at the arranged location, but the kidnappers never picked up the money (perhaps suspecting or detecting police involvement). The family has lost contact with the kidnappers, and fear for Mrs. Boegerl’s fate has caused German authorities to launch a massive search operation, which has included hundreds of searchers along with dogs, helicopters and divers.

Two days after the Boegerl kidnapping, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) posted a message on the Internet claiming to have custody of French citizen Michel Germaneau, a retired engineer who had previously worked in Algeria’s petroleum sector. Germaneau was reportedly kidnapped April 22, in northern Niger, close to the border with Mali and Algeria. The AQIM video contained a photo of Germaneau and of his identification card. The group demanded a prisoner exchange and said that French President Nicolas Sarkozy would be responsible for the captive’s well-being.

Also on May 14, Diego Fernandez de Cevallos, a high-profile attorney and former presidential candidate, was kidnapped near his ranch in the Mexican state of Queretaro. Fernandez had left his home in Mexico City to drive to his ranch but never arrived. His vehicle was found abandoned near the ranch on Saturday morning and the vehicle reportedly showed signs of a struggle. It is not known who kidnapped Fernandez or what the motivation for the kidnapping was.

At the moment a kidnapping occurs, the abduction team usually has achieved tactical surprise and usually employs overwhelming force. To the previously unsuspecting victim, the abductors seemingly appear out of nowhere. But when examined carefully, kidnappings are, for the most part, the result of a long and carefully orchestrated process. They do not arise from a vacuum. There are almost always some indications or warnings that the process is in motion prior to the actual abduction, meaning that many kidnappings are avoidable. In light of this reality, let’s take a more detailed look at the phenomenon of kidnappings.

Types of Kidnappings

There are many different types of kidnappings. Although kidnappings for ransom and political kidnappings generate considerable news interest, most kidnappings have nothing to do with money or political statements. They are typically kidnappings conducted by family members in custody disputes, emotionally disturbed strangers wanting to take a child to raise or strangers who abduct a victim for sexual exploitation.

Even in financially motivated kidnappings, there are a number of different types. The stereotypical kidnapping of a high-value target comes most readily to mind, but there are also more spur-of-the-moment express kidnappings, where a person is held until his bank account can be drained using an ATM card, and even virtual kidnappings, where no kidnapping occurs at all but the victim is frightened by a claim that a loved one has been kidnapped and pays a ransom to the alleged abductors. Some of the piracy incidents in Somalia also move into the economic kidnapping realm, especially in cases where the crew or passengers are seen as being more valuable than the boat or its cargo.

Since kidnapping is such a broad topic, for the sake of this discussion, we will focus primarily on kidnappings that are financially motivated and those that are politically motivated. Financially motivated kidnappings can be conducted by a variety of criminal elements. At the highest level are highly trained professional kidnapping gangs that specialize in abducting high-net-worth individuals and who will frequently demand ransoms in the millions of dollars. Such groups often employ teams of specialists who carry out a variety of specific tasks such as collecting intelligence, conducting surveillance, snatching the target, negotiating with the victim’s family and establishing and guarding the safe-houses.

At the other end of the spectrum are gangs that randomly kidnap targets of opportunity. These gangs are generally far less skilled than the professional gangs and often will hold a victim for only a short time, as in an express kidnapping. Sometimes express kidnapping victims are held in the trunk of a car for the duration of their ordeal, which can sometimes last for days if the victim has a large amount in a checking account and a small daily ATM withdrawal limit. Other times, if an express kidnapping gang discovers it has grabbed a high-value target by accident, the gang will hold the victim longer and demand a much higher ransom. Occasionally, these express kidnapping groups will even “sell” a high-value victim to a more professional kidnapping gang. (On a side note, most express kidnapping victims tend to be male and are most frequently abducted while walking on the street after dark, and many have impaired their senses by consuming alcohol.)

In the United States, it is far more common for a relatively poor person to be kidnapped for financial motives than it is for a high-net-worth individual. This is because kidnapping groups frequently target groups of illegal immigrants, who they believe are far less likely to seek help from the authorities. In some cases, the police have found dozens of immigrant hostages being held in safe-houses.

Between the two extremes of kidnapping groups — those targeting the rich and those targeting the poor — there is a wide range of kidnapping gangs that might target a bank vice president or branch manager rather than the bank’s CEO, or that might kidnap the owner of a restaurant or other small business rather than an industrialist.

