SecurityDriver News

If you are in the EP Business you should read Circuit Magazine, they just made it a whole lot easier to find.  To order current or past issues of the #1 magazine dedicated to the close protection industry, visit Circuit Magazine

Each issues has an article by Elijah Shaw, one of the sharpest guys in the business, that alone makes it worth the price.

1979 Volvo Ad

Cleaning out my garage the other day and I found an old ad I did for Volvo. I’m sure most of the people reading this do not remember the Volvo 242 GT; it was a hell of a performance vehicle. In the late 70’s Volvo had the reputation of a stogy old man’s car (kind of like today’s Volvos) – at the time my school was sponsored by Volvo – we were asked to conduct a  product testing and comparisons program for the Volvo engineers and some people from their ad agency. We were testing the 242 GT against vehicles like the brand new (at that time) BMW 3 Series.

The results of the tests and some comments I made, brought about this ad, the ad appeared in all the Car Magazines. It even made it into the News Weeklies and some other none automotive publications. The ad came out in 1979.

 When the ad guys and engineers were driving through the Lane Change most of the cars were having a difficult time getting through without hitting anything, and were breaking loose at speeds that the 242 GT had no trouble with. Just as we do today (31 years later) we measured the other vehicles handling numbers and compared them to the measured numbers of the Volvo GT. The GT’s numbers were 13 to 15 % higher than all the other cars being tested.

 One comment made by an ad agency guy was “These other cars are exciting to drive”.  My comment was “If you think that’s exciting – drive a Pinto through the Lane Change” My other comment was “ When compared to the BMW the Volvo GT handles better than cars that are known for handling ”. That’s where the tag line came from. It was a classic case of mistaking adrenalin for handling. Just as today when students drive around a race track or through a lane change, without being tested and measured, they mistake adrenalin for education. 

 By the way for all you old racers the picture and test were done at Bridgehampton Raceway on Long Island.

EPI – 3-Day Course on Executive Protection in New York on August 25-27, 2010

This program offers 3 days of instruction and each student actively participates in learning sophisticated techniques and innovative skills and improving their personal performance on protective assignments.

Icon Services Corporation – 5 Day Celebrity & VIP Protection Course – Minneapolis, MN September 8-12th 2010

If you are new to the bodyguard industry or a current operator looking to refresh and polish your skills, this course will offer excellent instruction into the professional side of Close Protection work. Taught by industry veteran Elijah Shaw, who in addition to his corporate clients, has traveled the world as the personal bodyguard of international public figures such as musical giant Usher, supermodel Naomi Campbell, and rap megastar 50 Cent, the course will offer real world problems, scenarios, and solutions from instructors that are currently active in the industry.

I recently visited the Executive Security International (ESI) Stalker Training program in Grand Junction Colorado. The Stalker Program is a part of ESI’s Executive Protection Residency Program. As I walked into the classroom the first thing I noticed was the use of computers as a method of communications and instruction. ESI requires students to bring a lap top to the program and supplies them with a thumb drive that has the lessons and power points. As the instructor give their presentations students follow along on their computers. It was one of those “Why didn’t I think of that” moments.

 These are my observations of the Stalker program. The subjects include

Threat Assessments

Threat management

Surveillance Detection

Advancing

Moving the Principal

Security Surveys

None of the above is new to the world of EP Training but it is how the program is packaged, presented, and students tested that is unusual in the industry and impressive.

The students are split into groups and are assigned to do advances on hotels, restaurants and the airport, produce a plan, present their plan to the instructors, and then implement the plan. This part of the program frankly is what most of the other programs teach, but where this program differs from others I have observed are the time factor, and the interaction between student and instructor.

 The length of program allows the students ample time to complete the task. There is a lot of communications from instructor to student. After every field exercises the students huddle up with their instructors to review the exercises, they go over the good and the not too good. The not too good is analyzed, dissected and lessons learned are discussed, and the students go back out and do it again. Since the instructors are been there done that guys, the lessons learned are real and often taken from their experience – good ones and bad ones, makes for one hell of a teaching tool.

 Prior to the above students are split into groups and assigned to a client who is a victim of a Stalker. The teams get a series of letters. These are REAL LETTERS that were sent to REAL PEOPLE, who have or had a REAL THREAT.

