SecurityDriver News

Protective/Evasive Driving Program  – August 18-20, 2010

It doesn’t matter whether the driver is confronted with a potential accident or a deliberate attempt to stop the vehicle; nor does it matter where they happen to be in the world when the problem presents itself – survival hinges upon the driver’s ability to – recognize a potential problem as it begins to unfold – manage the time, distance and maneuvering room available to them – stay within the performance limits of the driver/vehicle combination

 VDI’s highly acclaimed Protective/ Evasive Driving program  is designed to  provide executive protection, law enforcement and military professionals the knowledge, skill and ability needed to survive behind-the-wheel emergencies utilizing a methodology that has been proven effective over the course of nearly four decades, which incorporates: 

• application of the science of vehicle dynamics – how the loads placed on a vehicle by the drivers actions effect it’s andling
• a series of exercises designed to closely replicate emergency situations and configured in a specific sequence designed to maximize student improvement
• an objective, scientific process for measuring the individual student’s improvement and overall performance
•  the real world experience garnered from the nearly 150 years of combined security, law enforcement, military and driver training experience which Tony Scotti and VDI’s Scotti Certified Instructors bring to the training arena.

Contact us at –  Tel: 732.738.5221 – Fax: 732.738.5223

email:info@vehicledynamics.net

In light of all the discussion concerning the assassination in Mexico – I thought I would go over my thoughts on Kill Zones. 

Since being in the Kill Zone can Ahhhhh kill you – you should

            Understand what they are

            How to stay out of them

            And if you get in one – how to get out of them

            If you can’t get out – how to put up one hell of a fight – but keep in mind why they are called Kill Zones 

Understand what they are – This isn’t brain surgery – A Kill Zone is a time distance relationship – how much time do I have and how much distance do I have. If you attend a “Security Driving School”, and they don’t talk about this concept – ask for your money back.

How to stay out of them – First and foremost – the best way to avoid an ambush, hence the kill zone, is don’t be there when it happens. There are plenty of people who are an ambush looking for a place to happen, just hope they are driving the same roads you are. 

If you haven’t done it already, take a course that has a heavy emphasis on Surveillance Detection – Route Surveys, and Advancing. 

And if you get in one – how to get out of them – Driving out of the kill zone is an exercise in the laws of physics and is a measurable skill. These are not skills you learn sitting in the back seat of a vehicle driving around a race track. The only skill you learn sitting in the back seat is how to projectile vomit out the back window. Again – If you attend a Security Driving School and they don’t talk – demonstrate – practice – objectively measure your skill to escape the Kill Zone – ask for your money back.           

If you can’t get out – how to put up one hell of a fight. This is where shooting skills meet driving skills – there are shooting schools that emphasize these skills – but keep in mind why they are called Kill Zones

Protective Driving Operations

3-DAY PROGRAM SEPTEMBER 13-15, 2010
PROTECTIVE DRIVING OPERATIONS
ESI’s TRAINING FACILITY IN COLORADO
$950 (Limited Discount Price)

ESI and Tony Scotti’s VDI will be sponsoring a 3 Day Protective Driving Operations in Grand Junction Colorado.

The course provides participants with a unique opportunity to build upon their existing training and further develop the knowledge, skill and ability required to perform one of the most challenging aspects of protection, providing safe and secure transportation in a high risk environment.

This is accomplished through a series of informative discussions and hands on practical exercises, students will develop an understanding of what the driver/vehicle combination can and, most importantly, cannot do when confronted with a potentially life threatening situation while behind the wheel. An emphasis is placed on how the driver can most effectively manage the limited time and distance available to them as a safety or security incident unfolds.

Classroom discussion will include the role vehicles play in mission strategy and tactics. Students will learn how armored vehicles affects the decision making process, and how to select the proper vehicle for the mission – or how to maximize the effectiveness of the vehicle given.

All hands on exercises are scenario based and designed to train and measure driver ability. Hence students will be objectively tested, and are required to attain a standard. All test and standards are based on the laws of physics as applied to vehicle attacks. The scenarios used during the testing are from case studies of vehicle ambushes.

