SecurityDriver News

Although an advertisement for the armored car company Centigon, this is a good and I would imagine expensive video depicting a vehicle attack. Not sure of level of protection and the type of rounds fired etc.

In light of all the discussion concerning the assassination in Mexico – I thought I would go over my thoughts on Kill Zones. 

Since being in the Kill Zone can Ahhhhh kill you – you should

            Understand what they are

            How to stay out of them

            And if you get in one – how to get out of them

            If you can’t get out – how to put up one hell of a fight – but keep in mind why they are called Kill Zones 

Understand what they are – This isn’t brain surgery – A Kill Zone is a time distance relationship – how much time do I have and how much distance do I have. If you attend a “Security Driving School”, and they don’t talk about this concept – ask for your money back.

How to stay out of them – First and foremost – the best way to avoid an ambush, hence the kill zone, is don’t be there when it happens. There are plenty of people who are an ambush looking for a place to happen, just hope they are driving the same roads you are. 

If you haven’t done it already, take a course that has a heavy emphasis on Surveillance Detection – Route Surveys, and Advancing. 

And if you get in one – how to get out of them – Driving out of the kill zone is an exercise in the laws of physics and is a measurable skill. These are not skills you learn sitting in the back seat of a vehicle driving around a race track. The only skill you learn sitting in the back seat is how to projectile vomit out the back window. Again – If you attend a Security Driving School and they don’t talk – demonstrate – practice – objectively measure your skill to escape the Kill Zone – ask for your money back.           

If you can’t get out – how to put up one hell of a fight. This is where shooting skills meet driving skills – there are shooting schools that emphasize these skills – but keep in mind why they are called Kill Zones

The upcoming International Executive Protection Conference in Las Vegas August 6-8 is adding a panel discussion on Protective Operations in Mexico. The change in the agenda is the result of the recent assassination of the gubernatorial candidate Rodolfo Torre Cantu in Tamaulipas, Mexico. Many view the assassination as a declaration of war on the state. This assassination is of enormous interest to those of us engaged in security services in Mexico.  

We are collecting information from those who have firsthand knowledge of the assassination. Using that information we will develop an analysis of the event, and I will introduce the panel with a diagnosis of the assassination. My first impression is that it will be a “lessons learned” attack that will be used in the training environment for years to come.

The panel members include: Dan Johnson, of Risk Control Strategies, Craig Dischinger and Cory Smith of Target’s Executive Services Division and Chuck Mauldin, Manager of Special Services for Wal-Mart’s Global Security Aviation & Travel will join the panel. Pete Dordal, Managing Director of International Security Operations for Garda World, will moderate.

It is the opinion of ESI and I concur, that the outcome of the struggle in Mexico is every bit as important as the war in Afghanistan. It is on our borders and there are tens of thousands of gang members in every city in America that are affiliated with the drug cartels in Mexico.

Hope to see you the conference.

Got this email from Sean Wang of International Armored Group, Sean was responding the May 9^th VR Armored Vehicle Classification Post

Sean wanted to elaborate a bit more on the issue. Here is what he had to say.

 Basically, the BRV 2009 VR7 certificate validates the vehicle armoring design by putting the vehicle through live ballistic testing.  Anyone can basically purchase certified ballistic steel and ballistic glass and install it on a vehicle, the challenge lies in the design and integration of the armoring so that the passenger cabin is fully sealed to prevent penetration from any projectiles.  Also, please note that under the BRV 2009 standard, VR7 is equivalent to the B6 level of armoring, not B7.  This is a common misconception due to the change in nomenclature.

In my opinion the only way to test an armoured vehicle is by shooting at the vehicle. As you can imagine this is expensive. The manufacture destroys the vehicle in the testing process. Take a look at the videos at the end of the article.

 I also wanted to mention that the blast testing is not a part of the BRV 2009 standards, which strictly covers ballistic threats.  Most of our armored vehicles are being used for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq where explosives are the most prominent threat.  Many organizations require certain levels of blast protection as well for their vehicles, which is the reason why we conducted additional testing even though it was not necessary to obtain the VR7 certificate.

 Sean sent along couple of demonstration videos of our vehicle ballistic and blast testing – I’m impressed.

The International Armored Group Web Site

Sean’s email sean.wang@interarmored.com

Protective Driving Operations

3-DAY PROGRAM SEPTEMBER 13-15, 2010
PROTECTIVE DRIVING OPERATIONS
ESI’s TRAINING FACILITY IN COLORADO
$950 (Limited Discount Price)

ESI and Tony Scotti’s VDI will be sponsoring a 3 Day Protective Driving Operations in Grand Junction Colorado.