 Students use their Threat Analysis training to provide a preliminary risk assessment, and then use their Threat Assessment training to single out the one letter that is an imminent threat

 Once they identify the letter that represents a threat to their principal, they go through a series of role playing exercises. Using investigative tools and additional role playing they zero in the stalkers. By asking the correct questions during the role playing exercises students will eventually be able to identify the stalkers address, their criminal history, and a myriad of information that will help them to protect their client.

There is an extensive use of role player, at times I had to remind myself that they were role players. The role players are “The stalkers” – the client – a handwriting expert – a Sheriff and a Psychologist.  Again they have ample time, and coaching from the instructors to achieve the standard that has been set. But it’s not just the role players, the time and the instructors it is also the logical systematic order in which it unfolds.

 The conclusion is the threat assessments and management reports that each student (not group) must submit and is graded on. I read one and have to say it was one of the best I have have read, not just from a student, from anyone.

In the Stalking program ESI creates a learning environment that gives the student the time and coaching to reach a predetermined standard, then measures to assure they have reached that standard. The attention to detail, the realism, and the role playing is more than I can put into an article.  I did not witness the entire program, but there seems to be a training philosophy that emphasizes “team building under stress” that runs through the entire Executive Protection Residency Program. A short article like this simply cannot do this program justice.

ESI is in the process of making the Stalker Program a corporate stand alone program, more on this later.

Protective Driving Operations

3-DAY PROGRAM SEPTEMBER 13-15, 2010
PROTECTIVE DRIVING OPERATIONS
ESI’s TRAINING FACILITY IN COLORADO
$950 (Limited Discount Price)

ESI and Tony Scotti’s VDI will be sponsoring a 3 Day Protective Driving Operations in Grand Junction Colorado.

The course provides participants with a unique opportunity to build upon their existing training and further develop the knowledge, skill and ability required to perform one of the most challenging aspects of protection, providing safe and secure transportation in a high risk environment.

This is accomplished through a series of informative discussions and hands on practical exercises, students will develop an understanding of what the driver/vehicle combination can and, most importantly, cannot do when confronted with a potentially life threatening situation while behind the wheel. An emphasis is placed on how the driver can most effectively manage the limited time and distance available to them as a safety or security incident unfolds.

Classroom discussion will include the role vehicles play in mission strategy and tactics. Students will learn how armored vehicles affects the decision making process, and how to select the proper vehicle for the mission – or how to maximize the effectiveness of the vehicle given.

All hands on exercises are scenario based and designed to train and measure driver ability. Hence students will be objectively tested, and are required to attain a standard. All test and standards are based on the laws of physics as applied to vehicle attacks. The scenarios used during the testing are from case studies of vehicle ambushes.

At the conclusion of the program students will have the knowledge too combine mission objectives, with the vehicles supplied, and if necessary, have the skills needed to escape the Kill Zone.

CLASSROOM

DYNAMICS OF A VEHICLE EMERGENCY

CASE STUDIES OF VEHICLE ATTACKS

ROADSIDE BOMBS

KILL ZONE THEORY

TACTICS AND SECURITY VEHICLES

ARMORED VEHICLES 

HANDS ON EXERCISES

BACKING-UP EXERCISE

ROLLING AMBUSH

ATTACKS AGAINST THE CONVOY

VEHICLE FAMILIARIZATION

RUN FLAT EXERCISE

VEHICLE COMBAT

DRIVE DOWN DRILLS

 For more information contact Brandon Delcamp at 888 718 3105

July 24, 2010

For the protection specialist or security driver the worst-case scenario is a deliberate attempt to stop the vehicle.  Surviving those scenarios requires the ability to keep the vehicle moving and clear the kill zone as quickly as possible – no matter what is happening outside the vehicle.

Focused, Intense, Effective Training

 VDI’s Immediate Action Driving Skills course is designed to provide security practitioners – from the entry-level protection specialist to highly experienced private sector, military and law enforcement professionals - the training and experience needed to deal with the worst-case scenario, a vehicle ambush. Where survival comes down to the driver’s ability to respond instinctively to the threat, when the difference between success and failure is measured in tenths of a second. 

