SecurityDriver News

Queensland Raceway

Joe and Larry have just come back from conducting training in Australia. They were there for a little more than a week.  The training was conducted at Queensland Raceway in beautiful downtown Kurwangbah, which is not too far from Brisbane. The program is specifically developed for our corporate clients and includes not only driving, but also Surveillance Detection and working the principal.

 TSVDI will be conducting the same program in the UAE , Guatemala, and followed by Europe, and South America. Although we have a hectic schedule coming up with 20 programs in 17 weeks in 4 countries, for 20 corporations, with some PSD, government, police, and private security companies thrown into the mix, we do have some seats available in our open enrollment programs.

Dates

Registration

Protective/Evasive Driving Course – This three day program is designed for professional security drivers, executive chauffeurs and protection specialists.

Immediate Action Driving Skills  – For the security driver or protection specialist a program designed to survive the worst-case scenario – October 23^rd New Jersey  

Surveillance Detection Tactics & Techniques  – This highly interactive three day course is designed to meet the unique needs of security professionals responsible for executive transportation and personal protection, particularly those working with limited manpower and resources.  October 27 – 29     New Jersey

  Vehicle Dynamics and Exercise Design –  An advanced 3 day course is designed to provide students with the capability to develop training scenarios that closely replicate the conditions they are likely to encounter in the real world. Restricted attendance November 15^th – 17^th New Jersey

 Instructor Development Program – A 5 day course that is widely acknowledged as the most advanced train-the-trainer driving programs offered today. The course provides the student with an in-depth understanding of the scientific approach to driver training and evaluation that was developed by Tony Scotti and refined over the last thirty five years. Restricted attendance – November 15^th – 19^th New Jersey

1979 Volvo Ad

Cleaning out my garage the other day and I found an old ad I did for Volvo. I’m sure most of the people reading this do not remember the Volvo 242 GT; it was a hell of a performance vehicle. In the late 70’s Volvo had the reputation of a stogy old man’s car (kind of like today’s Volvos) – at the time my school was sponsored by Volvo – we were asked to conduct a  product testing and comparisons program for the Volvo engineers and some people from their ad agency. We were testing the 242 GT against vehicles like the brand new (at that time) BMW 3 Series.

The results of the tests and some comments I made, brought about this ad, the ad appeared in all the Car Magazines. It even made it into the News Weeklies and some other none automotive publications. The ad came out in 1979.

 When the ad guys and engineers were driving through the Lane Change most of the cars were having a difficult time getting through without hitting anything, and were breaking loose at speeds that the 242 GT had no trouble with. Just as we do today (31 years later) we measured the other vehicles handling numbers and compared them to the measured numbers of the Volvo GT. The GT’s numbers were 13 to 15 % higher than all the other cars being tested.

 One comment made by an ad agency guy was “These other cars are exciting to drive”.  My comment was “If you think that’s exciting – drive a Pinto through the Lane Change” My other comment was “ When compared to the BMW the Volvo GT handles better than cars that are known for handling ”. That’s where the tag line came from. It was a classic case of mistaking adrenalin for handling. Just as today when students drive around a race track or through a lane change, without being tested and measured, they mistake adrenalin for education. 

 By the way for all you old racers the picture and test were done at Bridgehampton Raceway on Long Island.

Protective Driving Operations

3-DAY PROGRAM SEPTEMBER 13-15, 2010
PROTECTIVE DRIVING OPERATIONS
ESI’s TRAINING FACILITY IN COLORADO
$950 (Limited Discount Price)

ESI and Tony Scotti’s VDI will be sponsoring a 3 Day Protective Driving Operations in Grand Junction Colorado.

The course provides participants with a unique opportunity to build upon their existing training and further develop the knowledge, skill and ability required to perform one of the most challenging aspects of protection, providing safe and secure transportation in a high risk environment.

This is accomplished through a series of informative discussions and hands on practical exercises, students will develop an understanding of what the driver/vehicle combination can and, most importantly, cannot do when confronted with a potentially life threatening situation while behind the wheel. An emphasis is placed on how the driver can most effectively manage the limited time and distance available to them as a safety or security incident unfolds.

Classroom discussion will include the role vehicles play in mission strategy and tactics. Students will learn how armored vehicles affects the decision making process, and how to select the proper vehicle for the mission – or how to maximize the effectiveness of the vehicle given.