The course provides participants with a unique opportunity to build upon their existing training and further develop the knowledge, skill and ability required to perform one of the most challenging aspects of protection, providing safe and secure transportation in a high risk environment.

This is accomplished through a series of informative discussions and hands on practical exercises, students will develop an understanding of what the driver/vehicle combination can and, most importantly, cannot do when confronted with a potentially life threatening situation while behind the wheel. An emphasis is placed on how the driver can most effectively manage the limited time and distance available to them as a safety or security incident unfolds.

Classroom discussion will include the role vehicles play in mission strategy and tactics. Students will learn how armored vehicles affects the decision making process, and how to select the proper vehicle for the mission – or how to maximize the effectiveness of the vehicle given.

All hands on exercises are scenario based and designed to train and measure driver ability. Hence students will be objectively tested, and are required to attain a standard. All test and standards are based on the laws of physics as applied to vehicle attacks. The scenarios used during the testing are from case studies of vehicle ambushes.

At the conclusion of the program students will have the knowledge too combine mission objectives, with the vehicles supplied, and if necessary, have the skills needed to escape the Kill Zone.

CLASSROOM

DYNAMICS OF A VEHICLE EMERGENCY

CASE STUDIES OF VEHICLE ATTACKS

ROADSIDE BOMBS

KILL ZONE THEORY

TACTICS AND SECURITY VEHICLES

ARMORED VEHICLES 

HANDS ON EXERCISES

BACKING-UP EXERCISE

ROLLING AMBUSH

ATTACKS AGAINST THE CONVOY

VEHICLE FAMILIARIZATION

RUN FLAT EXERCISE

VEHICLE COMBAT

DRIVE DOWN DRILLS

 For more information contact Brandon Delcamp at 888 718 3105

July 24, 2010

For the protection specialist or security driver the worst-case scenario is a deliberate attempt to stop the vehicle.  Surviving those scenarios requires the ability to keep the vehicle moving and clear the kill zone as quickly as possible – no matter what is happening outside the vehicle.

Focused, Intense, Effective Training

 VDI’s Immediate Action Driving Skills course is designed to provide security practitioners – from the entry-level protection specialist to highly experienced private sector, military and law enforcement professionals - the training and experience needed to deal with the worst-case scenario, a vehicle ambush. Where survival comes down to the driver’s ability to respond instinctively to the threat, when the difference between success and failure is measured in tenths of a second. 

This one day course provides students with an opportunity to:

 - Learn from professionals with real world experience

 - Experience the realities of driving through a kill zone        

 - Understand how to effectivelyoperate damaged vehicles

 Students will gain hands-on, practical experience in:

 - Pushing through roadblocks - (One & two vehicle ramming)

 - Defeating rolling ambushes - (PIT/Counter-PIT techniques)

 - Dealing with an incapacitated driver – (Driving from passenger seat)

 - Forced lane excursions – (Surface transitions)

For addtional information
Joseph Autera
Tony Scotti’s Vehicle Dynamics Institute
Tel: 732 738-5221
Cell : 732–586-4020   email: jautera@vehicledynamics.net

Or Tony Scotti
781 395 3097 email tonyscotti@securitydriver.com

Another must read report from Stratfor

Thanks to Scott Stewart for writing it and a major thank you to Stratfor for allowing the article to be circulated.

Looking at the world from a protective-intelligence perspective, the theme for the past week has not been improvised explosive devices or potential mass-casualty attacks. While there have been suicide bombings in Afghanistan, alleged threats to the World Cup and seemingly endless post-mortem discussions of the failed May 1 Times Square attack, one recurring and under-reported theme in a number of regions around the world has been kidnapping.

For example, in Heidenheim, Germany, Maria Boegerl, the wife of German banker Thomas Boegerl, was reportedly kidnapped from her home May 12. The kidnappers issued a ransom demand to the family and an amount was agreed upon. Mr. Boegerl placed the ransom payment at the arranged location, but the kidnappers never picked up the money (perhaps suspecting or detecting police involvement). The family has lost contact with the kidnappers, and fear for Mrs. Boegerl’s fate has caused German authorities to launch a massive search operation, which has included hundreds of searchers along with dogs, helicopters and divers.