This one day course provides students with an opportunity to:

 - Learn from professionals with real world experience

 - Experience the realities of driving through a kill zone        

 - Understand how to effectivelyoperate damaged vehicles

 Students will gain hands-on, practical experience in:

 - Pushing through roadblocks - (One & two vehicle ramming)

 - Defeating rolling ambushes - (PIT/Counter-PIT techniques)

 - Dealing with an incapacitated driver – (Driving from passenger seat)

 - Forced lane excursions – (Surface transitions)

For addtional information
Joseph Autera
Tony Scotti’s Vehicle Dynamics Institute
Tel: 732 738-5221
Cell : 732–586-4020   email: jautera@vehicledynamics.net

Or Tony Scotti
781 395 3097 email tonyscotti@securitydriver.com

Joe giving the standoff foot print lecture in our Surveillance Detection Program

Students working on their field exercises

Joe and Larry getting the students ready for one of Our Vehicle Dynamics and Exercise Design Programs, the program is one of our Mission Oriented Driving Skills (MODS) programs. This is an old article about the program.

The students gathering vehicle dynamics data on a Lenco BearCat, they are measuring handling capability.

Larry and Jerry conducting a motorcade program in the UAE

A UN report on the assassination of Pakistani Prime Minister Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto has been widely circulated. It is fairly long, 54 pages. I have taken the section that deals with the “Day of the Assassination”. When we have some time we will offer our opinion of what happened and developed a lessons learned. In the interim I am sure the the community would welcome any comments. It’s long but filled with good info.

 “The Day of the Assassination”

Departure from Zardari House for Liaquat Bagh

86. Around 1400 hours, Ms Bhutto left Zardari House, for Liaquat Bagh, in a convoy of vehicles. The convoy consisted of a black Toyota Land Cruiser used by Mr Tauqir Kaira, followed by Ms Bhutto’s white armoured Land Cruiser and two of Mr Kaira’s vehicles on either side of Ms Bhutto’s vehicle. The latter two were a Mercedes-Benz van on the right and a four-door double cabin vehicle on the left.

Immediately behind those vehicles were two Toyota Vigo pick-up trucks, positioned side by side. A black Mercedes-Benz car was behind these Vigos. This Mercedes- Benz, from Zardari House, was bullet-proof and served as the back-up vehicle for Ms Bhutto. The two Vigo pick-up trucks were also from Zardari House.

87. Mr Kaira was inside the lead vehicle with his security men. Accompanying Ms Bhutto in her vehicle were Mr Javed-ur-Rehman (driver, front-left seat), SSP Major (ret) Imtiaz Hussain (front-right seat), Makhdoom Amin Fahim (senior PPP member, second row-left seat), Ms Bhutto (second row-centre seat), Ms Naheed Khan (senior PPP member and political secretary of Ms Bhutto, second row-right seat). Seated in the back of the vehicle on two benches facing each other were Senator Safdar Abbasi (senior PPP member, rear-right bench), Mr Shahenshah (rear-left bench, facing

Senator Abbasi) and Mr Razaq Mirani (personal attendant of Ms Bhutto, rear-right bench next to Senator Abbasi and to his left). Mr Kaira’s two vehicles on either side of Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser carried his men. The Vigo pick-up trucks carried members of Mr Chaudry Aslam’s security team. Riding in the black Mercedes-Benz car were the driver, PPP official Mr Faratullah Babar in the front passenger seat and, in the rear passenger seat from left to right, two PPP officials Mr Babar Awan and Mr Rehman Malik and General (ret) Tauqir Zia.

Arrival at Liaquat Bagh

88. Ms Bhutto’s convoy reached the Faizabad junction at about 1415 hours, according to the Rawalpindi District Police, who were to assume responsibility for security of the convoy. According to the police and the Security Plan, an escort was to be provided composed of a traffic police “pilot” jeep, a regular police jeep leading the convoy and three Elite Force Toyota pick-up trucks protecting Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser on three sides. People in Ms Bhutto’s vehicle claim, however, that there was no such escort except for one traffic police vehicle.

89. At about 1456 hours, Ms Bhutto’s convoy turned right at the Murree Road – Liaquat Road junction and headed towards Liaquat Bagh. Video footage shows Ms Bhutto’s convoy driving from the Murree Road – Liaquat Bagh junction to the inner security gate leading to the VIP parking area at Liaquat Bagh. The footage shows Ms Bhutto standing through the roof escape hatch of her Land Cruiser and waving at the large crowd around the vehicle while it moved slowly on Liaquat Road.