All hands on exercises are scenario based and designed to train and measure driver ability. Hence students will be objectively tested, and are required to attain a standard. All test and standards are based on the laws of physics as applied to vehicle attacks. The scenarios used during the testing are from case studies of vehicle ambushes.

At the conclusion of the program students will have the knowledge too combine mission objectives, with the vehicles supplied, and if necessary, have the skills needed to escape the Kill Zone.

CLASSROOM

DYNAMICS OF A VEHICLE EMERGENCY

CASE STUDIES OF VEHICLE ATTACKS

ROADSIDE BOMBS

KILL ZONE THEORY

TACTICS AND SECURITY VEHICLES

ARMORED VEHICLES 

HANDS ON EXERCISES

BACKING-UP EXERCISE

ROLLING AMBUSH

ATTACKS AGAINST THE CONVOY

VEHICLE FAMILIARIZATION

RUN FLAT EXERCISE

VEHICLE COMBAT

DRIVE DOWN DRILLS

 For more information contact Brandon Delcamp at 888 718 3105

A UN report on the assassination of Pakistani Prime Minister Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto has been widely circulated. It is fairly long, 54 pages. I have taken the section that deals with the “Day of the Assassination”. When we have some time we will offer our opinion of what happened and developed a lessons learned. In the interim I am sure the the community would welcome any comments. It’s long but filled with good info.

 “The Day of the Assassination”

Departure from Zardari House for Liaquat Bagh

86. Around 1400 hours, Ms Bhutto left Zardari House, for Liaquat Bagh, in a convoy of vehicles. The convoy consisted of a black Toyota Land Cruiser used by Mr Tauqir Kaira, followed by Ms Bhutto’s white armoured Land Cruiser and two of Mr Kaira’s vehicles on either side of Ms Bhutto’s vehicle. The latter two were a Mercedes-Benz van on the right and a four-door double cabin vehicle on the left.

Immediately behind those vehicles were two Toyota Vigo pick-up trucks, positioned side by side. A black Mercedes-Benz car was behind these Vigos. This Mercedes- Benz, from Zardari House, was bullet-proof and served as the back-up vehicle for Ms Bhutto. The two Vigo pick-up trucks were also from Zardari House.

87. Mr Kaira was inside the lead vehicle with his security men. Accompanying Ms Bhutto in her vehicle were Mr Javed-ur-Rehman (driver, front-left seat), SSP Major (ret) Imtiaz Hussain (front-right seat), Makhdoom Amin Fahim (senior PPP member, second row-left seat), Ms Bhutto (second row-centre seat), Ms Naheed Khan (senior PPP member and political secretary of Ms Bhutto, second row-right seat). Seated in the back of the vehicle on two benches facing each other were Senator Safdar Abbasi (senior PPP member, rear-right bench), Mr Shahenshah (rear-left bench, facing

Senator Abbasi) and Mr Razaq Mirani (personal attendant of Ms Bhutto, rear-right bench next to Senator Abbasi and to his left). Mr Kaira’s two vehicles on either side of Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser carried his men. The Vigo pick-up trucks carried members of Mr Chaudry Aslam’s security team. Riding in the black Mercedes-Benz car were the driver, PPP official Mr Faratullah Babar in the front passenger seat and, in the rear passenger seat from left to right, two PPP officials Mr Babar Awan and Mr Rehman Malik and General (ret) Tauqir Zia.

Arrival at Liaquat Bagh

88. Ms Bhutto’s convoy reached the Faizabad junction at about 1415 hours, according to the Rawalpindi District Police, who were to assume responsibility for security of the convoy. According to the police and the Security Plan, an escort was to be provided composed of a traffic police “pilot” jeep, a regular police jeep leading the convoy and three Elite Force Toyota pick-up trucks protecting Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser on three sides. People in Ms Bhutto’s vehicle claim, however, that there was no such escort except for one traffic police vehicle.

89. At about 1456 hours, Ms Bhutto’s convoy turned right at the Murree Road – Liaquat Road junction and headed towards Liaquat Bagh. Video footage shows Ms Bhutto’s convoy driving from the Murree Road – Liaquat Bagh junction to the inner security gate leading to the VIP parking area at Liaquat Bagh. The footage shows Ms Bhutto standing through the roof escape hatch of her Land Cruiser and waving at the large crowd around the vehicle while it moved slowly on Liaquat Road.