Two days after the Boegerl kidnapping, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) posted a message on the Internet claiming to have custody of French citizen Michel Germaneau, a retired engineer who had previously worked in Algeria’s petroleum sector. Germaneau was reportedly kidnapped April 22, in northern Niger, close to the border with Mali and Algeria. The AQIM video contained a photo of Germaneau and of his identification card. The group demanded a prisoner exchange and said that French President Nicolas Sarkozy would be responsible for the captive’s well-being.

Also on May 14, Diego Fernandez de Cevallos, a high-profile attorney and former presidential candidate, was kidnapped near his ranch in the Mexican state of Queretaro. Fernandez had left his home in Mexico City to drive to his ranch but never arrived. His vehicle was found abandoned near the ranch on Saturday morning and the vehicle reportedly showed signs of a struggle. It is not known who kidnapped Fernandez or what the motivation for the kidnapping was.

At the moment a kidnapping occurs, the abduction team usually has achieved tactical surprise and usually employs overwhelming force. To the previously unsuspecting victim, the abductors seemingly appear out of nowhere. But when examined carefully, kidnappings are, for the most part, the result of a long and carefully orchestrated process. They do not arise from a vacuum. There are almost always some indications or warnings that the process is in motion prior to the actual abduction, meaning that many kidnappings are avoidable. In light of this reality, let’s take a more detailed look at the phenomenon of kidnappings.

Types of Kidnappings

There are many different types of kidnappings. Although kidnappings for ransom and political kidnappings generate considerable news interest, most kidnappings have nothing to do with money or political statements. They are typically kidnappings conducted by family members in custody disputes, emotionally disturbed strangers wanting to take a child to raise or strangers who abduct a victim for sexual exploitation.

Even in financially motivated kidnappings, there are a number of different types. The stereotypical kidnapping of a high-value target comes most readily to mind, but there are also more spur-of-the-moment express kidnappings, where a person is held until his bank account can be drained using an ATM card, and even virtual kidnappings, where no kidnapping occurs at all but the victim is frightened by a claim that a loved one has been kidnapped and pays a ransom to the alleged abductors. Some of the piracy incidents in Somalia also move into the economic kidnapping realm, especially in cases where the crew or passengers are seen as being more valuable than the boat or its cargo.

Since kidnapping is such a broad topic, for the sake of this discussion, we will focus primarily on kidnappings that are financially motivated and those that are politically motivated. Financially motivated kidnappings can be conducted by a variety of criminal elements. At the highest level are highly trained professional kidnapping gangs that specialize in abducting high-net-worth individuals and who will frequently demand ransoms in the millions of dollars. Such groups often employ teams of specialists who carry out a variety of specific tasks such as collecting intelligence, conducting surveillance, snatching the target, negotiating with the victim’s family and establishing and guarding the safe-houses.

At the other end of the spectrum are gangs that randomly kidnap targets of opportunity. These gangs are generally far less skilled than the professional gangs and often will hold a victim for only a short time, as in an express kidnapping. Sometimes express kidnapping victims are held in the trunk of a car for the duration of their ordeal, which can sometimes last for days if the victim has a large amount in a checking account and a small daily ATM withdrawal limit. Other times, if an express kidnapping gang discovers it has grabbed a high-value target by accident, the gang will hold the victim longer and demand a much higher ransom. Occasionally, these express kidnapping groups will even “sell” a high-value victim to a more professional kidnapping gang. (On a side note, most express kidnapping victims tend to be male and are most frequently abducted while walking on the street after dark, and many have impaired their senses by consuming alcohol.)

In the United States, it is far more common for a relatively poor person to be kidnapped for financial motives than it is for a high-net-worth individual. This is because kidnapping groups frequently target groups of illegal immigrants, who they believe are far less likely to seek help from the authorities. In some cases, the police have found dozens of immigrant hostages being held in safe-houses.

Between the two extremes of kidnapping groups — those targeting the rich and those targeting the poor — there is a wide range of kidnapping gangs that might target a bank vice president or branch manager rather than the bank’s CEO, or that might kidnap the owner of a restaurant or other small business rather than an industrialist.

In the realm of political kidnappings, there are abductions that are very well-planned, such as the December 1981 kidnapping of Gen. James Dozier by the Italian Red Brigades, or Hezbollah’s March 1985 kidnapping of journalist Terry Anderson. However, there are also opportunistic cases of politically motivated kidnappings, such as when foreigners are abducted at a Taliban checkpoint in Afghanistan or AQIM militants grab a European tourist in the Sahel area of Africa. Of course, in the case of both the Taliban and AQIM, the groups see kidnapping as an important source of funding as well as a politically useful tool.