At the conclusion of the program students will have the knowledge too combine mission objectives, with the vehicles supplied, and if necessary, have the skills needed to escape the Kill Zone.

CLASSROOM

DYNAMICS OF A VEHICLE EMERGENCY

CASE STUDIES OF VEHICLE ATTACKS

ROADSIDE BOMBS

KILL ZONE THEORY

TACTICS AND SECURITY VEHICLES

ARMORED VEHICLES 

HANDS ON EXERCISES

BACKING-UP EXERCISE

ROLLING AMBUSH

ATTACKS AGAINST THE CONVOY

VEHICLE FAMILIARIZATION

RUN FLAT EXERCISE

VEHICLE COMBAT

DRIVE DOWN DRILLS

 For more information contact Brandon Delcamp at 888 718 3105

July 24, 2010

For the protection specialist or security driver the worst-case scenario is a deliberate attempt to stop the vehicle.  Surviving those scenarios requires the ability to keep the vehicle moving and clear the kill zone as quickly as possible – no matter what is happening outside the vehicle.

Focused, Intense, Effective Training

 VDI’s Immediate Action Driving Skills course is designed to provide security practitioners – from the entry-level protection specialist to highly experienced private sector, military and law enforcement professionals - the training and experience needed to deal with the worst-case scenario, a vehicle ambush. Where survival comes down to the driver’s ability to respond instinctively to the threat, when the difference between success and failure is measured in tenths of a second. 

This one day course provides students with an opportunity to:

 - Learn from professionals with real world experience

 - Experience the realities of driving through a kill zone        

 - Understand how to effectivelyoperate damaged vehicles

 Students will gain hands-on, practical experience in:

 - Pushing through roadblocks - (One & two vehicle ramming)

 - Defeating rolling ambushes - (PIT/Counter-PIT techniques)

 - Dealing with an incapacitated driver – (Driving from passenger seat)

 - Forced lane excursions – (Surface transitions)

For addtional information
Joseph Autera
Tony Scotti’s Vehicle Dynamics Institute
Tel: 732 738-5221
Cell : 732–586-4020   email: jautera@vehicledynamics.net

Or Tony Scotti
781 395 3097 email tonyscotti@securitydriver.com

Joe giving the standoff foot print lecture in our Surveillance Detection Program

Students working on their field exercises

Joe and Larry getting the students ready for one of Our Vehicle Dynamics and Exercise Design Programs, the program is one of our Mission Oriented Driving Skills (MODS) programs. This is an old article about the program.

The students gathering vehicle dynamics data on a Lenco BearCat, they are measuring handling capability.

Larry and Jerry conducting a motorcade program in the UAE

Although it is an advertisement for BMW High Security Vehicles – this You Tube video is still a good primer on armored cars.

A UN report on the assassination of Pakistani Prime Minister Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto has been widely circulated. It is fairly long, 54 pages. I have taken the section that deals with the “Day of the Assassination”. When we have some time we will offer our opinion of what happened and developed a lessons learned. In the interim I am sure the the community would welcome any comments. It’s long but filled with good info.

 “The Day of the Assassination”

Departure from Zardari House for Liaquat Bagh

86. Around 1400 hours, Ms Bhutto left Zardari House, for Liaquat Bagh, in a convoy of vehicles. The convoy consisted of a black Toyota Land Cruiser used by Mr Tauqir Kaira, followed by Ms Bhutto’s white armoured Land Cruiser and two of Mr Kaira’s vehicles on either side of Ms Bhutto’s vehicle. The latter two were a Mercedes-Benz van on the right and a four-door double cabin vehicle on the left.

Immediately behind those vehicles were two Toyota Vigo pick-up trucks, positioned side by side. A black Mercedes-Benz car was behind these Vigos. This Mercedes- Benz, from Zardari House, was bullet-proof and served as the back-up vehicle for Ms Bhutto. The two Vigo pick-up trucks were also from Zardari House.