90. Both ASP Ashfaq Anwar who was the supervisor of the Elite Force unit and Inspector Azmat Ali Dogar, the unit’s commander, told the Commission that they accompanied Ms Bhutto all the way to the back of the stage according to the Security Plan. However, video footage and pictures show that as Ms Bhutto drove on much of Liaquat Road, her vehicle was flanked only by her private security vehicles. The Elite Force vehicles were nowhere near her vehicle. In fact, the Commission has identified Inspector Dogar among the crowd some distance from Ms Bhutto’s vehicle.

Contrary to the police assertion, there was no police-provided box formation around Ms Bhutto as she arrived at the rally, and the Elite Force unit did not execute their duties as specified in the security deployment. Furthermore, the Commission does not believe that the full escort as described by the police was ever present.

91. At about 1516 hours, Ms Bhutto’s convoy stopped for a few minutes at the inner gate of the parking area waiting for that gate to be opened, during which Ms Bhutto remained standing through the escape hatch. The police and some PPP members disagree as to the reason for the delay in opening the gate. While the PPP asserts that the police did not have the key to open the gate, the police said that they did not want the large crowd following Ms Bhutto to get into the VIP parking area.

Altogether, Ms Bhutto stood through the escape hatch for the approximately 20 minutes it took to drive from the Murree Road – Liaquat Road junction to the gate of the parking area. This calls into question the claim of the Rawalpindi District Police that they were surprised when Ms Bhutto emerged from the escape hatch on her way out of Liaquat Bagh.

92. Once the convoy passed through the inner gate, at about 1531 hours, it drove through the VIP parking area to the rear of the stage. At least the following three vehicles were in the VIP parking area: Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser, Mr Kaira’s lead vehicle and the black bullet-proof Mercedes-Benz car. Temporary wooden stairs had been built for the rally to access the rear of the stage directly from the parking area.

Ms Bhutto climbed the stairs, went to the stage to wave to the crowd and took her seat before addressing the crowd.

93. Near the rear of the stage, a scuffle broke out between some workers of the PPP and police who tried to prevent them from climbing to the stage. This created tension between PPP workers and the police officers posted in that area. Accounts given by PPP representatives and the police with regard to the degree and nature of this event differ significantly. The police state that the dispute was minor and was settled immediately, whereas some on the local PPP side claim it was serious and led to bitter reactions from the police during the rest of the rally. They say that the police felt insulted and became more passive in their security role. The Commission finds that the police were indeed passive in their provision of security and believes it unprofessional if the Rawalpindi District Police reduced their level of alert to any degree as a result of wounded pride.

Exit from Liaquat Bagh

94. Several thousand people attended the event. Ms Bhutto was joined on the stage by a number of national-level PPP leaders and all of the parliamentary candidates from Rawalpindi district. The crowds were enthusiastic, and PPP leaders and activists considered the event to have been a great success. They say Ms Bhutto gave a strong and rousing speech, one of the best of her campaign, and describe her as having been radiant that day.

95. The public gathering concluded and, at about 1710 hours, Ms Bhutto descended the wooden stairs and entered her Land Cruiser. The occupants of the Land Cruiser and their seating positions were the same as for the trip in to Liaquat Bagh. The composition of passengers in the black Mercedes-Benz car also remained the same.

96. The black bullet-proof Mercedes-Benz car was the first to leave the parking area. It is not clear how much distance there was between this vehicle and the rest of Ms Bhutto’s convoy at the moment of the blast. Credible reports range from 100 meters to 250 meters. Some of those in the car said that they were close enough to Ms Bhutto’s vehicle to feel the impact of the blast. Others at the site of the blast have said that the Mercedes-Benz left Liaquat Bagh so quickly that it was nowhere to be seen when the blast occurred. Indeed, the Commission has not seen this vehicle in the many video images of the exit area it reviewed. Despite the acknowledgement of some occupants of the vehicle that they felt the impact of the blast, the Commission finds it incredible that they drove all the way to Zardari House, a drive of about 20 minutes, before they became aware that Ms Bhutto had been injured in the blast.

They should have stopped at a safe distance when they felt the blast so as to check on Ms Bhutto’s condition, the condition of her vehicle and whether the back-up vehicle was required. Indeed, as the back-up vehicle, the Mercedes-Benz car would have been an essential element of Ms Bhutto’s convoy on the return trip even if the occupants of that car had confirmed that Ms Bhutto had been unscathed in the attack.