90. Both ASP Ashfaq Anwar who was the supervisor of the Elite Force unit and Inspector Azmat Ali Dogar, the unit’s commander, told the Commission that they accompanied Ms Bhutto all the way to the back of the stage according to the Security Plan. However, video footage and pictures show that as Ms Bhutto drove on much of Liaquat Road, her vehicle was flanked only by her private security vehicles. The Elite Force vehicles were nowhere near her vehicle. In fact, the Commission has identified Inspector Dogar among the crowd some distance from Ms Bhutto’s vehicle.

Contrary to the police assertion, there was no police-provided box formation around Ms Bhutto as she arrived at the rally, and the Elite Force unit did not execute their duties as specified in the security deployment. Furthermore, the Commission does not believe that the full escort as described by the police was ever present.

91. At about 1516 hours, Ms Bhutto’s convoy stopped for a few minutes at the inner gate of the parking area waiting for that gate to be opened, during which Ms Bhutto remained standing through the escape hatch. The police and some PPP members disagree as to the reason for the delay in opening the gate. While the PPP asserts that the police did not have the key to open the gate, the police said that they did not want the large crowd following Ms Bhutto to get into the VIP parking area.

Altogether, Ms Bhutto stood through the escape hatch for the approximately 20 minutes it took to drive from the Murree Road – Liaquat Road junction to the gate of the parking area. This calls into question the claim of the Rawalpindi District Police that they were surprised when Ms Bhutto emerged from the escape hatch on her way out of Liaquat Bagh.

92. Once the convoy passed through the inner gate, at about 1531 hours, it drove through the VIP parking area to the rear of the stage. At least the following three vehicles were in the VIP parking area: Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser, Mr Kaira’s lead vehicle and the black bullet-proof Mercedes-Benz car. Temporary wooden stairs had been built for the rally to access the rear of the stage directly from the parking area.

Ms Bhutto climbed the stairs, went to the stage to wave to the crowd and took her seat before addressing the crowd.

93. Near the rear of the stage, a scuffle broke out between some workers of the PPP and police who tried to prevent them from climbing to the stage. This created tension between PPP workers and the police officers posted in that area. Accounts given by PPP representatives and the police with regard to the degree and nature of this event differ significantly. The police state that the dispute was minor and was settled immediately, whereas some on the local PPP side claim it was serious and led to bitter reactions from the police during the rest of the rally. They say that the police felt insulted and became more passive in their security role. The Commission finds that the police were indeed passive in their provision of security and believes it unprofessional if the Rawalpindi District Police reduced their level of alert to any degree as a result of wounded pride.

Exit from Liaquat Bagh

94. Several thousand people attended the event. Ms Bhutto was joined on the stage by a number of national-level PPP leaders and all of the parliamentary candidates from Rawalpindi district. The crowds were enthusiastic, and PPP leaders and activists considered the event to have been a great success. They say Ms Bhutto gave a strong and rousing speech, one of the best of her campaign, and describe her as having been radiant that day.

95. The public gathering concluded and, at about 1710 hours, Ms Bhutto descended the wooden stairs and entered her Land Cruiser. The occupants of the Land Cruiser and their seating positions were the same as for the trip in to Liaquat Bagh. The composition of passengers in the black Mercedes-Benz car also remained the same.

96. The black bullet-proof Mercedes-Benz car was the first to leave the parking area. It is not clear how much distance there was between this vehicle and the rest of Ms Bhutto’s convoy at the moment of the blast. Credible reports range from 100 meters to 250 meters. Some of those in the car said that they were close enough to Ms Bhutto’s vehicle to feel the impact of the blast. Others at the site of the blast have said that the Mercedes-Benz left Liaquat Bagh so quickly that it was nowhere to be seen when the blast occurred. Indeed, the Commission has not seen this vehicle in the many video images of the exit area it reviewed. Despite the acknowledgement of some occupants of the vehicle that they felt the impact of the blast, the Commission finds it incredible that they drove all the way to Zardari House, a drive of about 20 minutes, before they became aware that Ms Bhutto had been injured in the blast.

They should have stopped at a safe distance when they felt the blast so as to check on Ms Bhutto’s condition, the condition of her vehicle and whether the back-up vehicle was required. Indeed, as the back-up vehicle, the Mercedes-Benz car would have been an essential element of Ms Bhutto’s convoy on the return trip even if the occupants of that car had confirmed that Ms Bhutto had been unscathed in the attack.