87. Mr Kaira was inside the lead vehicle with his security men. Accompanying Ms Bhutto in her vehicle were Mr Javed-ur-Rehman (driver, front-left seat), SSP Major (ret) Imtiaz Hussain (front-right seat), Makhdoom Amin Fahim (senior PPP member, second row-left seat), Ms Bhutto (second row-centre seat), Ms Naheed Khan (senior PPP member and political secretary of Ms Bhutto, second row-right seat). Seated in the back of the vehicle on two benches facing each other were Senator Safdar Abbasi (senior PPP member, rear-right bench), Mr Shahenshah (rear-left bench, facing

Senator Abbasi) and Mr Razaq Mirani (personal attendant of Ms Bhutto, rear-right bench next to Senator Abbasi and to his left). Mr Kaira’s two vehicles on either side of Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser carried his men. The Vigo pick-up trucks carried members of Mr Chaudry Aslam’s security team. Riding in the black Mercedes-Benz car were the driver, PPP official Mr Faratullah Babar in the front passenger seat and, in the rear passenger seat from left to right, two PPP officials Mr Babar Awan and Mr Rehman Malik and General (ret) Tauqir Zia.

Arrival at Liaquat Bagh

88. Ms Bhutto’s convoy reached the Faizabad junction at about 1415 hours, according to the Rawalpindi District Police, who were to assume responsibility for security of the convoy. According to the police and the Security Plan, an escort was to be provided composed of a traffic police “pilot” jeep, a regular police jeep leading the convoy and three Elite Force Toyota pick-up trucks protecting Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser on three sides. People in Ms Bhutto’s vehicle claim, however, that there was no such escort except for one traffic police vehicle.

89. At about 1456 hours, Ms Bhutto’s convoy turned right at the Murree Road – Liaquat Road junction and headed towards Liaquat Bagh. Video footage shows Ms Bhutto’s convoy driving from the Murree Road – Liaquat Bagh junction to the inner security gate leading to the VIP parking area at Liaquat Bagh. The footage shows Ms Bhutto standing through the roof escape hatch of her Land Cruiser and waving at the large crowd around the vehicle while it moved slowly on Liaquat Road.

90. Both ASP Ashfaq Anwar who was the supervisor of the Elite Force unit and Inspector Azmat Ali Dogar, the unit’s commander, told the Commission that they accompanied Ms Bhutto all the way to the back of the stage according to the Security Plan. However, video footage and pictures show that as Ms Bhutto drove on much of Liaquat Road, her vehicle was flanked only by her private security vehicles. The Elite Force vehicles were nowhere near her vehicle. In fact, the Commission has identified Inspector Dogar among the crowd some distance from Ms Bhutto’s vehicle.

Contrary to the police assertion, there was no police-provided box formation around Ms Bhutto as she arrived at the rally, and the Elite Force unit did not execute their duties as specified in the security deployment. Furthermore, the Commission does not believe that the full escort as described by the police was ever present.

91. At about 1516 hours, Ms Bhutto’s convoy stopped for a few minutes at the inner gate of the parking area waiting for that gate to be opened, during which Ms Bhutto remained standing through the escape hatch. The police and some PPP members disagree as to the reason for the delay in opening the gate. While the PPP asserts that the police did not have the key to open the gate, the police said that they did not want the large crowd following Ms Bhutto to get into the VIP parking area.

Altogether, Ms Bhutto stood through the escape hatch for the approximately 20 minutes it took to drive from the Murree Road – Liaquat Road junction to the gate of the parking area. This calls into question the claim of the Rawalpindi District Police that they were surprised when Ms Bhutto emerged from the escape hatch on her way out of Liaquat Bagh.

92. Once the convoy passed through the inner gate, at about 1531 hours, it drove through the VIP parking area to the rear of the stage. At least the following three vehicles were in the VIP parking area: Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser, Mr Kaira’s lead vehicle and the black bullet-proof Mercedes-Benz car. Temporary wooden stairs had been built for the rally to access the rear of the stage directly from the parking area.

Ms Bhutto climbed the stairs, went to the stage to wave to the crowd and took her seat before addressing the crowd.