97. Mr Kaira’s vehicle was the next to leave the inner parking area after the Mercedes-Benz car, with Ms Bhutto’s vehicle right behind it, followed by another of Mr Kaira’s vehicles. The two Vigo pick-up trucks then followed from the outer parking area located between the inner and outer gates.

98. At 1712 hours, Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser exited from the outer gate. Crowds of people who were already on Liaquat Road drew closer to the vehicle as it began to turn right onto Liaquat Road. In addition, many people left the park, swelling the crowd around the Land Cruiser, contrary to the police assertion that they did not allow anyone to leave the park before the departure of Ms Bhutto’s convoy. Ms Bhutto emerged through the escape hatch of the vehicle and started waving to her supporters. When the vehicle approached the central road divider, it was slowed further by the crowd.

99. Major Imtiaz, who was sitting in the front seat of the Land Cruiser, said that he was worried that the convoy was being slowed down by the crowd. He wanted to call CPO Saud Aziz by cell phone, but he did not have the CPO’s direct number. Instead he called CPO Saud Aziz’s operator and the operator at the police station in Multan, another town in Punjab Province (where Major Imtiaz had recently served). The Commission finds that this lack of preparation was a major flaw in the security arrangements and reflects badly on the professionalism of Major Imtiaz who should have had full and rapid access to the Rawalpindi police command.

100. Questions remain as to the nature of the crowd that gathered around the Land Cruiser. Passengers in the Land Cruiser and some local PPP members recalled that they were mostly PPP workers, and they did not see any strangers or irregular movements among them. The Rawalpindi District Police and other PPP members, however, suggested that a group of people had deliberately stood in front of the Land Cruiser to prevent it from moving. Regardless of the accuracy of either account, it remains that the police did not control the crowd outside of Liaquat Bagh. As a result, the attacker was able to get as close as he did to Ms Bhutto’s vehicle.

101. The Rawalpindi police authorities and some PPP workers dispute the exact exit route agreed for Ms Bhutto’s convoy. The Rawalpindi District Police and DCO Elahi claim that the planned route for the convoy was to turn right onto Liaquat Road and then left onto Murree Road, retracing the convoy’s entry route. Only in case of an emergency was the convoy to make a left turn after exiting from the outer gate; a decision to take the emergency route had to be made by the senior police officer in charge of security on the scene. Some local PPP workers who attended the preparatory meeting with the police disagree with this account. They claim that the original plan was to make a left turn onto Liaquat Road and that the minutes provided by the DCO, which did not indicate this left turn, were inaccurate. In any event, photographs show two stationary police vehicles on Liaquat Road blocking the left- side drive lane where the left turn would have been made. As a result, even in an emergency, it would have been impossible for Ms Bhutto’s convoy to make a left turn and use the escape route unless those police vehicles were quickly moved. The Commission learned that these vehicles were official vehicles of senior Rawalpindi police officers. The Commission finds it irresponsible that these vehicles were parked in such a way as to block the emergency exit route.

102. The Rawalpindi District Police claim that police vehicles from the Elite Force unit headed by ASP Ashfaq Anwar were waiting outside the outer gate to escort Ms Bhutto’s convoy and that they were about to go into a protective box formation when the attack on Ms Bhutto took place. However, forming the box at this point was impracticable given the narrow width of Liaquat Road and the number of people who had already started to surround Ms Bhutto’s vehicle. In any event, video footage shows very few uniformed police on the scene available to push back the crowd to create space for the box formation. Furthermore, video and photographs taken shortly before the blast as well as Commission interviews indicate that the Elite Force unit was not in position to go into a box formation. The Elite Force unit was in place neither for the entry nor the exit of the convoy and did not afford the protection they were tasked with, thus failing spectacularly in their duty.

103. Overall, video and photographic materials as well as the Commission’s interviews establish that there were very few police deployed outside the outer gate and on Liaquat Road as Ms Bhutto’s convoy attempted to depart the scene.

The Attack

104. From the exit, Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser started to make a right turn onto Liaquat Road. As it slowly approached the central divider on Liaquat Road, the crowd began chanting slogans. There is some dispute over whether Ms Bhutto made the decision to stand up on her own or was urged to do so. Before she stood up, Ms Bhutto asked Ms Naheed Khan to make a phone call to Mr Nawaz Sharif, PML-N leader, to convey condolences for the deaths of some of his supporters who had been shot during the PML-N rally earlier that day. It had been reported that the shooting incident occurred between supporters of the PML-N and those of the PML-Q parties.