97. Mr Kaira’s vehicle was the next to leave the inner parking area after the Mercedes-Benz car, with Ms Bhutto’s vehicle right behind it, followed by another of Mr Kaira’s vehicles. The two Vigo pick-up trucks then followed from the outer parking area located between the inner and outer gates.

98. At 1712 hours, Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser exited from the outer gate. Crowds of people who were already on Liaquat Road drew closer to the vehicle as it began to turn right onto Liaquat Road. In addition, many people left the park, swelling the crowd around the Land Cruiser, contrary to the police assertion that they did not allow anyone to leave the park before the departure of Ms Bhutto’s convoy. Ms Bhutto emerged through the escape hatch of the vehicle and started waving to her supporters. When the vehicle approached the central road divider, it was slowed further by the crowd.

99. Major Imtiaz, who was sitting in the front seat of the Land Cruiser, said that he was worried that the convoy was being slowed down by the crowd. He wanted to call CPO Saud Aziz by cell phone, but he did not have the CPO’s direct number. Instead he called CPO Saud Aziz’s operator and the operator at the police station in Multan, another town in Punjab Province (where Major Imtiaz had recently served). The Commission finds that this lack of preparation was a major flaw in the security arrangements and reflects badly on the professionalism of Major Imtiaz who should have had full and rapid access to the Rawalpindi police command.

100. Questions remain as to the nature of the crowd that gathered around the Land Cruiser. Passengers in the Land Cruiser and some local PPP members recalled that they were mostly PPP workers, and they did not see any strangers or irregular movements among them. The Rawalpindi District Police and other PPP members, however, suggested that a group of people had deliberately stood in front of the Land Cruiser to prevent it from moving. Regardless of the accuracy of either account, it remains that the police did not control the crowd outside of Liaquat Bagh. As a result, the attacker was able to get as close as he did to Ms Bhutto’s vehicle.

101. The Rawalpindi police authorities and some PPP workers dispute the exact exit route agreed for Ms Bhutto’s convoy. The Rawalpindi District Police and DCO Elahi claim that the planned route for the convoy was to turn right onto Liaquat Road and then left onto Murree Road, retracing the convoy’s entry route. Only in case of an emergency was the convoy to make a left turn after exiting from the outer gate; a decision to take the emergency route had to be made by the senior police officer in charge of security on the scene. Some local PPP workers who attended the preparatory meeting with the police disagree with this account. They claim that the original plan was to make a left turn onto Liaquat Road and that the minutes provided by the DCO, which did not indicate this left turn, were inaccurate. In any event, photographs show two stationary police vehicles on Liaquat Road blocking the left- side drive lane where the left turn would have been made. As a result, even in an emergency, it would have been impossible for Ms Bhutto’s convoy to make a left turn and use the escape route unless those police vehicles were quickly moved. The Commission learned that these vehicles were official vehicles of senior Rawalpindi police officers. The Commission finds it irresponsible that these vehicles were parked in such a way as to block the emergency exit route.

102. The Rawalpindi District Police claim that police vehicles from the Elite Force unit headed by ASP Ashfaq Anwar were waiting outside the outer gate to escort Ms Bhutto’s convoy and that they were about to go into a protective box formation when the attack on Ms Bhutto took place. However, forming the box at this point was impracticable given the narrow width of Liaquat Road and the number of people who had already started to surround Ms Bhutto’s vehicle. In any event, video footage shows very few uniformed police on the scene available to push back the crowd to create space for the box formation. Furthermore, video and photographs taken shortly before the blast as well as Commission interviews indicate that the Elite Force unit was not in position to go into a box formation. The Elite Force unit was in place neither for the entry nor the exit of the convoy and did not afford the protection they were tasked with, thus failing spectacularly in their duty.

103. Overall, video and photographic materials as well as the Commission’s interviews establish that there were very few police deployed outside the outer gate and on Liaquat Road as Ms Bhutto’s convoy attempted to depart the scene.

The Attack

104. From the exit, Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser started to make a right turn onto Liaquat Road. As it slowly approached the central divider on Liaquat Road, the crowd began chanting slogans. There is some dispute over whether Ms Bhutto made the decision to stand up on her own or was urged to do so. Before she stood up, Ms Bhutto asked Ms Naheed Khan to make a phone call to Mr Nawaz Sharif, PML-N leader, to convey condolences for the deaths of some of his supporters who had been shot during the PML-N rally earlier that day. It had been reported that the shooting incident occurred between supporters of the PML-N and those of the PML-Q parties.