93. Near the rear of the stage, a scuffle broke out between some workers of the PPP and police who tried to prevent them from climbing to the stage. This created tension between PPP workers and the police officers posted in that area. Accounts given by PPP representatives and the police with regard to the degree and nature of this event differ significantly. The police state that the dispute was minor and was settled immediately, whereas some on the local PPP side claim it was serious and led to bitter reactions from the police during the rest of the rally. They say that the police felt insulted and became more passive in their security role. The Commission finds that the police were indeed passive in their provision of security and believes it unprofessional if the Rawalpindi District Police reduced their level of alert to any degree as a result of wounded pride.

Exit from Liaquat Bagh

94. Several thousand people attended the event. Ms Bhutto was joined on the stage by a number of national-level PPP leaders and all of the parliamentary candidates from Rawalpindi district. The crowds were enthusiastic, and PPP leaders and activists considered the event to have been a great success. They say Ms Bhutto gave a strong and rousing speech, one of the best of her campaign, and describe her as having been radiant that day.

95. The public gathering concluded and, at about 1710 hours, Ms Bhutto descended the wooden stairs and entered her Land Cruiser. The occupants of the Land Cruiser and their seating positions were the same as for the trip in to Liaquat Bagh. The composition of passengers in the black Mercedes-Benz car also remained the same.

96. The black bullet-proof Mercedes-Benz car was the first to leave the parking area. It is not clear how much distance there was between this vehicle and the rest of Ms Bhutto’s convoy at the moment of the blast. Credible reports range from 100 meters to 250 meters. Some of those in the car said that they were close enough to Ms Bhutto’s vehicle to feel the impact of the blast. Others at the site of the blast have said that the Mercedes-Benz left Liaquat Bagh so quickly that it was nowhere to be seen when the blast occurred. Indeed, the Commission has not seen this vehicle in the many video images of the exit area it reviewed. Despite the acknowledgement of some occupants of the vehicle that they felt the impact of the blast, the Commission finds it incredible that they drove all the way to Zardari House, a drive of about 20 minutes, before they became aware that Ms Bhutto had been injured in the blast.

They should have stopped at a safe distance when they felt the blast so as to check on Ms Bhutto’s condition, the condition of her vehicle and whether the back-up vehicle was required. Indeed, as the back-up vehicle, the Mercedes-Benz car would have been an essential element of Ms Bhutto’s convoy on the return trip even if the occupants of that car had confirmed that Ms Bhutto had been unscathed in the attack.

97. Mr Kaira’s vehicle was the next to leave the inner parking area after the Mercedes-Benz car, with Ms Bhutto’s vehicle right behind it, followed by another of Mr Kaira’s vehicles. The two Vigo pick-up trucks then followed from the outer parking area located between the inner and outer gates.

98. At 1712 hours, Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser exited from the outer gate. Crowds of people who were already on Liaquat Road drew closer to the vehicle as it began to turn right onto Liaquat Road. In addition, many people left the park, swelling the crowd around the Land Cruiser, contrary to the police assertion that they did not allow anyone to leave the park before the departure of Ms Bhutto’s convoy. Ms Bhutto emerged through the escape hatch of the vehicle and started waving to her supporters. When the vehicle approached the central road divider, it was slowed further by the crowd.

99. Major Imtiaz, who was sitting in the front seat of the Land Cruiser, said that he was worried that the convoy was being slowed down by the crowd. He wanted to call CPO Saud Aziz by cell phone, but he did not have the CPO’s direct number. Instead he called CPO Saud Aziz’s operator and the operator at the police station in Multan, another town in Punjab Province (where Major Imtiaz had recently served). The Commission finds that this lack of preparation was a major flaw in the security arrangements and reflects badly on the professionalism of Major Imtiaz who should have had full and rapid access to the Rawalpindi police command.

100. Questions remain as to the nature of the crowd that gathered around the Land Cruiser. Passengers in the Land Cruiser and some local PPP members recalled that they were mostly PPP workers, and they did not see any strangers or irregular movements among them. The Rawalpindi District Police and other PPP members, however, suggested that a group of people had deliberately stood in front of the Land Cruiser to prevent it from moving. Regardless of the accuracy of either account, it remains that the police did not control the crowd outside of Liaquat Bagh. As a result, the attacker was able to get as close as he did to Ms Bhutto’s vehicle.