105. While Ms Khan was trying to reach Mr Sharif, Ms Bhutto stopped her and asked Senator Abbasi, who was sitting in the rear seat, to chant slogans to the crowd using the vehicle’s loudspeaker. Ms Bhutto then stood on the seat and appeared through the escape hatch, with her head and shoulders exposed.

106. Ms Bhutto waved to the crowd. The vehicle continued to move slowly into its right turn onto Liaquat Road. At this point, a man wearing dark glasses appeared in the crowd on the left side of the Land Cruiser. Around 1714 hours, while the vehicle continued into its right turn, the man pulled out a pistol, and from a distance of approximately two to three meters, fired three shots at Ms Bhutto. According to video analysis conducted by Scotland Yard, the three shots were fired in less than one second.

107. The Commission examined video footage taken from a back angle, which shows Ms Bhutto’s dupatta, her white head covering, and her hair flick upwards after the second shot. However, there is no evidence of a link between the second shot and that movement. After the third shot, she started to move down into the vehicle.

108. After the third shot, the gunman lowered the gun, looked down and then detonated the explosives. At the time of the blast, the gunman was near the left rear corner of the vehicle. Video footage shows that at the time of the explosion, the Land Cruiser was still making the right turn. The Scotland Yard team’s analysis shows that it took 1.6 seconds from the time of the first shot to the detonation of the bomb.

In the Land Cruiser

109. Ms Naheed Khan recalled that immediately after she had heard the three gunshots, Ms Bhutto fell down into the vehicle onto her lap. Ms Khan said that she felt the impact of the explosion immediately thereafter. The right side of Ms Bhutto’s head came to rest on Ms Khan’s lap. Ms Khan saw that Ms Bhutto was bleeding profusely from the right side of her head. She noticed that Ms Bhutto was not moving and saw that blood was also trickling from her ear. Makhdoom Amin Fahim recalled that Ms Bhutto fell heavily and showed no sign of life after falling.

According to Scotland Yard’s video analysis, the flash of the blast appeared just over two-thirds of a second after Ms Bhutto disappeared from view.

110. No one else in her vehicle was seriously injured.

Transfer to the Hospital

111. After the explosion, Senator Abbasi told the driver to drive to the hospital (initially having in mind a hospital in Islamabad). Although all four of its tires were punctured by the blast, the Land Cruiser managed to drive along Liaquat Road for approximately 300 meters towards the junction with Murree Road where it turned left. As the Land Cruiser moved along Murree Road, it became increasingly difficult for the driver to manoeuvre on the metal rims of the wheels. The Land Cruiser made a U-turn at the Rehmanabad junction, located approximately four kilometres from the Liaquat Road-Murree Road junction, in order to get to the other side of the road where Rawalpindi General Hospital (RGH) was located. The occupants of the Land Cruiser recalled that at this point there was only one traffic police vehicle ahead of the Land Cruiser. No other vehicles were visible – neither the bullet proof black Mercedes-Benz car nor any Elite Force unit vehicle. Following the U-turn, the Land Cruiser stalled. The party had to wait for some time on Murree Road until a private vehicle that belonged to Ms Sherry Rehman arrived and took Ms Bhutto to the hospital.

In the process of a putting together an iPhone Application about vehicle attacks I came across this You Tube video. It is a re-enactment of the 1978 Moro kidnapping.  At the time, the kidnapping of the highly respected elder statesman of Italian politics, Aldo Moro, shocked the world. This incident would be similar to the kidnapping of one of our former Presidents. Although the Moro attack occurred more than 30 years ago it is still a lesson learned scenario.  

This event (plus the Schleyer ambush) had a profound effect on the security community. To gain an understanding of the historical significance of this attack we need to examine the security industry the 70’s.

Some History – During the 1970’s these types of attacks had been occurring often in South America, the prevailing attitude was that it would never spread beyond those borders.  Although the terrorism experts at the time (there were maybe three of them), had all been predicting this type of attack was going to spread, and become prolific. No one paid much attention to them, and the general feeling was that the terrorist were not that good – and that if you put a guy with gun sitting next to the chauffer, and maybe some guys with more guns in a vehicle following the boss the problem is solved. At the time the general thinking of the non security community was that the enemy was not that smart.  The following is an actual comment from an executive “After all we are dealing with unsophisticated rabble”.