Understanding the Process

In deliberate (as opposed to opportunistic) kidnappings based on financial or political motives, the kidnappers generally follow a process that is very similar to what we call the terrorist attack cycle: target selection, planning, deployment, attack, escape and exploitation. In a kidnapping, this means the group must identify a victim; plan for the abduction, captivity and negotiation; conduct the abduction and secure the hostage; successfully leverage the life of the victim for financial or political gain; and then escape.

During some phases of this process, the kidnappers may not be visible to the target, but there are several points during the process when the kidnappers are forced to expose themselves to detection in order to accomplish their mission. Like the perpetrators of a terrorist attack, those planning a kidnapping are most vulnerable to detection while they are conducting surveillance — before they are ready to deploy and conduct their attack. As we have noted several times in past analyses, one of the secrets of countersurveillance is that most criminals are not very good at conducting surveillance. The primary reason they succeed is that no one is looking for them.

Of course, kidnappers are also very easy to spot once they launch their attack, pull their weapons and perhaps even begin to shoot. By this time, however, it might very well be too late to escape their attack. They will have selected their attack site and employed the forces they believe they need to overpower their victim and complete the operation. While the kidnappers could botch their operation and the target could escape unscathed, it is simply not practical to pin one’s hopes on that possibility. It is clearly better to spot the kidnappers early and avoid their trap before it is sprung and the guns come out.

Kidnappers, like other criminals, look for patterns and vulnerabilities that they can exploit. Their chances for success increase greatly if they are allowed to conduct surveillance at will and are given the opportunity to thoroughly assess the security measures (if any) employed by the target. We have seen several cases in Mexico in which the criminals even chose to attack despite security measures such as armored cars and armed security guards. In such cases, criminals attack with adequate resources to overcome existing security. For example, if there are protective agents, the attackers will plan to neutralize them first. If there is an armored vehicle, they will find ways to defeat the armor or grab the target when he or she is outside the vehicle. Because of this, criminals must not be allowed to conduct surveillance at will. Potential targets should practice a heightened but relaxed state of situational awareness that will help them spot hostile surveillance.

Potential targets should also conduct simple pattern and route analyses to determine where they are most predictable and vulnerable. Taking an objective look at your schedule and routes is really not as complicated as it may seem. While the ideal is to vary routes and times to avoid predictable locations, this is also difficult and disruptive and warranted only when the threat is extremely high. A more practical alternative is for potential targets to raise their situational awareness a notch as they travel through such areas at predictable times.

Of course, using the term “potential targets” points to another problem. Many kidnapping victims simply don’t believe they are potential targets until after they have been kidnapped, and therefore do not take commonsense security measures. Frequently, when such people are debriefed after their release from captivity, they are able to recall suspicious activity before their abduction that they did not take seriously because they did not consider themselves targets. One American businessman who was kidnapped in Central America said upon his release that he knew there was something odd about the behavior of a particular couple he saw frequently sitting on a park bench near his home prior to his kidnapping, but he didn’t think he was rich enough to be targeted for kidnapping. As soon as he was abducted, he said that he immediately knew that the awkward couple had been observing him to determine his pattern. He said that he often thought about that couple during his two months in captivity, and how a little bit of curiosity could have saved him from a terrifying ordeal and his family a substantial sum of money.

The same steps involved in a deliberate kidnapping are also followed in ad hoc, opportunistic kidnappings — though the steps may be condensed and accomplished in seconds or minutes rather than the weeks or months normally associated with a well-planned kidnapping operation. And the same problems with lack of awareness often apply. It is not uncommon to talk to someone who was involved in an express kidnapping and hear the person say, “I got a bad feeling about those three guys standing near that car when I started walking down that block, but I kept walking anyway.” This frequent occurrence highlights the importance of situational awareness, attack recognition and proper mindset maintenance.

Potential targets do not have to institute security measures that will make them invulnerable to such crimes — something that is very difficult and that can be very expensive. Rather, the objective is to take measures that make them a harder target than other members of the specific class of individuals to which they belong. Groups conducting pre-operational surveillance, whether for an intentional kidnapping or an opportunistic kidnapping, prefer a target that is unaware and easy prey. Taking some basic security measures such as maintaining a healthy state of situational awareness will, in many cases, cause the criminals to choose another target who is less aware and therefore more vulnerable.