In the realm of political kidnappings, there are abductions that are very well-planned, such as the December 1981 kidnapping of Gen. James Dozier by the Italian Red Brigades, or Hezbollah’s March 1985 kidnapping of journalist Terry Anderson. However, there are also opportunistic cases of politically motivated kidnappings, such as when foreigners are abducted at a Taliban checkpoint in Afghanistan or AQIM militants grab a European tourist in the Sahel area of Africa. Of course, in the case of both the Taliban and AQIM, the groups see kidnapping as an important source of funding as well as a politically useful tool.

Understanding the Process

In deliberate (as opposed to opportunistic) kidnappings based on financial or political motives, the kidnappers generally follow a process that is very similar to what we call the terrorist attack cycle: target selection, planning, deployment, attack, escape and exploitation. In a kidnapping, this means the group must identify a victim; plan for the abduction, captivity and negotiation; conduct the abduction and secure the hostage; successfully leverage the life of the victim for financial or political gain; and then escape.

During some phases of this process, the kidnappers may not be visible to the target, but there are several points during the process when the kidnappers are forced to expose themselves to detection in order to accomplish their mission. Like the perpetrators of a terrorist attack, those planning a kidnapping are most vulnerable to detection while they are conducting surveillance — before they are ready to deploy and conduct their attack. As we have noted several times in past analyses, one of the secrets of countersurveillance is that most criminals are not very good at conducting surveillance. The primary reason they succeed is that no one is looking for them.

Of course, kidnappers are also very easy to spot once they launch their attack, pull their weapons and perhaps even begin to shoot. By this time, however, it might very well be too late to escape their attack. They will have selected their attack site and employed the forces they believe they need to overpower their victim and complete the operation. While the kidnappers could botch their operation and the target could escape unscathed, it is simply not practical to pin one’s hopes on that possibility. It is clearly better to spot the kidnappers early and avoid their trap before it is sprung and the guns come out.

Kidnappers, like other criminals, look for patterns and vulnerabilities that they can exploit. Their chances for success increase greatly if they are allowed to conduct surveillance at will and are given the opportunity to thoroughly assess the security measures (if any) employed by the target. We have seen several cases in Mexico in which the criminals even chose to attack despite security measures such as armored cars and armed security guards. In such cases, criminals attack with adequate resources to overcome existing security. For example, if there are protective agents, the attackers will plan to neutralize them first. If there is an armored vehicle, they will find ways to defeat the armor or grab the target when he or she is outside the vehicle. Because of this, criminals must not be allowed to conduct surveillance at will. Potential targets should practice a heightened but relaxed state of situational awareness that will help them spot hostile surveillance.

Potential targets should also conduct simple pattern and route analyses to determine where they are most predictable and vulnerable. Taking an objective look at your schedule and routes is really not as complicated as it may seem. While the ideal is to vary routes and times to avoid predictable locations, this is also difficult and disruptive and warranted only when the threat is extremely high. A more practical alternative is for potential targets to raise their situational awareness a notch as they travel through such areas at predictable times.

Of course, using the term “potential targets” points to another problem. Many kidnapping victims simply don’t believe they are potential targets until after they have been kidnapped, and therefore do not take commonsense security measures. Frequently, when such people are debriefed after their release from captivity, they are able to recall suspicious activity before their abduction that they did not take seriously because they did not consider themselves targets. One American businessman who was kidnapped in Central America said upon his release that he knew there was something odd about the behavior of a particular couple he saw frequently sitting on a park bench near his home prior to his kidnapping, but he didn’t think he was rich enough to be targeted for kidnapping. As soon as he was abducted, he said that he immediately knew that the awkward couple had been observing him to determine his pattern. He said that he often thought about that couple during his two months in captivity, and how a little bit of curiosity could have saved him from a terrifying ordeal and his family a substantial sum of money.

The same steps involved in a deliberate kidnapping are also followed in ad hoc, opportunistic kidnappings — though the steps may be condensed and accomplished in seconds or minutes rather than the weeks or months normally associated with a well-planned kidnapping operation. And the same problems with lack of awareness often apply. It is not uncommon to talk to someone who was involved in an express kidnapping and hear the person say, “I got a bad feeling about those three guys standing near that car when I started walking down that block, but I kept walking anyway.” This frequent occurrence highlights the importance of situational awareness, attack recognition and proper mindset maintenance.