105. While Ms Khan was trying to reach Mr Sharif, Ms Bhutto stopped her and asked Senator Abbasi, who was sitting in the rear seat, to chant slogans to the crowd using the vehicle’s loudspeaker. Ms Bhutto then stood on the seat and appeared through the escape hatch, with her head and shoulders exposed.

106. Ms Bhutto waved to the crowd. The vehicle continued to move slowly into its right turn onto Liaquat Road. At this point, a man wearing dark glasses appeared in the crowd on the left side of the Land Cruiser. Around 1714 hours, while the vehicle continued into its right turn, the man pulled out a pistol, and from a distance of approximately two to three meters, fired three shots at Ms Bhutto. According to video analysis conducted by Scotland Yard, the three shots were fired in less than one second.

107. The Commission examined video footage taken from a back angle, which shows Ms Bhutto’s dupatta, her white head covering, and her hair flick upwards after the second shot. However, there is no evidence of a link between the second shot and that movement. After the third shot, she started to move down into the vehicle.

108. After the third shot, the gunman lowered the gun, looked down and then detonated the explosives. At the time of the blast, the gunman was near the left rear corner of the vehicle. Video footage shows that at the time of the explosion, the Land Cruiser was still making the right turn. The Scotland Yard team’s analysis shows that it took 1.6 seconds from the time of the first shot to the detonation of the bomb.

In the Land Cruiser

109. Ms Naheed Khan recalled that immediately after she had heard the three gunshots, Ms Bhutto fell down into the vehicle onto her lap. Ms Khan said that she felt the impact of the explosion immediately thereafter. The right side of Ms Bhutto’s head came to rest on Ms Khan’s lap. Ms Khan saw that Ms Bhutto was bleeding profusely from the right side of her head. She noticed that Ms Bhutto was not moving and saw that blood was also trickling from her ear. Makhdoom Amin Fahim recalled that Ms Bhutto fell heavily and showed no sign of life after falling.

According to Scotland Yard’s video analysis, the flash of the blast appeared just over two-thirds of a second after Ms Bhutto disappeared from view.

110. No one else in her vehicle was seriously injured.

Transfer to the Hospital

111. After the explosion, Senator Abbasi told the driver to drive to the hospital (initially having in mind a hospital in Islamabad). Although all four of its tires were punctured by the blast, the Land Cruiser managed to drive along Liaquat Road for approximately 300 meters towards the junction with Murree Road where it turned left. As the Land Cruiser moved along Murree Road, it became increasingly difficult for the driver to manoeuvre on the metal rims of the wheels. The Land Cruiser made a U-turn at the Rehmanabad junction, located approximately four kilometres from the Liaquat Road-Murree Road junction, in order to get to the other side of the road where Rawalpindi General Hospital (RGH) was located. The occupants of the Land Cruiser recalled that at this point there was only one traffic police vehicle ahead of the Land Cruiser. No other vehicles were visible – neither the bullet proof black Mercedes-Benz car nor any Elite Force unit vehicle. Following the U-turn, the Land Cruiser stalled. The party had to wait for some time on Murree Road until a private vehicle that belonged to Ms Sherry Rehman arrived and took Ms Bhutto to the hospital.

This is the first of two articles by Derek Humble. Derek is a transplanted British security professional currently living in Toronto, Canada. After a career in the British Military he took a position with a large Canadian security provider operating a specialized department offering corporate protective services to Canada’s elite. In 1988 Derek decided to incorporate his own business that he named The Anvil Group.

The Anvil Group Inc under Derek’s guidance ran operations in Canada and around the world with operations in North, Central and South America as well as Europe. Derek has run numerous versions of secure driver programs around the world specifically Moscow, Chicago, Mexico City and London to name a few. He is a long time friend, and was an early graduate of the old Scotti School of Defensive Driving and has constantly strived to study the cerebral aspects to protective driving as much as the physical practical side of the business.

 Currently Derek consults with companies on matters of personal protection, risk management and travel risk assessments. His company is NEMESIS CONSULTING     Derek’s email dhumble@nemesisinfo.com

“Situation Awareness” Just a catch phrase or a vitally useful tactic? Part 1The phrase “Situation Awareness” has gradually entered the lexicon of security trainers and is seen in text books as an almost throw away line when talking about anything from driving the CEO in their day-to-day lives or driving down Route Irish. However few of those using this important term truly understand what is meant by being “Situation Aware” or even where that phase derives from.