101. The Rawalpindi police authorities and some PPP workers dispute the exact exit route agreed for Ms Bhutto’s convoy. The Rawalpindi District Police and DCO Elahi claim that the planned route for the convoy was to turn right onto Liaquat Road and then left onto Murree Road, retracing the convoy’s entry route. Only in case of an emergency was the convoy to make a left turn after exiting from the outer gate; a decision to take the emergency route had to be made by the senior police officer in charge of security on the scene. Some local PPP workers who attended the preparatory meeting with the police disagree with this account. They claim that the original plan was to make a left turn onto Liaquat Road and that the minutes provided by the DCO, which did not indicate this left turn, were inaccurate. In any event, photographs show two stationary police vehicles on Liaquat Road blocking the left- side drive lane where the left turn would have been made. As a result, even in an emergency, it would have been impossible for Ms Bhutto’s convoy to make a left turn and use the escape route unless those police vehicles were quickly moved. The Commission learned that these vehicles were official vehicles of senior Rawalpindi police officers. The Commission finds it irresponsible that these vehicles were parked in such a way as to block the emergency exit route.

102. The Rawalpindi District Police claim that police vehicles from the Elite Force unit headed by ASP Ashfaq Anwar were waiting outside the outer gate to escort Ms Bhutto’s convoy and that they were about to go into a protective box formation when the attack on Ms Bhutto took place. However, forming the box at this point was impracticable given the narrow width of Liaquat Road and the number of people who had already started to surround Ms Bhutto’s vehicle. In any event, video footage shows very few uniformed police on the scene available to push back the crowd to create space for the box formation. Furthermore, video and photographs taken shortly before the blast as well as Commission interviews indicate that the Elite Force unit was not in position to go into a box formation. The Elite Force unit was in place neither for the entry nor the exit of the convoy and did not afford the protection they were tasked with, thus failing spectacularly in their duty.

103. Overall, video and photographic materials as well as the Commission’s interviews establish that there were very few police deployed outside the outer gate and on Liaquat Road as Ms Bhutto’s convoy attempted to depart the scene.

The Attack

104. From the exit, Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser started to make a right turn onto Liaquat Road. As it slowly approached the central divider on Liaquat Road, the crowd began chanting slogans. There is some dispute over whether Ms Bhutto made the decision to stand up on her own or was urged to do so. Before she stood up, Ms Bhutto asked Ms Naheed Khan to make a phone call to Mr Nawaz Sharif, PML-N leader, to convey condolences for the deaths of some of his supporters who had been shot during the PML-N rally earlier that day. It had been reported that the shooting incident occurred between supporters of the PML-N and those of the PML-Q parties.

105. While Ms Khan was trying to reach Mr Sharif, Ms Bhutto stopped her and asked Senator Abbasi, who was sitting in the rear seat, to chant slogans to the crowd using the vehicle’s loudspeaker. Ms Bhutto then stood on the seat and appeared through the escape hatch, with her head and shoulders exposed.

106. Ms Bhutto waved to the crowd. The vehicle continued to move slowly into its right turn onto Liaquat Road. At this point, a man wearing dark glasses appeared in the crowd on the left side of the Land Cruiser. Around 1714 hours, while the vehicle continued into its right turn, the man pulled out a pistol, and from a distance of approximately two to three meters, fired three shots at Ms Bhutto. According to video analysis conducted by Scotland Yard, the three shots were fired in less than one second.

107. The Commission examined video footage taken from a back angle, which shows Ms Bhutto’s dupatta, her white head covering, and her hair flick upwards after the second shot. However, there is no evidence of a link between the second shot and that movement. After the third shot, she started to move down into the vehicle.

108. After the third shot, the gunman lowered the gun, looked down and then detonated the explosives. At the time of the blast, the gunman was near the left rear corner of the vehicle. Video footage shows that at the time of the explosion, the Land Cruiser was still making the right turn. The Scotland Yard team’s analysis shows that it took 1.6 seconds from the time of the first shot to the detonation of the bomb.