Potential targets do not have to institute security measures that will make them invulnerable to such crimes — something that is very difficult and that can be very expensive. Rather, the objective is to take measures that make them a harder target than other members of the specific class of individuals to which they belong. Groups conducting pre-operational surveillance, whether for an intentional kidnapping or an opportunistic kidnapping, prefer a target that is unaware and easy prey. Taking some basic security measures such as maintaining a healthy state of situational awareness will, in many cases, cause the criminals to choose another target who is less aware and therefore more vulnerable.

Also, most people who are kidnapped in places like Afghanistan or the Sahel know they are going into dangerous places and disregard the warnings not to go to those places. Many of these people, like journalists and aid workers, take the risk as part of their jobs. Others, like the European tourists abducted in the Sahel (and some of the pleasure boaters kidnapped by Somali pirates), appear to naively disregard the risk or to be thrill-seekers. In the recent Germaneau case in Niger, due to the number of highly publicized kidnappings in the Sahel region over the past eight years, and Germaneau’s personal history of working in Algeria, it would be hard to argue that he did not know what he could be getting himself into (though we are unsure at this point what motivated him to run that risk). After Germaneau’s kidnapping, his driver was subsequently arrested, raising the possibility that he was somehow complicit in the abduction. This is a reminder that it is not at all unusual for kidnapping gangs to have inside help, whether a maid, bodyguard, interpreter or taxi driver.

In retrospect, almost every person who is kidnapped either missed or ignored some indication or warning of danger. These warnings can range from observable criminal behavior to a consular information bulletin specifically warning people not to drive outside of cities in Guatemala after dark, for example. This means that, while kidnapping can be a devastating crime, it can also be an avoidable one.

OTM’s – Other than Mexicans – coming across the border – Who is coming into the US from Mexico?

This was sent to me by a friend; it is a new broadcast from a TV station in Atlanta.

 http://www.wsbtv.com/video/23438021/index.html

http://www.wsbtv.com/video/23438712/index.html

There are two publications that I would like to bring to your attention
Directory of Protection Officers
The first is a directory titled “The 2010 International Directory of Protection Officers”. It is produced by Robin Barratt. It is a downloadable PDF file from the HOME page of The Close Protection Officer’s Club

Robin’s goal is create a directory that is a major resource for the CP community. The International Directory of Protection Officers lists hundreds of individuals and companies that supply close protection services in both the UK and worldwide and will be updated every six months.

The Circuit Magazine
The Circuit Magazine is aimed at the security industry and is produced by the The British & American Bodyguard Associations. Although it is produced in the UK, it has a US flavor and content. I have written for them and Elijah Shaw has a regular column in the publication.
You can find more information and costs at The Circuit Magazine

John Demand    jdemandjr@aol.com

John’s Web Site  www.observationondemand.com

The following is from John

I would like to ask your help in an effort that could significantly help to combat terrorism.
The media is hyping the Times Square terrorist attempt and law enforcement has done an outstanding job of grabbing the perpetrator, but they are not emphasizing the important key to the initial discovery of this incident. It was a street vendor – a citizen – that made the observation and immediately reported it to the police. That alert citizen may have saved lives and got law enforcement on the scene.

In order to downplay the possibility of panic or for whatever reason we have not emphasized to the community that we need their help. WE NEED THE EYES, EARS, NOSES, AND INTUITION OF EVERY CITIZEN.

Below are the seven signs of terrorism that I have put into the acronym (OBSERVE).

Thank you all in advance. Together we can make a difference.

The Seven Signs of Terrorism

To remember the seven signs of terrorism think of the word “OBSERVE”

O – Observe signs of surveillance, look for photographing, recording and monitoring activities, such as: Persons making drawings diagrams or maps. Pay attention to persons watching or those with unusual interest in infrastructure: power, water, plants, bridges, schools, stadiums, shopping malls, public transportation.

B – Be aware of unusual inquiries regarding important places, workers, or operations dealing with power, water, plants, bridges, schools, stadiums, shopping malls, public transportation.

S – Security may be compromised by walking into restricted areas to gauge response or test the strength and weaknesses of security in a building or area. Frequently test your systems to assure they have not been compromised.