Also, most people who are kidnapped in places like Afghanistan or the Sahel know they are going into dangerous places and disregard the warnings not to go to those places. Many of these people, like journalists and aid workers, take the risk as part of their jobs. Others, like the European tourists abducted in the Sahel (and some of the pleasure boaters kidnapped by Somali pirates), appear to naively disregard the risk or to be thrill-seekers. In the recent Germaneau case in Niger, due to the number of highly publicized kidnappings in the Sahel region over the past eight years, and Germaneau’s personal history of working in Algeria, it would be hard to argue that he did not know what he could be getting himself into (though we are unsure at this point what motivated him to run that risk). After Germaneau’s kidnapping, his driver was subsequently arrested, raising the possibility that he was somehow complicit in the abduction. This is a reminder that it is not at all unusual for kidnapping gangs to have inside help, whether a maid, bodyguard, interpreter or taxi driver.

In retrospect, almost every person who is kidnapped either missed or ignored some indication or warning of danger. These warnings can range from observable criminal behavior to a consular information bulletin specifically warning people not to drive outside of cities in Guatemala after dark, for example. This means that, while kidnapping can be a devastating crime, it can also be an avoidable one.

Malcolm Cheshire asked, via LinkedIn – “What is the VR armored vehicle classification and how does it differ from the other classifications”

 This is what I came up with

This is taken from an article I read.

  In order to address the issue of full vehicle certification, the VPAM BRV 1999 standard   was initially created, ranging from VR1 to VR7 (equivalent to B1 to B7 level of    protection).  Since then, a new and updated standard called the VPAM BRV 2009 (VR1 to  VR10) has been created with more stringent testing requirements.  The VR certification requires the entire armored vehicle to be subject to a comprehensive destructive testing process with multiple shots on the vehicle to ensure that the armoring will withstand the appropriate type of ammunition that it is rated for.

The most notable difference between the BRV2009 and BRV 1999 is that under the new standard, the firewall, windscreen, side panels, rear, gaps/apertures, and roof areas can be shot from any angle, whereas the older standard only required test shots to be fired from a 90 degree angle (45-60 degree angle for the roof).

The testing is still conducted by Beschussamt Mellrichstadt. This is the 2009 Standard - you will have to go to a computer translator to get in English.

Although it is an advertisement for BMW High Security Vehicles – this You Tube video is still a good primer on armored cars.

A UN report on the assassination of Pakistani Prime Minister Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto has been widely circulated. It is fairly long, 54 pages. I have taken the section that deals with the “Day of the Assassination”. When we have some time we will offer our opinion of what happened and developed a lessons learned. In the interim I am sure the the community would welcome any comments. It’s long but filled with good info.

 “The Day of the Assassination”

Departure from Zardari House for Liaquat Bagh

86. Around 1400 hours, Ms Bhutto left Zardari House, for Liaquat Bagh, in a convoy of vehicles. The convoy consisted of a black Toyota Land Cruiser used by Mr Tauqir Kaira, followed by Ms Bhutto’s white armoured Land Cruiser and two of Mr Kaira’s vehicles on either side of Ms Bhutto’s vehicle. The latter two were a Mercedes-Benz van on the right and a four-door double cabin vehicle on the left.

Immediately behind those vehicles were two Toyota Vigo pick-up trucks, positioned side by side. A black Mercedes-Benz car was behind these Vigos. This Mercedes- Benz, from Zardari House, was bullet-proof and served as the back-up vehicle for Ms Bhutto. The two Vigo pick-up trucks were also from Zardari House.

87. Mr Kaira was inside the lead vehicle with his security men. Accompanying Ms Bhutto in her vehicle were Mr Javed-ur-Rehman (driver, front-left seat), SSP Major (ret) Imtiaz Hussain (front-right seat), Makhdoom Amin Fahim (senior PPP member, second row-left seat), Ms Bhutto (second row-centre seat), Ms Naheed Khan (senior PPP member and political secretary of Ms Bhutto, second row-right seat). Seated in the back of the vehicle on two benches facing each other were Senator Safdar Abbasi (senior PPP member, rear-right bench), Mr Shahenshah (rear-left bench, facing

Senator Abbasi) and Mr Razaq Mirani (personal attendant of Ms Bhutto, rear-right bench next to Senator Abbasi and to his left). Mr Kaira’s two vehicles on either side of Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser carried his men. The Vigo pick-up trucks carried members of Mr Chaudry Aslam’s security team. Riding in the black Mercedes-Benz car were the driver, PPP official Mr Faratullah Babar in the front passenger seat and, in the rear passenger seat from left to right, two PPP officials Mr Babar Awan and Mr Rehman Malik and General (ret) Tauqir Zia.