In the Land Cruiser

109. Ms Naheed Khan recalled that immediately after she had heard the three gunshots, Ms Bhutto fell down into the vehicle onto her lap. Ms Khan said that she felt the impact of the explosion immediately thereafter. The right side of Ms Bhutto’s head came to rest on Ms Khan’s lap. Ms Khan saw that Ms Bhutto was bleeding profusely from the right side of her head. She noticed that Ms Bhutto was not moving and saw that blood was also trickling from her ear. Makhdoom Amin Fahim recalled that Ms Bhutto fell heavily and showed no sign of life after falling.

According to Scotland Yard’s video analysis, the flash of the blast appeared just over two-thirds of a second after Ms Bhutto disappeared from view.

110. No one else in her vehicle was seriously injured.

Transfer to the Hospital

111. After the explosion, Senator Abbasi told the driver to drive to the hospital (initially having in mind a hospital in Islamabad). Although all four of its tires were punctured by the blast, the Land Cruiser managed to drive along Liaquat Road for approximately 300 meters towards the junction with Murree Road where it turned left. As the Land Cruiser moved along Murree Road, it became increasingly difficult for the driver to manoeuvre on the metal rims of the wheels. The Land Cruiser made a U-turn at the Rehmanabad junction, located approximately four kilometres from the Liaquat Road-Murree Road junction, in order to get to the other side of the road where Rawalpindi General Hospital (RGH) was located. The occupants of the Land Cruiser recalled that at this point there was only one traffic police vehicle ahead of the Land Cruiser. No other vehicles were visible – neither the bullet proof black Mercedes-Benz car nor any Elite Force unit vehicle. Following the U-turn, the Land Cruiser stalled. The party had to wait for some time on Murree Road until a private vehicle that belonged to Ms Sherry Rehman arrived and took Ms Bhutto to the hospital.

The International Executive Protection Conference sponsored by the ESI Alumni Association will be held in Las Vegas Aug 6th to the 8th at the Caesar’s Place.

The conference is a networking event opened to all Protection Professionals. The conference presents a unique opportunity to network with others in the business. Studies indicate that 75% of all positions are filled by networking, my guess would be in the protection business that number is higher.

There are discussions by industry leaders such as – Directors of Security of major corporations – Detail Leaders from high end security companies – Personal Protection Agents working in the industry, all of them willing to share their experience with you.

For three days the conference delivers seminars that are relevant to the success of your business or career. Subjects that you won’t find in most other Protection Conferences – like financing and budgeting – International travel for the EP agent – Resume writing – you can have your resume reviewed by people who have worked in the industry for decades and have looked at hundreds of resumes.

And in my opinion one of the most important seminars of the convention is the “Building a Business including Branding and Marketing”. The talk is given by a graduate of the prestigious Wharton School of Business, who also happens to be the CEO of a Security Company with 18 years of experience supplying personal protection agents.

There are other great subjects covering the use of K9’s and Close Protection

Oh I forgot to mention that I will be the Keynote Speaker

For more information

Read it and feel free to comment – you can comment here on the Blogs or contact Frank at fg0321@gmail.com

What is leadership today? What has happened to the so called leaders of the industry? Who really makes the decisions that affects the lives of the people that we protect? Has the profession sold out?

As a former Recon Marine, I make all decisions pertaining to the daily operations of any protection detail predicated upon 2 principles:

1. Accomplish the mission
2. Look out for the welfare of my men

Seems pretty easy to me. How do I keep the principal from getting hurt or embarrassed and how do I keep my team from getting hurt?  So far, my track record is pretty good. I’ve had zero casualties for VIP’s and zero for my team. I’ve done protection operations in 46 countries. Some extremely high threat, some nearly zero threat. I have taught protection in another dozen extremely high threat countries. None of the people that I have taught have ever had a VIP injured. There have, however, been some casualties amongst the protection teams. Not to be unexpected, as the areas that they are working in are not vacation areas. Of course, we would not have been there if they did not need real help.

The points that I am going to make seem like no brainers to me, but there is something intrinsically flawed in our profession today. Or I wouldn’t be writing this. As usual, I have all the questions and very few of the answers.