E – Engaging in the surreptitious acquisition of supplies such as identification, stealing uniforms, forging IDs, passports. Acquiring firearms, ammunitions, explosives, or bomb making materials, immediately investigate thefts of these items.

R – Remember to be on the lookout for suspicious or out of the place behaviors. Asking unusual questions or being in places that seem out of place – Trust your instincts. If it does not look right… It probably is not. – REPORT IT.

V – Very likely to make dry runs where they put people into position and move them
around according to the eventual plan without committing the act itself.

E – Evolving plots will try to get terrorists into position at or near a target. Sometimes
leaving something behind and removing themselves from the premises, such as a back pack or box. Other times staying with something suspicious (such as suicide bomber). This is the last opportunity to report something to the police. Do not dismiss it.

A UN report on the assassination of Pakistani Prime Minister Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto has been widely circulated. It is fairly long, 54 pages. I have taken the section that deals with the “Day of the Assassination”. When we have some time we will offer our opinion of what happened and developed a lessons learned. In the interim I am sure the the community would welcome any comments. It’s long but filled with good info.

 “The Day of the Assassination”

Departure from Zardari House for Liaquat Bagh

86. Around 1400 hours, Ms Bhutto left Zardari House, for Liaquat Bagh, in a convoy of vehicles. The convoy consisted of a black Toyota Land Cruiser used by Mr Tauqir Kaira, followed by Ms Bhutto’s white armoured Land Cruiser and two of Mr Kaira’s vehicles on either side of Ms Bhutto’s vehicle. The latter two were a Mercedes-Benz van on the right and a four-door double cabin vehicle on the left.

Immediately behind those vehicles were two Toyota Vigo pick-up trucks, positioned side by side. A black Mercedes-Benz car was behind these Vigos. This Mercedes- Benz, from Zardari House, was bullet-proof and served as the back-up vehicle for Ms Bhutto. The two Vigo pick-up trucks were also from Zardari House.

87. Mr Kaira was inside the lead vehicle with his security men. Accompanying Ms Bhutto in her vehicle were Mr Javed-ur-Rehman (driver, front-left seat), SSP Major (ret) Imtiaz Hussain (front-right seat), Makhdoom Amin Fahim (senior PPP member, second row-left seat), Ms Bhutto (second row-centre seat), Ms Naheed Khan (senior PPP member and political secretary of Ms Bhutto, second row-right seat). Seated in the back of the vehicle on two benches facing each other were Senator Safdar Abbasi (senior PPP member, rear-right bench), Mr Shahenshah (rear-left bench, facing

Senator Abbasi) and Mr Razaq Mirani (personal attendant of Ms Bhutto, rear-right bench next to Senator Abbasi and to his left). Mr Kaira’s two vehicles on either side of Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser carried his men. The Vigo pick-up trucks carried members of Mr Chaudry Aslam’s security team. Riding in the black Mercedes-Benz car were the driver, PPP official Mr Faratullah Babar in the front passenger seat and, in the rear passenger seat from left to right, two PPP officials Mr Babar Awan and Mr Rehman Malik and General (ret) Tauqir Zia.

Arrival at Liaquat Bagh

88. Ms Bhutto’s convoy reached the Faizabad junction at about 1415 hours, according to the Rawalpindi District Police, who were to assume responsibility for security of the convoy. According to the police and the Security Plan, an escort was to be provided composed of a traffic police “pilot” jeep, a regular police jeep leading the convoy and three Elite Force Toyota pick-up trucks protecting Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser on three sides. People in Ms Bhutto’s vehicle claim, however, that there was no such escort except for one traffic police vehicle.

89. At about 1456 hours, Ms Bhutto’s convoy turned right at the Murree Road – Liaquat Road junction and headed towards Liaquat Bagh. Video footage shows Ms Bhutto’s convoy driving from the Murree Road – Liaquat Bagh junction to the inner security gate leading to the VIP parking area at Liaquat Bagh. The footage shows Ms Bhutto standing through the roof escape hatch of her Land Cruiser and waving at the large crowd around the vehicle while it moved slowly on Liaquat Road.