Arrival at Liaquat Bagh

88. Ms Bhutto’s convoy reached the Faizabad junction at about 1415 hours, according to the Rawalpindi District Police, who were to assume responsibility for security of the convoy. According to the police and the Security Plan, an escort was to be provided composed of a traffic police “pilot” jeep, a regular police jeep leading the convoy and three Elite Force Toyota pick-up trucks protecting Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser on three sides. People in Ms Bhutto’s vehicle claim, however, that there was no such escort except for one traffic police vehicle.

89. At about 1456 hours, Ms Bhutto’s convoy turned right at the Murree Road – Liaquat Road junction and headed towards Liaquat Bagh. Video footage shows Ms Bhutto’s convoy driving from the Murree Road – Liaquat Bagh junction to the inner security gate leading to the VIP parking area at Liaquat Bagh. The footage shows Ms Bhutto standing through the roof escape hatch of her Land Cruiser and waving at the large crowd around the vehicle while it moved slowly on Liaquat Road.

90. Both ASP Ashfaq Anwar who was the supervisor of the Elite Force unit and Inspector Azmat Ali Dogar, the unit’s commander, told the Commission that they accompanied Ms Bhutto all the way to the back of the stage according to the Security Plan. However, video footage and pictures show that as Ms Bhutto drove on much of Liaquat Road, her vehicle was flanked only by her private security vehicles. The Elite Force vehicles were nowhere near her vehicle. In fact, the Commission has identified Inspector Dogar among the crowd some distance from Ms Bhutto’s vehicle.

Contrary to the police assertion, there was no police-provided box formation around Ms Bhutto as she arrived at the rally, and the Elite Force unit did not execute their duties as specified in the security deployment. Furthermore, the Commission does not believe that the full escort as described by the police was ever present.

91. At about 1516 hours, Ms Bhutto’s convoy stopped for a few minutes at the inner gate of the parking area waiting for that gate to be opened, during which Ms Bhutto remained standing through the escape hatch. The police and some PPP members disagree as to the reason for the delay in opening the gate. While the PPP asserts that the police did not have the key to open the gate, the police said that they did not want the large crowd following Ms Bhutto to get into the VIP parking area.

Altogether, Ms Bhutto stood through the escape hatch for the approximately 20 minutes it took to drive from the Murree Road – Liaquat Road junction to the gate of the parking area. This calls into question the claim of the Rawalpindi District Police that they were surprised when Ms Bhutto emerged from the escape hatch on her way out of Liaquat Bagh.

92. Once the convoy passed through the inner gate, at about 1531 hours, it drove through the VIP parking area to the rear of the stage. At least the following three vehicles were in the VIP parking area: Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser, Mr Kaira’s lead vehicle and the black bullet-proof Mercedes-Benz car. Temporary wooden stairs had been built for the rally to access the rear of the stage directly from the parking area.

Ms Bhutto climbed the stairs, went to the stage to wave to the crowd and took her seat before addressing the crowd.

93. Near the rear of the stage, a scuffle broke out between some workers of the PPP and police who tried to prevent them from climbing to the stage. This created tension between PPP workers and the police officers posted in that area. Accounts given by PPP representatives and the police with regard to the degree and nature of this event differ significantly. The police state that the dispute was minor and was settled immediately, whereas some on the local PPP side claim it was serious and led to bitter reactions from the police during the rest of the rally. They say that the police felt insulted and became more passive in their security role. The Commission finds that the police were indeed passive in their provision of security and believes it unprofessional if the Rawalpindi District Police reduced their level of alert to any degree as a result of wounded pride.

Exit from Liaquat Bagh

94. Several thousand people attended the event. Ms Bhutto was joined on the stage by a number of national-level PPP leaders and all of the parliamentary candidates from Rawalpindi district. The crowds were enthusiastic, and PPP leaders and activists considered the event to have been a great success. They say Ms Bhutto gave a strong and rousing speech, one of the best of her campaign, and describe her as having been radiant that day.

95. The public gathering concluded and, at about 1710 hours, Ms Bhutto descended the wooden stairs and entered her Land Cruiser. The occupants of the Land Cruiser and their seating positions were the same as for the trip in to Liaquat Bagh. The composition of passengers in the black Mercedes-Benz car also remained the same.