40 years ago, being a protection guy meant one of 2 things – either you were a knuckle dragging Neanderthal with an IQ of 80 or you were an ex cop, ex football player, weight lifter, etc that was related to somebody who knew somebody. Your job was to look intimidating and be ready to kick some ass if your principal found themselves in a bad spot. We were professional fighters. Brain not required nor desired. The profession was viewed as a less than honorable one.

30 years ago, this perception began to change as world events put more people in harm’s way.

Major corporations, entertainers, politicians, etc realized that by virtue of being well known or controversial that they needed to make sure they did not become a statistic. Visionaries like Dr. Richard Kobetz (Executive Protection Institute) and Bob Duggan (Executive Security International) saw what was happening and started programs to make the profession honorable. They made people realize that planning and being presentable (not ogres) was the way of the future. We learned that the keys to success lay in never having problems by planning properly and not by having to beat the crap out of miscreants. Of course, the lawyers were pleased to have a new breed of protection specialist that they did not have to represent in court nearly as often.

Others like Tony Scotti realized that getting our VIP’s from point A to point B without getting killed on the road required a different set of driving skills. He saw that just having a driver’s license was not enough to help keep the VIP’s safe. That defensive driving and evasive skills were as important to the VIP’s as planning. That being able to see bad things unfolding on the road ahead of us gave a chance to avoid problems. Again, the lawyers were ecstatic.

Forward thinking corporations, families, entertainers (and their legal staffs) soon realized that our profession could keep them safe, not get them embarrassed and not sued in court as regularly as they used to be. CEO’s and their board of directors even realized that they had a fiduciary responsibility to their clients and share holders NOT to get hurt, killed or sued. And these folks were hiring the graduates of these specialized training courses and seeing them as assets not liabilities.

All of this progress was a good thing for the industry. BUT, like all things, change is not embraced by all. Where did the protection guys fit in the hierarchy of the corporate, family pyramid? Who did we answer to? What was the chain of command? Who did the director of security report to? Who did our reviews? Who decided who was good and should be retained and who should be let go?

Some reported to the CFO, some to the director of human resources, some to the secretary of the boss, some to house manager of the family. No big deal, right?

WRONG! This is where the wheels start to come off the train and where the leadership guys fall far short of their responsibilities to their men and their VIP’s. How can someone judge what we do and how do it if they have never done it? They can’t. And never will be able to. It is up the team leaders, the security directors, detail leaders (choose your term) to enlighten these so called “bosses” and look out for the members of their teams. Unfortunately, today, this does not happen.

Since when did being a house manager, wife of a CEO, butler, human resource director, or anybody else automatically qualify them as security experts? Sure, they can comment on looks, weight, verbal abilities, demeanor, clothes, but they know nothing about the industry. Never have, never will. Why do they have this power? Who gave it to them?

All of this has come to pass because the leadership guys have sold out. They are more concerned with keeping their jobs than doing the job correctly. They don’t have the balls to tell anyone outside their team that they do not know what they are talking about. They don’t tell them to stay in their lane. As a result, the protection of the principal has been compromised as the protection team guys are now asked to cook breakfast, hang up coats, walk the dogs, take the maid to the train station, this list could go on forever. Instead of doing advances, running routes, working out, etc – the protection team is seen sitting around eating donuts by the other worker bees and we quickly are labeled as lazy and probably not needed. True leaders know this and make sure their team is always working, not seen feeding their faces or sleeping in the command post.

This has become a huge factor in our industry and why we are losing the respect that we earned a few short years ago. Combine this with all the PSD (personal security detail) guys returning from the Middle East that are now trying to find state side work and we have serious problems.

Here’s a news flash – PSD work in Iraq does not translate to executive protection in the US. Apples and oranges. You may have been the cock of the walk in Iraq, but in the US, the rules are different. You need to attend a school and learn the realities of state side work. Leave the 511’s in the foot locker and buy some real khaki pants and Polo shirts.