90. Both ASP Ashfaq Anwar who was the supervisor of the Elite Force unit and Inspector Azmat Ali Dogar, the unit’s commander, told the Commission that they accompanied Ms Bhutto all the way to the back of the stage according to the Security Plan. However, video footage and pictures show that as Ms Bhutto drove on much of Liaquat Road, her vehicle was flanked only by her private security vehicles. The Elite Force vehicles were nowhere near her vehicle. In fact, the Commission has identified Inspector Dogar among the crowd some distance from Ms Bhutto’s vehicle.

Contrary to the police assertion, there was no police-provided box formation around Ms Bhutto as she arrived at the rally, and the Elite Force unit did not execute their duties as specified in the security deployment. Furthermore, the Commission does not believe that the full escort as described by the police was ever present.

91. At about 1516 hours, Ms Bhutto’s convoy stopped for a few minutes at the inner gate of the parking area waiting for that gate to be opened, during which Ms Bhutto remained standing through the escape hatch. The police and some PPP members disagree as to the reason for the delay in opening the gate. While the PPP asserts that the police did not have the key to open the gate, the police said that they did not want the large crowd following Ms Bhutto to get into the VIP parking area.

Altogether, Ms Bhutto stood through the escape hatch for the approximately 20 minutes it took to drive from the Murree Road – Liaquat Road junction to the gate of the parking area. This calls into question the claim of the Rawalpindi District Police that they were surprised when Ms Bhutto emerged from the escape hatch on her way out of Liaquat Bagh.

92. Once the convoy passed through the inner gate, at about 1531 hours, it drove through the VIP parking area to the rear of the stage. At least the following three vehicles were in the VIP parking area: Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser, Mr Kaira’s lead vehicle and the black bullet-proof Mercedes-Benz car. Temporary wooden stairs had been built for the rally to access the rear of the stage directly from the parking area.

Ms Bhutto climbed the stairs, went to the stage to wave to the crowd and took her seat before addressing the crowd.

93. Near the rear of the stage, a scuffle broke out between some workers of the PPP and police who tried to prevent them from climbing to the stage. This created tension between PPP workers and the police officers posted in that area. Accounts given by PPP representatives and the police with regard to the degree and nature of this event differ significantly. The police state that the dispute was minor and was settled immediately, whereas some on the local PPP side claim it was serious and led to bitter reactions from the police during the rest of the rally. They say that the police felt insulted and became more passive in their security role. The Commission finds that the police were indeed passive in their provision of security and believes it unprofessional if the Rawalpindi District Police reduced their level of alert to any degree as a result of wounded pride.

Exit from Liaquat Bagh

94. Several thousand people attended the event. Ms Bhutto was joined on the stage by a number of national-level PPP leaders and all of the parliamentary candidates from Rawalpindi district. The crowds were enthusiastic, and PPP leaders and activists considered the event to have been a great success. They say Ms Bhutto gave a strong and rousing speech, one of the best of her campaign, and describe her as having been radiant that day.

95. The public gathering concluded and, at about 1710 hours, Ms Bhutto descended the wooden stairs and entered her Land Cruiser. The occupants of the Land Cruiser and their seating positions were the same as for the trip in to Liaquat Bagh. The composition of passengers in the black Mercedes-Benz car also remained the same.

96. The black bullet-proof Mercedes-Benz car was the first to leave the parking area. It is not clear how much distance there was between this vehicle and the rest of Ms Bhutto’s convoy at the moment of the blast. Credible reports range from 100 meters to 250 meters. Some of those in the car said that they were close enough to Ms Bhutto’s vehicle to feel the impact of the blast. Others at the site of the blast have said that the Mercedes-Benz left Liaquat Bagh so quickly that it was nowhere to be seen when the blast occurred. Indeed, the Commission has not seen this vehicle in the many video images of the exit area it reviewed. Despite the acknowledgement of some occupants of the vehicle that they felt the impact of the blast, the Commission finds it incredible that they drove all the way to Zardari House, a drive of about 20 minutes, before they became aware that Ms Bhutto had been injured in the blast.

They should have stopped at a safe distance when they felt the blast so as to check on Ms Bhutto’s condition, the condition of her vehicle and whether the back-up vehicle was required. Indeed, as the back-up vehicle, the Mercedes-Benz car would have been an essential element of Ms Bhutto’s convoy on the return trip even if the occupants of that car had confirmed that Ms Bhutto had been unscathed in the attack.