96. The black bullet-proof Mercedes-Benz car was the first to leave the parking area. It is not clear how much distance there was between this vehicle and the rest of Ms Bhutto’s convoy at the moment of the blast. Credible reports range from 100 meters to 250 meters. Some of those in the car said that they were close enough to Ms Bhutto’s vehicle to feel the impact of the blast. Others at the site of the blast have said that the Mercedes-Benz left Liaquat Bagh so quickly that it was nowhere to be seen when the blast occurred. Indeed, the Commission has not seen this vehicle in the many video images of the exit area it reviewed. Despite the acknowledgement of some occupants of the vehicle that they felt the impact of the blast, the Commission finds it incredible that they drove all the way to Zardari House, a drive of about 20 minutes, before they became aware that Ms Bhutto had been injured in the blast.

They should have stopped at a safe distance when they felt the blast so as to check on Ms Bhutto’s condition, the condition of her vehicle and whether the back-up vehicle was required. Indeed, as the back-up vehicle, the Mercedes-Benz car would have been an essential element of Ms Bhutto’s convoy on the return trip even if the occupants of that car had confirmed that Ms Bhutto had been unscathed in the attack.

97. Mr Kaira’s vehicle was the next to leave the inner parking area after the Mercedes-Benz car, with Ms Bhutto’s vehicle right behind it, followed by another of Mr Kaira’s vehicles. The two Vigo pick-up trucks then followed from the outer parking area located between the inner and outer gates.

98. At 1712 hours, Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser exited from the outer gate. Crowds of people who were already on Liaquat Road drew closer to the vehicle as it began to turn right onto Liaquat Road. In addition, many people left the park, swelling the crowd around the Land Cruiser, contrary to the police assertion that they did not allow anyone to leave the park before the departure of Ms Bhutto’s convoy. Ms Bhutto emerged through the escape hatch of the vehicle and started waving to her supporters. When the vehicle approached the central road divider, it was slowed further by the crowd.

99. Major Imtiaz, who was sitting in the front seat of the Land Cruiser, said that he was worried that the convoy was being slowed down by the crowd. He wanted to call CPO Saud Aziz by cell phone, but he did not have the CPO’s direct number. Instead he called CPO Saud Aziz’s operator and the operator at the police station in Multan, another town in Punjab Province (where Major Imtiaz had recently served). The Commission finds that this lack of preparation was a major flaw in the security arrangements and reflects badly on the professionalism of Major Imtiaz who should have had full and rapid access to the Rawalpindi police command.

100. Questions remain as to the nature of the crowd that gathered around the Land Cruiser. Passengers in the Land Cruiser and some local PPP members recalled that they were mostly PPP workers, and they did not see any strangers or irregular movements among them. The Rawalpindi District Police and other PPP members, however, suggested that a group of people had deliberately stood in front of the Land Cruiser to prevent it from moving. Regardless of the accuracy of either account, it remains that the police did not control the crowd outside of Liaquat Bagh. As a result, the attacker was able to get as close as he did to Ms Bhutto’s vehicle.

101. The Rawalpindi police authorities and some PPP workers dispute the exact exit route agreed for Ms Bhutto’s convoy. The Rawalpindi District Police and DCO Elahi claim that the planned route for the convoy was to turn right onto Liaquat Road and then left onto Murree Road, retracing the convoy’s entry route. Only in case of an emergency was the convoy to make a left turn after exiting from the outer gate; a decision to take the emergency route had to be made by the senior police officer in charge of security on the scene. Some local PPP workers who attended the preparatory meeting with the police disagree with this account. They claim that the original plan was to make a left turn onto Liaquat Road and that the minutes provided by the DCO, which did not indicate this left turn, were inaccurate. In any event, photographs show two stationary police vehicles on Liaquat Road blocking the left- side drive lane where the left turn would have been made. As a result, even in an emergency, it would have been impossible for Ms Bhutto’s convoy to make a left turn and use the escape route unless those police vehicles were quickly moved. The Commission learned that these vehicles were official vehicles of senior Rawalpindi police officers. The Commission finds it irresponsible that these vehicles were parked in such a way as to block the emergency exit route.