 “Situation Awareness”, as a catch phrase, owes its birth to the very steep learning curve experienced by the Brits in the very difficult war against terrorists, both Republican and Loyalist, in Northern Ireland and the British mainland. As with all counter insurgency situations survival lessons must be learnt faster than the terrorists learn theirs. Staying ahead of the insurgent’s tactical learning curve means keeping friendly forces alive long enough to slow the enemy successes. This has been a core requirement in all counter insurgency wars since WW2. As the threat changes and increases so must the counter tactics to those dangers. Those immersed in facing a competent enemy, such as Irish, Iraqi, or Afghan insurgents or even the ordinary criminal element must developed training tactics that were/are meaningful, sensible. They must also be easy to learn and understand but most of all there is a need for tactical sustainability.

Whether the protector is in the military, law enforcement, government security, or in private sector protection, training is always budget, time and resource sensitive. Even those with significant budgets struggle with the needs of those on the leading edge of the battle. Physical skills taught need regular practice, areas needed for training are difficult to find and staff are often too busy with operations to be released to retrain. Situation Awareness is a tool that addresses the inability of operational personnel to regularly retrain and refresh to meet the required standards. How often have operational staff laughed when told that they need to re-qualify on a regular basis.

The maxim of “it is impossible to protect everyone, everywhere all the time from everything” has never been truer than it is now in the year 2010. A large part of the protective battle is to understand the “alert level requirement” to know this increases the sustainability of any protective task. High Risk situations (Route Irish) can be adrenalin demanding and then draining to the body. Intensive concentration is exhausting and in most cases a high state of awareness cannot be maintained for periods of hours let alone days, without a serious degradation in effectiveness. This alert level recognition and adoption is the age old difference between the veteran and the “new guy”. Boredom is equally debilitating and long periods of inactivity will have an equally negative effect on the need for a competent and timely reaction to incidents. The true protection professional needs to be able understand when to “up their game” and equally “when to safely relax” To arrive at this ultimate and enviable mental state is the aim of being “Situation Awareness”

All of the skills required to properly protect those at risk be they driving, shooting, first aid or intelligence gathering are secondary to the need to understand how to become, and stay, “Situation Aware”. All of the physical skills are of course important in the reactive phase of any protective assignment. However the best kind of protective skill will allow the protective practitioner to avoid discovering whether their shooting/medical skills are up to the mark by being “Situation Aware” and thus avoiding danger. Truly understanding where the risks are highest, what type of attack are likely , what tactics they prefer and how to detect and/or deter attacks will dramatically reduce need for using driving, shooting or fighting skills. The learning involved in this proactive approach is simple to understand and therefore easy to retain over lengthy periods of time. It can be constantly practiced, tested and modified in any operational environment. This is the approach that is truly sustainable. And this approach represents the one key element in surviving in the realities of day-to-day operations and/or daily duties. Being truly “Situation Aware” can be the protective equivalent of Zen the question is how to achieve it?

The International Executive Protection Conference sponsored by the ESI Alumni Association will be held in Las Vegas Aug 6th to the 8th at the Caesar’s Place.

The conference is a networking event opened to all Protection Professionals. The conference presents a unique opportunity to network with others in the business. Studies indicate that 75% of all positions are filled by networking, my guess would be in the protection business that number is higher.

There are discussions by industry leaders such as – Directors of Security of major corporations – Detail Leaders from high end security companies – Personal Protection Agents working in the industry, all of them willing to share their experience with you.

For three days the conference delivers seminars that are relevant to the success of your business or career. Subjects that you won’t find in most other Protection Conferences – like financing and budgeting – International travel for the EP agent – Resume writing – you can have your resume reviewed by people who have worked in the industry for decades and have looked at hundreds of resumes.

And in my opinion one of the most important seminars of the convention is the “Building a Business including Branding and Marketing”. The talk is given by a graduate of the prestigious Wharton School of Business, who also happens to be the CEO of a Security Company with 18 years of experience supplying personal protection agents.

There are other great subjects covering the use of K9’s and Close Protection

Oh I forgot to mention that I will be the Keynote Speaker

For more information