97. Mr Kaira’s vehicle was the next to leave the inner parking area after the Mercedes-Benz car, with Ms Bhutto’s vehicle right behind it, followed by another of Mr Kaira’s vehicles. The two Vigo pick-up trucks then followed from the outer parking area located between the inner and outer gates.

98. At 1712 hours, Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser exited from the outer gate. Crowds of people who were already on Liaquat Road drew closer to the vehicle as it began to turn right onto Liaquat Road. In addition, many people left the park, swelling the crowd around the Land Cruiser, contrary to the police assertion that they did not allow anyone to leave the park before the departure of Ms Bhutto’s convoy. Ms Bhutto emerged through the escape hatch of the vehicle and started waving to her supporters. When the vehicle approached the central road divider, it was slowed further by the crowd.

99. Major Imtiaz, who was sitting in the front seat of the Land Cruiser, said that he was worried that the convoy was being slowed down by the crowd. He wanted to call CPO Saud Aziz by cell phone, but he did not have the CPO’s direct number. Instead he called CPO Saud Aziz’s operator and the operator at the police station in Multan, another town in Punjab Province (where Major Imtiaz had recently served). The Commission finds that this lack of preparation was a major flaw in the security arrangements and reflects badly on the professionalism of Major Imtiaz who should have had full and rapid access to the Rawalpindi police command.

100. Questions remain as to the nature of the crowd that gathered around the Land Cruiser. Passengers in the Land Cruiser and some local PPP members recalled that they were mostly PPP workers, and they did not see any strangers or irregular movements among them. The Rawalpindi District Police and other PPP members, however, suggested that a group of people had deliberately stood in front of the Land Cruiser to prevent it from moving. Regardless of the accuracy of either account, it remains that the police did not control the crowd outside of Liaquat Bagh. As a result, the attacker was able to get as close as he did to Ms Bhutto’s vehicle.

101. The Rawalpindi police authorities and some PPP workers dispute the exact exit route agreed for Ms Bhutto’s convoy. The Rawalpindi District Police and DCO Elahi claim that the planned route for the convoy was to turn right onto Liaquat Road and then left onto Murree Road, retracing the convoy’s entry route. Only in case of an emergency was the convoy to make a left turn after exiting from the outer gate; a decision to take the emergency route had to be made by the senior police officer in charge of security on the scene. Some local PPP workers who attended the preparatory meeting with the police disagree with this account. They claim that the original plan was to make a left turn onto Liaquat Road and that the minutes provided by the DCO, which did not indicate this left turn, were inaccurate. In any event, photographs show two stationary police vehicles on Liaquat Road blocking the left- side drive lane where the left turn would have been made. As a result, even in an emergency, it would have been impossible for Ms Bhutto’s convoy to make a left turn and use the escape route unless those police vehicles were quickly moved. The Commission learned that these vehicles were official vehicles of senior Rawalpindi police officers. The Commission finds it irresponsible that these vehicles were parked in such a way as to block the emergency exit route.

102. The Rawalpindi District Police claim that police vehicles from the Elite Force unit headed by ASP Ashfaq Anwar were waiting outside the outer gate to escort Ms Bhutto’s convoy and that they were about to go into a protective box formation when the attack on Ms Bhutto took place. However, forming the box at this point was impracticable given the narrow width of Liaquat Road and the number of people who had already started to surround Ms Bhutto’s vehicle. In any event, video footage shows very few uniformed police on the scene available to push back the crowd to create space for the box formation. Furthermore, video and photographs taken shortly before the blast as well as Commission interviews indicate that the Elite Force unit was not in position to go into a box formation. The Elite Force unit was in place neither for the entry nor the exit of the convoy and did not afford the protection they were tasked with, thus failing spectacularly in their duty.

103. Overall, video and photographic materials as well as the Commission’s interviews establish that there were very few police deployed outside the outer gate and on Liaquat Road as Ms Bhutto’s convoy attempted to depart the scene.

The Attack

104. From the exit, Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser started to make a right turn onto Liaquat Road. As it slowly approached the central divider on Liaquat Road, the crowd began chanting slogans. There is some dispute over whether Ms Bhutto made the decision to stand up on her own or was urged to do so. Before she stood up, Ms Bhutto asked Ms Naheed Khan to make a phone call to Mr Nawaz Sharif, PML-N leader, to convey condolences for the deaths of some of his supporters who had been shot during the PML-N rally earlier that day. It had been reported that the shooting incident occurred between supporters of the PML-N and those of the PML-Q parties.