 Lessons –  Moro was one of the attacks that brought to light that terrorist actually plan what they do. You can see from this re-enactment that these guys, and girl, had their act together.

This was one of the attacks that made the “powers to be” come to the conclusion that –

 Having guys with guns with the boss doesn’t solve the problem – it creates a different problem

 We ought to train those guys that are protecting the principal – drivers and shooters should be trained to drive and shoot

Armored cars are a good thing – we are talking about 1970’s armored cars that were a lot less sophisticated than they are now.

The protection team was expendable

 This is a question – not a comment – have things changed that much in thirty years?  What do you think?

By Joe Autera

One of the many challenges that corporate security professionals face is maintaining adequate security for their executives and other key personnel as they go about their daily business. Often times, these challenges are far greater when those folks are traveling beyond the umbrella of protection that has been established for them in and around their residence, their workplace and while moving between these familiar locations. But what happens when they are visiting an out-of state (or overseas) facility? Or attending a meeting in a city where the company has no presence? We’ve all heard the stories of executives getting in the wrong car at some unfamiliar airport or, worse yet, hailing a cab when they can’t seem to find the driver hired to take them to that meeting and, on more than one occasion, listened as a corporate pilot or personal assistant recounts how some executive was picked-up ramp side by some nefarious looking character in a vehicle that was better suited for the scrap pile than carrying passengers.

When issues like this arise, they aren’t necessarily the fault of the person who was responsible for arranging the transportation, though they often bear the brunt of it. Larger transportation companies often boast of how many cities they cover, when in reality they sub-contract a large portion of their work out to independent operators, especially in cities with low volumes of business. Now, with the advent of the internet and pre-packaged web sites it’s all too easy for someone, say the independent driver with a single twelve year old sedan, to portray themselves as something other than what they are, like a high end, professional car service with modern cars and equipment. Complacency also plays a part in some of the problems that arise with ground transportation, particularly in smaller companies as they tend to rely on vendors simply because they’re the ones they have always used, even though the company’s needs may have changed dramatically.

Today, finding the right transportation provider is becoming even more complicated as a shifting economy and negative media attention have raised the profile and increased the security risks for many corporations and their executives while, at the same time, budgets are being cut and cost saving measures are being implemented across the board. All of this places an even greater importance on ensuring that contract ground transportation providers are not the weak link in your security program and that your company is getting what it pays for.

Regardless of whether risk management (security) or cost effectiveness is the driving factor in the decision making process, given what’s at stake – the safety and security of some of the company’s valuable assets – the need for a formal vetting process for transportation providers has never been greater. When properly documented, the results of such a process will prove useful in identifying which provider truly offers the better value, as opposed to the best price.

The framework for a ground transportation provider vetting process, that has proven to be useful for corporate security decision makers and satisfies most basic due diligence requirements is outlined below.

1. Verify vendors financial standing through third party service (Dunn & Bradstreet, Hoover’s, etc.)
2. Verify vendor holds proper operating licenses – transportation, security or both – for all locales they will be providing service in.  
3. Verify insurance (require that their broker provide ACORD certificates of insurance directly to you).
4. Establish contractual requirements for minimum coverage levels, require notification of any change in status or coverage
5. Check for and review current and past civil or criminal case filings in all locales where vendor operates – not just those where they will be servicing your account (use data mining service such as LexisNexis, Choicepoint, etc.)
6. Check with Better Business Bureau, or similar agency, for complaints in all locales where vendor operates – not just those where they will be servicing your account
7. Review vendors hiring practices (minimum qualifications, requisite experience etc. Require proof of compliance (i.e. sampling of documentation/credentials of new or recent hires as well as long term employees).
8. Review vendors training requirements (type of programs, frequency of training). Require proof of compliance (again, a sampling of documentation pertaining to current employees)
9. Review vendor’s maintenance and vehicle replacement program or policies, require proof of compliance (i.e. sampling of documentation for specific vehicles). For example, we are aware of at least one transportation provider that replaces all vehicles at 30K miles and has a strict maintenance schedule
10. Ensure vendor  has capability to fully support your security needs (i.e. drivers with specialized security training – not just off-duty police officers) through client references and review of appropriate documentation

As with any other vetting process the operative phrase is “trust, but verify”. When it comes to documentation and references, you want to take every step possible to ensure the accuracy and legitimacy of the information provided by contacting references directly, getting documentation directly from the source (i.e. the insurance broker), and establishing a contractual right to request further documentation, updated information or to perform periodic inspections, at your discretion.