Why do I bring this up, you ask? I have worked in both arenas and I know the differences. I had 60 guys working for me in Iraq and have worked anywhere from 1 man details to 12 man details in the states. The philosophy is the same, the skill sets are different. Too many times, I have seen guys from the war zone work in the states and attempt to hammer square pegs into round holes. It doesn’t work. But, it all comes back to leadership. The heads of any and all details have to be able to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of their team and make sure that they never put their people in a position to fail. We all get painted with the same brush if and when a mistake is made.

More importantly, the detail leaders have to make sure that the principals understand what our jobs are and push back when ridiculous requests are made of our people. No, we don’t cook dinner. No, we don’t hang up coats. We are protection specialists. The leadership has to spend the time and energy to make sure that the other employees know what we do. We have to look out for the welfare of our team or we become man servants or woman servants.

Yes, we are in a service industry. Our service is to allow our principals to live as normal a life as possible free from worry. We need to make sure that we always present a professional image. We need to keep our people (both the VIP’s and the team) out of the line of fire.

How do we undo this trend of house managers, wives, whomever from directing our day to day activities? First and foremost, never put your team in a position to look anything other than professional. When comments are made by people not qualified to make them, take them the time to educate them. Be polite, but be firm.

Have a meeting with VIP and explain to him or her how and why you are directing your people to do things a certain way. A lack of respect from the VIP or his family will quickly encourage others to treat you the same way. Don’t let it happen.

Establish a real chain of command. Make sure that everyone knows to come to the head of the detail with issues, problems, requests, etc. Make sure these folks are not going directly to your team. Only the head of the detail should be tasking his team with work to be done. Make sure your team tells anybody asking them to do things to run it through you first.

Get rid of the guys or gals on your team that seem to have their agenda ahead of yours. Beware of those that will try and eat their way to the top. Be firm, but fair. Once somebody has undermined you, they have to go.

Lead from the front. Never ask anyone to do something that you wouldn’t or couldn’t do.

This will be a painful war. Guys will lose their jobs as we attempt to put Pandora back in the box. Is your job more important to you than your reputation or self esteem? It seems in an awful lot of cases that this is true. We need to get back to the basics of being good at what we do and how we do it. While we protect the principals, we also need to protect our teams. I’d rather have the respect of my peer group than kiss the ass of the house manager any day of the week. But, that’s just me.

Frank Gallagher

Whether driving to the mall, driving the boss to work or driving in a high risk environment most driving is done in the Comfort Zone. The Comfort Zone is a combination of speed – steering and/or braking where the vehicle reacts as the driver expects it to. The Red Zone is a combination of speed – steering and/or braking that creates big changes in the way the vehicle responds, changes that are not expected, and create anxiety. Unless it is a race, the Red Zone is not a place a driver would go to on purpose, it is a place visited only when bad things are happening.

 It  may be difficult to think of a 10,000 lb armored Suburban as “sensitive”, but a car’s controls are very sensitive to speed, the faster you go, the more sensitive the vehicles braking and steering become. This area of sensitivity is the Red Zone.

 Research indicates that going from the Comfort Zone to the beginning stages of the Red Zone, happens with an increase of a fraction of an inch on the steering wheel, and/or an increases of speed as little as 2 MPH. To complicate the issue research has also shown the driver gets into their own personal Red Zone way before the vehicle does. As the driver enters Red Zone the vehicle will send feedback that makes the driver feel uncomfortable (the researcher’s way of saying scared). At this stage of the Red Zone the vehicle is still controllable, but the level of skill needed to keep the vehicle under control has gone up dramatically, and the window of opportunity to maintain control is extremely small.

 Look at it as the vehicle has a limit and the driver has a limit. The drivers limit is much lower than the vehicles limit. Basically the driver is uncomfortable with a combination of speed – steering and/or braking that are below the amount of speed – steering and/or braking the vehicle can take. 

 It is the transition from Comfort to Red that creates a training challenge. In an emergency a driver will be required to quickly transition from their Comfort Zone, into the Red Zone, there can be no hesitation. Common sense dictates that a driver has to be trained to recognize and manage this transition. In our opinion this transition is the essence of driver training. One of the goals of a driver training program is to raise the amount of steering, braking and speed a driver is comfortable with.