105. While Ms Khan was trying to reach Mr Sharif, Ms Bhutto stopped her and asked Senator Abbasi, who was sitting in the rear seat, to chant slogans to the crowd using the vehicle’s loudspeaker. Ms Bhutto then stood on the seat and appeared through the escape hatch, with her head and shoulders exposed.

106. Ms Bhutto waved to the crowd. The vehicle continued to move slowly into its right turn onto Liaquat Road. At this point, a man wearing dark glasses appeared in the crowd on the left side of the Land Cruiser. Around 1714 hours, while the vehicle continued into its right turn, the man pulled out a pistol, and from a distance of approximately two to three meters, fired three shots at Ms Bhutto. According to video analysis conducted by Scotland Yard, the three shots were fired in less than one second.

107. The Commission examined video footage taken from a back angle, which shows Ms Bhutto’s dupatta, her white head covering, and her hair flick upwards after the second shot. However, there is no evidence of a link between the second shot and that movement. After the third shot, she started to move down into the vehicle.

108. After the third shot, the gunman lowered the gun, looked down and then detonated the explosives. At the time of the blast, the gunman was near the left rear corner of the vehicle. Video footage shows that at the time of the explosion, the Land Cruiser was still making the right turn. The Scotland Yard team’s analysis shows that it took 1.6 seconds from the time of the first shot to the detonation of the bomb.

In the Land Cruiser

109. Ms Naheed Khan recalled that immediately after she had heard the three gunshots, Ms Bhutto fell down into the vehicle onto her lap. Ms Khan said that she felt the impact of the explosion immediately thereafter. The right side of Ms Bhutto’s head came to rest on Ms Khan’s lap. Ms Khan saw that Ms Bhutto was bleeding profusely from the right side of her head. She noticed that Ms Bhutto was not moving and saw that blood was also trickling from her ear. Makhdoom Amin Fahim recalled that Ms Bhutto fell heavily and showed no sign of life after falling.

According to Scotland Yard’s video analysis, the flash of the blast appeared just over two-thirds of a second after Ms Bhutto disappeared from view.

110. No one else in her vehicle was seriously injured.

Transfer to the Hospital

111. After the explosion, Senator Abbasi told the driver to drive to the hospital (initially having in mind a hospital in Islamabad). Although all four of its tires were punctured by the blast, the Land Cruiser managed to drive along Liaquat Road for approximately 300 meters towards the junction with Murree Road where it turned left. As the Land Cruiser moved along Murree Road, it became increasingly difficult for the driver to manoeuvre on the metal rims of the wheels. The Land Cruiser made a U-turn at the Rehmanabad junction, located approximately four kilometres from the Liaquat Road-Murree Road junction, in order to get to the other side of the road where Rawalpindi General Hospital (RGH) was located. The occupants of the Land Cruiser recalled that at this point there was only one traffic police vehicle ahead of the Land Cruiser. No other vehicles were visible – neither the bullet proof black Mercedes-Benz car nor any Elite Force unit vehicle. Following the U-turn, the Land Cruiser stalled. The party had to wait for some time on Murree Road until a private vehicle that belonged to Ms Sherry Rehman arrived and took Ms Bhutto to the hospital.

This is the first of two articles by Derek Humble. Derek is a transplanted British security professional currently living in Toronto, Canada. After a career in the British Military he took a position with a large Canadian security provider operating a specialized department offering corporate protective services to Canada’s elite. In 1988 Derek decided to incorporate his own business that he named The Anvil Group.

The Anvil Group Inc under Derek’s guidance ran operations in Canada and around the world with operations in North, Central and South America as well as Europe. Derek has run numerous versions of secure driver programs around the world specifically Moscow, Chicago, Mexico City and London to name a few. He is a long time friend, and was an early graduate of the old Scotti School of Defensive Driving and has constantly strived to study the cerebral aspects to protective driving as much as the physical practical side of the business.

 Currently Derek consults with companies on matters of personal protection, risk management and travel risk assessments. His company is NEMESIS CONSULTING     Derek’s email dhumble@nemesisinfo.com

“Situation Awareness” Just a catch phrase or a vitally useful tactic? Part 1The phrase “Situation Awareness” has gradually entered the lexicon of security trainers and is seen in text books as an almost throw away line when talking about anything from driving the CEO in their day-to-day lives or driving down Route Irish. However few of those using this important term truly understand what is meant by being “Situation Aware” or even where that phase derives from.