While there is a lot to be said for dealing with larger, more established vendors there are some downsides as well (high turnover, less clout for your company, less emphasis on customer service, etc.) and if you happen to be in need of more specialized services – like experienced security drivers or drivers with BLS/AED certification, specially-equipped vehicles or the like – dealing with a smaller company with a shorter track record may be the only option available. If security is the deciding factor you may be best served by dealing with one of the few local or regional companies that provide a bona fide secure ground transportation service. Of course, regardless of how large or small the service providers business may be, a thorough vetting process will help guard against costly and embarrassing problems further down the road.

DESIGNING DRIVING EXERCISES

The purpose of  placing a student in a given exercise or scenario is to evoke a response from the driver/vehicle which introduces or reinforces specific skills or skill sets , and to afford an opportunity to coach the student on applying those skills and, of course, measure their baseline performance and quantify their improvement. None of this can be accomplished without understanding of vehicle dynamics. This understanding leads to questions that a professional driving instructor asks and can provide answers to:

 How far apart are the cones in the slalom?

What is the width of the barrier in the lane change?

What is the maximum capability of the vehicle, measured in G’s, in each exercise?

What is the maximum rate of de-acceleration of the vehicle?

At what speed does the student approach the vehicles maximum capability in each  exercise (or scenario) that you place them in?

Why are the answers to these questions so important? Because if the instructor does not know the maximum capability of the vehicle and what conditions and/or limitations an exercise will impose on that vehicle, it is impossible to measure the capability of the driver. And if the instructor cannot determine what the driver was capable of at the beginning of their training and then compare that to what the student is capable of at the conclusion of their training, there is no way to determine if the training was effective; in fact, there is no way to establish and meet objective goals for the training.  Perhaps more importantly, without measuring the student’s capability there is simply no way for them to fully recognize what they can, and cannot, do behind the wheel.

 Ultimately, you cannot separate vehicle dynamics from driver training; hence instructors MUST have a thorough understanding of vehicle dynamics and the ability to apply that knowledge to driver training.  Because once they have that understanding, they then have the ability to provide training that incorporates the three critical factors of survivability behind-the-wheel emergencies – the driver, the vehicle and the environment – into exercises that not only provide a mechanism for measuring the driver’s improvement, but also closely replicate the types of emergencies he or she is likely to face.

 For an example of just how advantageous this understanding  can be to the instructor, we  just need to look  back at a an Instructor-level Vehicle Dynamics and Exercise Design program TSVDI conducted for a Federal Agency. When we passed out the calculators (standard issue for the vehicle dynamics savvy instructor), one of the students was looking at the calculator like a monkey might look at a watch – confused. It wasn’t long before he came up to Tony and expressed his displeasure that he would have to learn math to pass the course. He, like many others we have trained, pointed out that during his high school days; (with some it even extends into their college days) math was the bane of his existence. In a roundabout way he made the point that he was concerned that he would not pass the course because of the math. Tony’s answer was the same for him as it has been for scores of others with the same concern – hang in for a few days, and give it your best shot, while we give our best shot to teaching you the math.

 Three days later, as we were on the track designing a training exercise to recreate a specific incident that involved their unique vehicles and the difference a new found knowledge of math and vehicle dynamics made was quite obvious. Tony had put together some guidelines for the students regarding the exercise design elements, and this same guy that had , just a couple of days before, been concerned about passing the course walks up to him  and says “I don’t agree with the way you suggested we design this exercise”. He then proceeded to walk Tony through nearly a full page of calculations he had worked out to express how he thought the exercise should be designed and thoroughly explained why he thought that. In just a few days this instructor had gone from being intimidated by the math required to design driving exercises to combining his knowledge of the laws of physics (and, god forbid, math)  with his operational knowledge of the agencies mission objectives, the unique vehicles they operated and the types of incidents they had faced in the past to develop an exemplary driving exercise; one in which the drivers capability to resolve the problem while maintaining control of the vehicle was able to be objectively measured and, more importantly, drivers would be able to recognize that they were fully capable of resolving successfully.

 At the end of the day, that is the real value provided by an instructor who understands vehicle dynamics and how they apply to drivers training.