102. The Rawalpindi District Police claim that police vehicles from the Elite Force unit headed by ASP Ashfaq Anwar were waiting outside the outer gate to escort Ms Bhutto’s convoy and that they were about to go into a protective box formation when the attack on Ms Bhutto took place. However, forming the box at this point was impracticable given the narrow width of Liaquat Road and the number of people who had already started to surround Ms Bhutto’s vehicle. In any event, video footage shows very few uniformed police on the scene available to push back the crowd to create space for the box formation. Furthermore, video and photographs taken shortly before the blast as well as Commission interviews indicate that the Elite Force unit was not in position to go into a box formation. The Elite Force unit was in place neither for the entry nor the exit of the convoy and did not afford the protection they were tasked with, thus failing spectacularly in their duty.

103. Overall, video and photographic materials as well as the Commission’s interviews establish that there were very few police deployed outside the outer gate and on Liaquat Road as Ms Bhutto’s convoy attempted to depart the scene.

The Attack

104. From the exit, Ms Bhutto’s Land Cruiser started to make a right turn onto Liaquat Road. As it slowly approached the central divider on Liaquat Road, the crowd began chanting slogans. There is some dispute over whether Ms Bhutto made the decision to stand up on her own or was urged to do so. Before she stood up, Ms Bhutto asked Ms Naheed Khan to make a phone call to Mr Nawaz Sharif, PML-N leader, to convey condolences for the deaths of some of his supporters who had been shot during the PML-N rally earlier that day. It had been reported that the shooting incident occurred between supporters of the PML-N and those of the PML-Q parties.

105. While Ms Khan was trying to reach Mr Sharif, Ms Bhutto stopped her and asked Senator Abbasi, who was sitting in the rear seat, to chant slogans to the crowd using the vehicle’s loudspeaker. Ms Bhutto then stood on the seat and appeared through the escape hatch, with her head and shoulders exposed.

106. Ms Bhutto waved to the crowd. The vehicle continued to move slowly into its right turn onto Liaquat Road. At this point, a man wearing dark glasses appeared in the crowd on the left side of the Land Cruiser. Around 1714 hours, while the vehicle continued into its right turn, the man pulled out a pistol, and from a distance of approximately two to three meters, fired three shots at Ms Bhutto. According to video analysis conducted by Scotland Yard, the three shots were fired in less than one second.

107. The Commission examined video footage taken from a back angle, which shows Ms Bhutto’s dupatta, her white head covering, and her hair flick upwards after the second shot. However, there is no evidence of a link between the second shot and that movement. After the third shot, she started to move down into the vehicle.

108. After the third shot, the gunman lowered the gun, looked down and then detonated the explosives. At the time of the blast, the gunman was near the left rear corner of the vehicle. Video footage shows that at the time of the explosion, the Land Cruiser was still making the right turn. The Scotland Yard team’s analysis shows that it took 1.6 seconds from the time of the first shot to the detonation of the bomb.

In the Land Cruiser

109. Ms Naheed Khan recalled that immediately after she had heard the three gunshots, Ms Bhutto fell down into the vehicle onto her lap. Ms Khan said that she felt the impact of the explosion immediately thereafter. The right side of Ms Bhutto’s head came to rest on Ms Khan’s lap. Ms Khan saw that Ms Bhutto was bleeding profusely from the right side of her head. She noticed that Ms Bhutto was not moving and saw that blood was also trickling from her ear. Makhdoom Amin Fahim recalled that Ms Bhutto fell heavily and showed no sign of life after falling.

According to Scotland Yard’s video analysis, the flash of the blast appeared just over two-thirds of a second after Ms Bhutto disappeared from view.

110. No one else in her vehicle was seriously injured.

Transfer to the Hospital

111. After the explosion, Senator Abbasi told the driver to drive to the hospital (initially having in mind a hospital in Islamabad). Although all four of its tires were punctured by the blast, the Land Cruiser managed to drive along Liaquat Road for approximately 300 meters towards the junction with Murree Road where it turned left. As the Land Cruiser moved along Murree Road, it became increasingly difficult for the driver to manoeuvre on the metal rims of the wheels. The Land Cruiser made a U-turn at the Rehmanabad junction, located approximately four kilometres from the Liaquat Road-Murree Road junction, in order to get to the other side of the road where Rawalpindi General Hospital (RGH) was located. The occupants of the Land Cruiser recalled that at this point there was only one traffic police vehicle ahead of the Land Cruiser. No other vehicles were visible – neither the bullet proof black Mercedes-Benz car nor any Elite Force unit vehicle. Following the U-turn, the Land Cruiser stalled. The party had to wait for some time on Murree Road until a private vehicle that belonged to Ms Sherry Rehman arrived and took Ms Bhutto to the hospital.