 “Situation Awareness”, as a catch phrase, owes its birth to the very steep learning curve experienced by the Brits in the very difficult war against terrorists, both Republican and Loyalist, in Northern Ireland and the British mainland. As with all counter insurgency situations survival lessons must be learnt faster than the terrorists learn theirs. Staying ahead of the insurgent’s tactical learning curve means keeping friendly forces alive long enough to slow the enemy successes. This has been a core requirement in all counter insurgency wars since WW2. As the threat changes and increases so must the counter tactics to those dangers. Those immersed in facing a competent enemy, such as Irish, Iraqi, or Afghan insurgents or even the ordinary criminal element must developed training tactics that were/are meaningful, sensible. They must also be easy to learn and understand but most of all there is a need for tactical sustainability.

Whether the protector is in the military, law enforcement, government security, or in private sector protection, training is always budget, time and resource sensitive. Even those with significant budgets struggle with the needs of those on the leading edge of the battle. Physical skills taught need regular practice, areas needed for training are difficult to find and staff are often too busy with operations to be released to retrain. Situation Awareness is a tool that addresses the inability of operational personnel to regularly retrain and refresh to meet the required standards. How often have operational staff laughed when told that they need to re-qualify on a regular basis.

The maxim of “it is impossible to protect everyone, everywhere all the time from everything” has never been truer than it is now in the year 2010. A large part of the protective battle is to understand the “alert level requirement” to know this increases the sustainability of any protective task. High Risk situations (Route Irish) can be adrenalin demanding and then draining to the body. Intensive concentration is exhausting and in most cases a high state of awareness cannot be maintained for periods of hours let alone days, without a serious degradation in effectiveness. This alert level recognition and adoption is the age old difference between the veteran and the “new guy”. Boredom is equally debilitating and long periods of inactivity will have an equally negative effect on the need for a competent and timely reaction to incidents. The true protection professional needs to be able understand when to “up their game” and equally “when to safely relax” To arrive at this ultimate and enviable mental state is the aim of being “Situation Awareness”

All of the skills required to properly protect those at risk be they driving, shooting, first aid or intelligence gathering are secondary to the need to understand how to become, and stay, “Situation Aware”. All of the physical skills are of course important in the reactive phase of any protective assignment. However the best kind of protective skill will allow the protective practitioner to avoid discovering whether their shooting/medical skills are up to the mark by being “Situation Aware” and thus avoiding danger. Truly understanding where the risks are highest, what type of attack are likely , what tactics they prefer and how to detect and/or deter attacks will dramatically reduce need for using driving, shooting or fighting skills. The learning involved in this proactive approach is simple to understand and therefore easy to retain over lengthy periods of time. It can be constantly practiced, tested and modified in any operational environment. This is the approach that is truly sustainable. And this approach represents the one key element in surviving in the realities of day-to-day operations and/or daily duties. Being truly “Situation Aware” can be the protective equivalent of Zen the question is how to achieve it?

The International Executive Protection Conference sponsored by the ESI Alumni Association will be held in Las Vegas Aug 6th to the 8th at the Caesar’s Place.

The conference is a networking event opened to all Protection Professionals. The conference presents a unique opportunity to network with others in the business. Studies indicate that 75% of all positions are filled by networking, my guess would be in the protection business that number is higher.

There are discussions by industry leaders such as – Directors of Security of major corporations – Detail Leaders from high end security companies – Personal Protection Agents working in the industry, all of them willing to share their experience with you.

For three days the conference delivers seminars that are relevant to the success of your business or career. Subjects that you won’t find in most other Protection Conferences – like financing and budgeting – International travel for the EP agent – Resume writing – you can have your resume reviewed by people who have worked in the industry for decades and have looked at hundreds of resumes.

And in my opinion one of the most important seminars of the convention is the “Building a Business including Branding and Marketing”. The talk is given by a graduate of the prestigious Wharton School of Business, who also happens to be the CEO of a Security Company with 18 years of experience supplying personal protection agents.

There are other great subjects covering the use of K9’s and Close Protection

Oh I forgot to mention that I will be the Keynote Speaker

For more information